793.94/6783
The Minister in China ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to report the substance of a conversation which a member of my staff informs me he had on August 13, 1934, with an official of the Japanese Foreign Office with regard to Japanese intentions toward North China. The comments of this official impress me as the frankest (and at the same time as a responsible) exposition of Japan’s aims in this regard which has come to my attention for some time.
The official is Mr. Hagiwara, one of the five officers of that section of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the Japanese Foreign Office which deals with questions relating to China Proper. I am told that Mr. Hagiwara is a young man of above-average intelligence who is intensely interested in and has a thorough knowledge of conditions in the Far East. He left Tokyo on July 17 for a 45 day tour of Manchuria and North and Central China, in connection with his official duties.
Mr. Hagiwara stated that two plans with regard to the future of North China are at present the subject of deep discussion between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Ministry of War, the primary object of either plan being the safeguarding of the existence of “Manchukuo”. The plan which the military are in favor of envisages a North China which would be practically independent but which would be nominally under the control of Nanking. (Mr. Hagiwara insisted that it would be more than “nominally” under Nanking, but was [Page 245] unable to make clear in what respects it would be so.) Under this plan, according to Mr. Hagiwara, a situation would be created in North China which would be similar to that suggested solution of the Manchurian situation which foreign powers at one time urged following Japanese occupation of that area. Through this regime in North China, the Japanese would attain their ends with respect to China. The other plan (which inferentially may be considered as looked upon favorably by the Foreign Office) is to have North China come as effectively under the authority of the Nanking Government as is the territory in the Yangtze Valley. It is presumed that, if this were successfully carried out, the Japanese anticipate that, in return for their assistance in rendering it effective, the Nanking Government would give to the Japanese what they want.
Mr. Hagiwara stated that the aims of the Japanese with respect to North China are to obtain favorable settlement of such questions as through postal facilities via Shanhaikuan and the establishment of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation in North China, the latter including the development of cotton production and the building of two railways, namely one from Taku, below Tientsin, to Shihkiachwang, on the Peiping–Hankow line (which would render easier access to the Shansi coal fields) and one from Tsinan, the terminus of the Tsingtao–Tsinan line, westward to Shunteh on the Peiping–Hankow line. He stated emphatically that the Japanese were not at all interested in a westward extension of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, such an extension being regarded as unprofitable. They would, however, like to have air communication established between North China and “Manchukuo”. Mr. Hagiwara said that the economic penetration of North China desired by Japan was no more than that described above, and that no Government in Japan could satisfy the people of Japan with anything less than that. He added that an area one or two miles in width along the “Manchukuo”–China border, where troops would not be permitted, would also be necessary and that, in case the second plan were put into effect, there would have to be some agreement with Nanking as to the number of Chinese troops which might be stationed in North China.
It was evident that Mr. Hagiwara regards the question of economic penetration into North China as of vital importance. With regard to what Japan expects to gain from “Manchukuo”, he was pessimistic, saying that all that the Japanese hope to gain is enough to pay for the upkeep of the army there.
Mr. Hagiwara stated that the Japanese authorities would welcome the cooperation of foreign capital in the development of North China. When it was suggested to him that foreigners might hesitate about investing, believing that North China might go the way of “Manchukuo”, [Page 246] he replied that that would not occur, that the Japanese Government would guarantee that its ambitions with respect to North China were not political. When it was recalled to him that the Japanese Government had given similar guarantees at times during the period when the Japanese army was radiating outward from the Manchuria Railway Zone toward the boundaries of what is now known as “Manchukuo” but that those guarantees had failed, he admitted, with regret, that that was so, but insisted that in those instances the Government should have never given such guarantees as they could not be upheld, whereas now such guarantees could be safely given because the military was satisfied that “Manchukuo’s” boundaries should not be extended south of the Great Wall.
When questioned with regard to his opinion as to whether the Nanking Government could give the Japanese what they want and survive, he replied that, if Japan does not receive what it wants (meaning the matters outlined above), then “we do not know what our navy will do. We do not control the navy.” He admitted that the collapse of the Nanking Government as a result of Japanese pressure would very likely result in a chaotic situation seriously adverse to Japan’s economic relations with China; but apparently he regarded this as less important than the effect in Japan of a failure to put through the Japanese program. He was emphatic in stating that political control of North China by Japan was not desired and in this connection said that at present the high positions in the Japanese Army are held by conservative military officers, the reactionary officers having been gradually replaced as a result of transfers effected during recent months. It was his opinion, however, that if neither of the above-mentioned plans were to succeed, then that part of the Japanese military—now a small minority—which would like to see North China a completely independent state might be able to make its desire effective.
Throughout the conversation Mr. Hagiwara exhibited a sincere desire to see the relations of Japan with China and of Japan with the United States improve. But it was evident that, regarding Japan’s future as absolutely dependent upon Japan’s “economic” expansion, he could not approve of any measures to improve those relations at the expense of what he regards as Japan’s legitimate and necessary expansion. It was also evident that he was honestly unable to regard as reasonable the attitude of the United States toward Japanese expansion, a view which, as Mr. Hagiwara is an intelligent man, may be regarded as being shared by many other intelligent Japanese.
Before concluding this despatch, I should like to refer to the Legation’s despatch No. 2557 of February 22, 1934,71 in which was given [Page 247] information obtained from a well-informed Chinese source to the effect that the Japanese authorities had made one proposal and two threats to a “personal representative” of General Huang Fu. The proposal was that Japan would support Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu in all ways necessary in return for certain concessions, and the threats were that, failing Chinese compliance with this proposal, the Japanese would attempt to put North China under the nominal control of a North China general and that, failing this, more strenuous action would be taken. The two plans and the possible alternative described by Mr. Hagiwara follow in general lines the proposal and two threats referred to. The fact that the Japanese Ministry of War is at present in favor of a North China only nominally under Nanking’s control would seem to indicate that the Japanese military is becoming, or has become, convinced that a policy of cooperation with the Nanking Government will not bring about the desired results.
In view of what Mr. Hagiwara has said, it would seem probable that the conversations, which have been in progress at Kuling during the past few days between such high officials as General Chiang Kai-shek, General Huang Fu, and Dr. H. H. Kung, have been concerned, at least in part, with the attitude which the Nanking Government should adopt toward these plans. It would also seem probable that Japan’s future course with respect to China will be considerably influenced by the outcome of these conversations.
Respectfully yours,