Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

761.94/722

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 714

Tokyo, March 23, 1934.
[Received April 2.]

Sir:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In appraising, therefore, the likelihood of a Soviet-Japanese war in the near future it becomes necessary to question whether the evidence now available in Japan indicates that an early attack upon Soviet Russia is being considered. There are listed below a number of observations which suggest that Japan has no intention of deliberately provoking a conflict this coming spring or summer.

(1). The Military Attaché of the Embassy has just returned from a twelve day inspection trip of various military establishments and writes concerning the regiments he visited, “No evidence of tenseness or any apprehension of war was noticed, nor was the training being hurried in any way” and further, reviewing his whole trip, “In general, nothing was seen or sensed that would indicate that the Japanese army is engaged in unusual preparations for war or that war during 1934 is anticipated.”

(2). The Assistant Naval Attaché of the Embassy reports that the Nakajima Aircraft Factories which manufacture the majority of the most modern Japanese pursuit planes is working upon an eight hour a day schedule, not upon a war-time 24 hour a day schedule although it is in aviation perhaps that Japan has the most to fear from Soviet Russia.

(3). The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant General Koiso, has been transferred to the command of the Fifth Division stationed at Hiroshima in Southern Japan. Since General Koiso is not only one of the most able men in the Japanese army but has an unrivalled knowledge of the situation in Manchuria it is questioned whether this normal step in his career would not be postponed were an early conflict in prospect.

(4). The correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, Mr. Reginald Sweetland, has just returned to Toyko from Manchuria and reports that he had a conversation with Major General Doihara, the “Lawrence of Manchuria” and leading Intelligence Officer in the Japanese army. General Doihara stated that it was impossible for Japan to fight Soviet Russia at the present time for three reasons: first, that world opinion was not behind Japan and that she could not afford to further isolate herself internationally; second, that a war would last three years and be too great a strain on the nation’s strength; and third, that it would take ten years to consolidate “Manchukuo” and to attempt a war in the face of a potentially unstable condition behind the lines would not be possible.

(5). Ambassador Youreneff is of the opinion that a meeting of the principal Japanese generals of division, which is scheduled for March 26,^* will discuss the pros and cons of an attack upon Soviet Russia and implied that this was an extraordinary meeting, similar to one held shortly before the outbreak of the Manchurian adventure in September 1931. I am now informed by the Military Attaché that this is a purely routine conference which is held periodically.

(6). There are no reports from Manchuria indicating an unusual concentration of Japanese troops nor any unusual preparations which would substantiate the Soviet fears of an early attack.

(7). It has puzzled foreign observers to note that the Foreign Office continues to oppose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia prior to the settlement of specific problems between the two countries. To Occidental observers this has seemed like putting the cart before the horse and has, in certain quarters, cast doubt upon the genuineness of Japan’s desire to settle the Russian situation amicably. The matter was explained by a member of the Foreign Office staff to a member of my staff as follows: “There is a strong minority in Japan which believes that war between this country and Russia is inevitable and that the sooner it comes the better. If a non-aggression pact should be negotiated while there were still serious problems pending between the two nations, this minority would probably become very vociferous and might even force a crisis. In Japan minorities are not ignored, they are compromised with. The plan of the Foreign Office is to reach a settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway and fisheries questions and thus to remove all grounds which the militant minority have for opposing a non-aggression pact”. In the light of the above explanation, settlement of the two problems mentioned would seem significant steps towards a restoration of normal relations between the two countries.

(8). Certain conditions for war which were present in 1904 are lacking in 1934. Two major factors in the Japanese decision to attack Russia thirty years ago were the Anglo-Japanese alliance² and a friendly attitude on the part of America which enabled the Japanese leaders to believe that it would be possible to finance the struggle. At the present time Japan is apparently isolated internationally and, in view of the Soviet-American rapprochement, there is general uncertainty as to what America’s attitude would be in case of war.

In concluding this despatch I refer to a conversation which took place recently between a member of my staff and an official of the Soviet Embassy in Nanking who has just come from Moscow. This official states that in Moscow government leaders do not believe that war with Japan is inevitable but that there is a 50–50 chance of one, that they feel that Japan has learnt a great deal about Russia’s power in the last six months, and that she is therefore not so sure of herself. He further remarked that the Soviet preparations for war involve no assumption that they would receive any aid from China in case hostilities with Japan break out. Viewing the situation from Tokyo I am inclined to concur that the Japanese are well aware of the efficacy of Soviet preparations regardless of whether or not the extent of such preparations have impaired the confidence of the Japanese army leaders. It is furthermore idle to believe that these leaders, chauvinists as they may be, will select an unfavorable time to commence operations against the Soviets. They did not do so in 1904, nor in 1931 in Manchuria. The present, moreover, appears to be an unfavorable time. Nevertheless there remains the possibility that a “now-or-never” attitude might lead the Japanese to action and there is still danger that an unforeseen incident might precipitate a clash.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

1. It is reported that there is to be a routine meeting of division chiefs of staff in April. [Footnote in the original.]
2. Signed at London, January 30, 1902, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 514.