500.A15a5/182
The Minister in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to report statements made on August 13, 1934, to a member of my staff by Mr. Hagiwara, an officer of the Asiatic Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, now on tour in China, with regard to the Japanese attitude toward the next naval disarmament conference. It is thought that his views may be of interest as it is probable that they are also the views of other members of the Japanese Foreign Office.
Mr. Hagiwara stated that the reason why the Japanese are strongly opposed to the settlement of naval armaments on a ratio basis is wholly one of national pride. When he has, in friendly conversation with Japanese naval officers, asked them what ratio they feel would be adequate in case of a combined Anglo-American attack on Japan, they have replied that ratios would have no significance in such a case [Page 248] and have countered with the rhetorical question of what difference in significance could, for example, a ratio of 10:7 or 10:6 have in such an eventuality. In short, it is the feeling of being placed in an inferior position by the employment of ratios which is repugnant to the Japanese. When asked what plan would be acceptable to them, Mr. Hagiwara replied that the abolition of battleships would be a satisfactory solution. This would avoid the need of ratios and would render each nation safe from attack. He added that it was incredible that, in case this plan were adopted, the Japanese would build large numbers of small vessels. When asked whether he believed that such a plan would be acceptable to Great Britain from the point of view of the requirements for the defense of her scattered empire, Mr. Hagiwara merely reiterated that this plan would be a satisfactory solution of the disarmament question.
Mr. Hagiwara stated that the Japanese are unyieldingly opposed to the introduction of political questions in connection with the next naval disarmament conference. This attitude, he said, has a sound basis in historical fact, having its origin in the conclusion of the Nine Power Treaty and the Shantung Settlement.72 The purpose of the powers, other than Japan, in drawing up the Nine Power Treaty, he went on to say, was twofold. One was to establish a sort of peace machinery, which had, however, failed to bring about effective cooperation among the powers with respect to developments in the Far East. The other was to prevent Japanese expansion, of which there had been unfortunate examples within the few years preceding the Washington Conference. The Japanese people are convinced that Japan must expand, and as the introduction of political matters into the naval disarmament conference of 1922 resulted in a blocking of this expansion, they do not wish to have a similar experience issue from the next conference.
With regard to the settlement of the Shantung question, Mr. Hagiwara said that it was a fatal error to have had this take place at Washington with foreign observers present. It ought to have taken place either in Japan or China without foreign observers. Although such an arrangement would have been disagreeable to the Powers because it would have brought results more favorable for Japan, yet this fact would have been greatly outweighed by the fact that China would not then have developed the conviction that, in case of difficulties with Japan, all she has to do to get what she wants at the expense of Japan is to obtain the participation of the foreign powers in a settlement. The Japanese people, Mr. Hagiwara concluded, are convinced that it was the method of the settlement of the Shantung [Page 249] question which created this conviction in the Chinese and that this attitude on the part of the Chinese was the factor primarily responsible for the eventual seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese military. The effect of the Shantung Settlement on the Chinese has increased Japanese opposition to the introduction of political questions relating to China at the next naval disarmament conference.
Respectfully yours,
- For treaty between China and Japan, signed at Washington, February 4, 1922, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 948.↩