761.94/693
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 10.]
Sir: While recent weeks have seen little change in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, efforts to reach an amicable settlement of the issues at stake seem to be crystallizing under the energetic leadership of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Evidence in this regard falls naturally into two categories, the first having to do with the Chinese Eastern Railway sale controversy and the second referring to more general aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations.
Chinese Eastern Railway
The plight of this railroad becomes daily more desperate. Its economic value is rapidly becoming negligible with the steady completion [Page 19] of competing lines such as the Harbin–Laf a line connecting with the Hsingking-Tunhua line to North Korean ports, the Harbin–Koshan-Tsitsihar loop, the Tsitsihar–Ssupingkai line connecting to Dairen, and the projected Taonan–Manchuli road. It is already possible for Japanese-“Manchukuo” interests to deprive the Chinese Eastern Railway of substantially all the long-haul traffic originating within Manchuria. Furthermore, if reports reaching Tokyo are to be credited, the operation of the Road is rendered increasingly difficult by an intensification of the local friction between Soviet officials of the line and officials of the government through whose territory the railroad has the misfortune to run. Reports have already reached the Department indicating the manner in which the administration of the railroad has been deliberately hampered at every turn, and I have indicated in a previous despatch* that the “Manchukuo” Minister of Communications admitted the possibility of the adoption of a policy of virtual sabotage by his government. The development of mutual suspicion and antagonism is indicated by the fact that after the serious train wrecks on the western line of the railway on December 14 and January 17 both sides immediately accused the other of deliberately causing the accident. Recently in Harbin a curious series of agitations for lower freight rates has developed. Beginning with the distribution of posters, following with a mass meeting before the offices of Mr. Rudy, the General Manager, the most serious agitation to date occurred on January 23 when some 2,000 men transported in a hundred trucks are reported to have visited the office of the railway directors and the Control Office and demanded a lower rate schedule. Needless to say such an affair seems no more the spontaneous action of the citizens of Harbin (which depends greatly on the railway) than the petitions for the coronation of Pu Yi represent the spontaneous wishes of his 30,000,000 “Manchu” subjects.
Concurrently with the destructive activity along the railroad the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs is endeavoring to bring the delegates of Soviet Russia and “Manchukuo” once more to the conference table. It will be remembered† that the “Manchukuo” side had decided to allow negotiations to lapse until Soviet Russia initiated them once more with a new proposal and that the Soviet side had absolutely refused‡ to renew negotiations until Soviet officials of the road who had been detained by “Manchukuo” were released. On January 8 and 15 conversations between the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo and Mr. Hirota apparently solved this deadlock because on [Page 20] January 22 the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs described the present situation to the Counselor of this Embassy as follows. According to Mr. Shigemitsu the Foreign Minister succeeded in obtaining the release of the Soviet officials on the understanding that they would leave Manchuria. The Russians, however, had insisted that they be reinstated in their former positions. Furthermore, this had created a troublesome situation because on the one hand the “Manchukuo” authorities were adamant and “very proud of themselves”, and on the other hand the Russian authorities in Moscow had seen fit to thunder against Japan, thereby placing Mr. Hirota in an embarrassing position. However, Mr. Shigemitsu said, the Foreign Office was marking time and would resume its efforts to get the Soviets and “Manchukuo” together on the railway question as well as the boundary problem and a few other minor matters.
A resumption of negotiations, however, will not in itself be reasonable cause for optimism as to their success. The disparity between the Soviet offering price and the “Manchukuo” bid will be so large as to greatly lessen the possibility of reconciliation. Nevertheless, those who hold that the original Soviet offer to sell the road was merely a convenient method of staving off the incidence of a crisis with Japan, declare that the position of the Soviet Union has been so strengthened within recent months that the Soviets would re-enter the conference with the sole aim of obtaining the optimum salvage price and withdraw from the untenable position in which they find themselves as co-owners of a railroad beyond their borders. It will be noted that this theory conflicts with the statement of the Soviet Ambassador to me,§ that his government had definitely determined not to yield an inch in the negotiations for sale of the road. In concluding this subject I may remark that the Foreign Minister is probably actuated in his efforts at settlement not only by the desire to remove the most critical Soviet-Japanese issue from the slate but also by the political aspects, involving de jure recognition of “Manchukuo”, which a formal sale would carry with it.
