711.94/941
The Counselor of Legation in China (Peck) to the Minister in China (Johnson)3
Dear Mr. Minister: I have just received a call from Mr. Li Shengwu, Director of the Department of General Affairs of the Foreign Office, who came under instructions from Dr. Wang Ching-wei, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Li is the officer of the Foreign Office who every afternoon at 6 o’clock goes over with Dr. Wang the day’s budget of reports received in the Ministry and he appears to be the man selected for Dr. Wang’s confidential work.
Mr. Li said that yesterday afternoon Dr. Wang had discussed with him an article in the Shanghai Evening Post of March 22 entitled “Japan and U. S. Move for Peace in Warship Race” and an article in the China Press of March 22 entitled “Japan, U. S. Trade Notes of Goodwill”. Copies of these articles are enclosed herewith.4
In the first article, bearing date line “London, March 22—United Press”, it will be noted that there occur the following passages:
“Japan is seeking in these preliminary negotiations the revision of American immigration laws, the abandonment of American naval air bases and the recognition of Manchukuo in exchange for maintenance of the present 5–5–3 naval ratios, it was learned.…5 In specific return for the proposed American concessions, Japan was believed to be prepared to renounce her insistence on naval parity with the United States and Great Britain at the forthcoming naval conference in 1935.”
In the second article there is presented a news despatch from London, March 21 (Reuters), which states, inter alia:
“In conclusion he says that every effort is being made by the United States to remain friendly with Japan and Japan’s rigid adherence to the doctrine of the Open Door would more than compensate for a certain skepticism on her part regarding the practicability of the Stimson Doctrine, whereby the non-recognition of territories acquired by force is upheld.”
Mr. Li said that the Chinese newspapers are playing up this news with large headlines. (I have already received visits from two Chinese newspaper representatives this morning on this subject.) He remarked that, as I probably knew, the Chinese people were placing great reliance on the United States for the recovery of Manchuria by China, and it would be a calamity if the Chinese public received the impression that the attitude of the American Government in regard to the Manchurian issue was changing. He emphasized the word “attitude”.
Mr. Li said that Dr. Wang’s attention was particularly attracted to the statements in the newspaper reports in question, to the effect that “recognition of Manchukuo” by the United States might become a factor in the discussion between the United States and Japan regarding naval ratios, and in the assertion that the American Government might alter its position in reference to the “Stimson Doctrine”. He transmitted Dr. Wang’s request that I telegraph to you asking that you inquire of the Department of State by telegraph what foundation there was for these reports.
I showed Mr. Li your telegram of February 24, 12 noon, transmitting the Department’s telegram No. 50 of February 23, 2 p.m.,6 which authorized the denial of a report then current that the American Government was considering a change in its attitude regarding the recognition of “Manchukuo”. Mr. Li said that he would inform Dr. Wang of the contents of this message, but he insisted that these later reports were a source of great anxiety to Dr. Wang and the latter would be extremely grateful for such comments as the Department might care to make in regard to them.
I urged that this inquiry be made confidentially through Dr. S. K. Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister in Washington, pointing out that Dr. Sze would be able to obtain much more satisfactory information than could be supplied in a telegram. Mr. Li said that an instruction would be telegraphed to Dr. Sze, but, unfortunately, Dr. Sze is travelling somewhere outside of Washington and can not execute the instruction in the near future.
[Page 90]I then invited Mr. Li’s attention to the self-evident fact that no government could predict what its attitude would be toward a subject like the “recognition of Manchukuo” over a period of years, in view of the impossibility of foreseeing the nature of the circumstances on which it would, necessarily, base its attitude. As an example of a possible change, I mentioned that the Chinese Government, itself, might recognize “Manchukuo”. Mr. Li hastily interjected that this would never happen. I accepted his statement and explained that I had merely used this extreme hypothesis by way of illustration of my meaning. I pointed out that no government could do more than the Department had done in its telegram of February 23, that is, to describe its position at the time an announcement of position is made. Mr. Li concurred in the reasonableness of this position.
Mr. Li wanted to know what I thought of the probability of truth in the press telegrams enclosed herewith. I said that, undoubtedly, there were some outstanding issues between the United States and Japan which, quite conceivably, were being discussed between the Secretary and the Japanese Ambassador. I instanced the immigration question, which I explained to Mr. Li.
I asked Mr. Li, in turn, why China felt that the position of the United States was so important a factor in the “recovery of Manchuria”, and I pointed out that China had appealed to the League of Nations in this regard. Mr. Li replied that in his private editorial capacity, before he joined the Foreign Office, namely two days after the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, he had published the opinion that the League of Nations would be unable to right China’s wrongs or control Japan; this editorial had been widely copied. He remarked that the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. C. T. Wang, had erroneously regarded the League as an “armed Power” able to enforce its decisions. He expressed the personal opinion that the League would be unable to solve the Sino-Japanese controversy, whereas the whole world was watching and would be greatly influenced by the attitude of the United States toward the Manchurian dispute.
I drew Mr. Li’s attention to another aspect of the question, namely, that the intention or ability of the United States to withhold recognition from “Manchukuo” seemed less important than China’s situation in this regard. I recalled that the United States had refrained for seventeen years from recognizing the Soviet Government, but Manchuria bordered China and necessarily had constant relations with China, which raised the question how long China could abstain from all connection with Manchuria. I inquired what China was relying on to end the impasse. Mr. Li said there were several things which might happen to bring about a solution, for example, a world [Page 91] war. He thought China could hold out indefinitely from recognizing “Manchukuo”.
After one or two other efforts to dissuade Dr. Wang, through Mr. Li, from asking that you telegraph to the Department for a new statement of the position of the American Government in regard to the Manchurian dispute, I consented to send you a telegram. This telegram you have doubtless received.7
Very respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in China in his despatch No. 2612, March 27; received April 21.↩
- Not reprinted.↩
- Omission indicated in the original despatch.↩
- See footnote 59, p. 51.↩
- The Counselor, later on March 23, informed the Chinese Foreign Office of the substance of the Hirota-Hull exchange of views, February 21 and March 3; for texts of informal and personal messages, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 127, 128.↩