500.A15A5/497: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)
300. Following is reply prepared by Navy Department and concurred in by this Department, to your No. 478 September 27, 5 p.m., [Page 126] 482 September 28, 1 p.m., 485 October 1, 5 p.m., 486 October 1, 6 p.m., and 508 October 10, 6 p.m.:
“This dispatch is intended as an analysis of and conclusive statement based upon the positions, proposals, and suggestions transmitted in your 478, 482, 485, 486, and 508. The substance of this dispatch should be presented in direct terms to the British, avoiding tentative methods of approach which imply a basis for trading, inasmuch as due to shortness of time we consider it essential to present a final unequivocal position to which we hope a definite and comprehensive statement can be returned.
With regard to capital ships, we can agree with the British suggestion made in your 508 that, subject to British and Japanese concurrence, ‘there should be no new United States, British or Japanese construction whatever with guns larger than 14 inches but that the first two capital ships could be of the present allowed individual maximum displacement’. We concur in their additional comment as to accomplishing an understanding on capital ships involving France, Germany, and Italy. We note with approval your statement of procedure and the reasons therefor set down in the last paragraph of your 486.
We are in general accord with the British proposal for a minimum displacement limit for capital ships at approximately 20,000 tons. We see no objection to the proposed maximum of 22,000 tons with 6.1-inch guns for aircraft carriers.
We make the following comment on your 485: As part of a comprehensive accord on cruisers we may agree not to build, at the present time, 8-inch cruisers except as replacements of the 18 existing ships. Our action as to any increase in 6-inch gun cruisers must be contingent on acceptance of a transfer system which will permit the United States to distribute any category (b) cruiser tonnage in excess of present limitations among other types as needed by us. We stress a general solution of the cruiser problem with moderate transfer clauses because we deem such a solution more susceptible to acceptance by other nations.
We concur in the British statement made in 508 that ‘when the time for such discussion came Britain and America would have no difficulty in coming to a satisfactory mutual agreement’.
We see the logic of the British objection to present treaty qualitative limitations of destroyers but feel that the same end may be gained by arranging for limited transfer between cruisers and destroyers under the method referred to above. We appreciate also the desire of Great Britain for 50,000 tons of over-age destroyers; unfortunately, however, this increase if unrelated to or not included in the desired cruiser increase results in still further increase of total tonnage. We consider that no distinction should be made between over-age and under-age tonnage in any category and that the question should be answered by necessary category increases or, in emergency, by utilization of escape clauses. We do not favor reduction in present characteristics of submarines and consider reduction of that category tonnage as the only feasible method of limiting submarines. We concur generally in the British attitude as to the relationship of destroyer tonnage to submarine tonnage. We suggest for consideration [Page 127] as a means of influencing reduction of submarine tonnage an allowance at a high ratio, for example, three to one, of destroyer tonnage for purposes of defense against submarines on the part of nations who desire to reduce their allowed submarine tonnage.
We have noted the British mention of Article 19 of the Washington Treaty and agree that this is not a subject for discussion at this stage. We concur generally in their statement regarding ‘items from existing naval treaties’; also the statements concerning the reciprocal notification. We concur in the British view as to London Treaty, Part 4, submarine warfare. We concur in the British suggestion of an age limit of 26 years for capital ships.”