General Situation
In recent days a formidable list of statesmen in Europe and America have been prominently quoted in the Japanese press as referring publicly to the possibility of war between Soviet Russia and Japan. Coming at a time when the Japanese public is debating the seriousness of this danger, the effect has been disquieting. Editorial comment in favor of a non-aggression pact with the Soviets has been stimulated by the public uneasiness as well as by the recent conciliatory [Page 21] conversations between Ambassador Yureneff and Mr. Hirota which were mentioned above. The Osaka Asahi, the Miyako, and the Tokyo Asahi have all voiced strong pleas for a settlement of this kind. The editorial of the Tokyo Asahi is worthy of quotation in part because the author seems to have grasped the fundamental conflict of interests which will some day necessitate a major settlement between Soviet Russia and Japan:
“Japan needs an understanding with the Soviet Union for successful prosecution of its continental policy. Fundamentally speaking the question of the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway is secondary. The authorities are willing to consider a pact of non-aggression with the USSR when all pending problems are out of the way. This is like hoping for the impossible. Suppose that the questions separating Japan and the USSR are settled today. Who dares say that fresh questions will not arise tomorrow? We want the authorities to take a far-sighted view in deciding their attitude toward a Soviet nonaggression pact.”
With the concern of the public over foreign affairs it was only natural that the formal address of the Foreign Minister to the Diet on January 23 should have been awaited with the keenest anticipation. Parenthetically it may be of interest to remark that a member of my staff was told several days ago by a member of the Foreign Office staff that Mr. Hirota’s popularity in the Foreign Office was outstanding and that he personally considered him the strongest Foreign Minister Japan had had since Kato26 and Komura.27 The speech, in reference to Soviet-Japanese relations, was marked by a tone of restraint, an attitude of common sense which was in vivid contrast to the recent outbursts of such Soviet officials as Litvinov,28 Molotov,29 and Kaganovitch.30 The core of this section of Mr. Hirota’s speech is as follows:
“Despite the fundamental differences in both theory and constitution of the state that divides the two countries, we have always endeavored to keep on good neighborly terms with Soviet Russia and sought the solution of all questions by pacific means. Especially since the establishment of Manchukuo the Japanese Government has been acting solely upon their conviction that the proper adjustment of the tripartite relationship between Japan, Manchukuo, and the Soviet Union was of paramount importance for the tranquility of East Asia.”
It of course is obvious that the “proper adjustment” referred to above is designed entirely to eliminate Soviet Russia from her inherited [Page 22] sphere of interest in North Manchuria, if indeed a more extended interpretation cannot now fairly be given to it.
While the attitude of Japan remains outwardly conciliatory toward Soviet Russia, the latter continues to strive for maximum preparedness in the areas contiguous to “Manchukuo”. Mr. Shigemitsu, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conversation with the Counselor of the Embassy stated that Russian troops along the border were far greater than the Japanese who had only about three divisions scattered all over Manchuria while the Russians had probably twice that number besides a large number of airplanes and even submarines which had been brought out by rail and assembled at Vladivostok. (The Military Attaché estimates the Japanese troops in Manchuria at something over 70,000. The Russian troops have been estimated to amount to anything from 80,000 to 200,000, depending on the area covered). It is only recently that the Soviets decreed important changes in the economy of Eastern Siberia with a view to improving the morale of the population, increasing agricultural production, and attracting new settlers.║
In conclusion it may be said that we seem at present to be witnessing the most able efforts for a restoration of amicable relations that Japan is capable of mustering. It is encouraging to receive such assurances as Mr. Shigemitsu’s that Mr. Hirota is determined to settle matters peaceably if possible and hopes to do so in a relatively short time if matters beyond his control do not prevent. It is perhaps significant that Mr. Hirota’s efforts do not at present seem to be hampered by the military. In due respect for the sincerity of Mr. Hirota’s endeavors and with my present belief that neither Japan nor Soviet Russia wishes war at this juncture I now feel more optimistic that at least a temporary settlement of pending problems may be found by peaceful means. Whether a permanent solution of the fundamental opposition of interests will be found in the same manner is at this writing impossible to predict.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatch No. 573, of November 2, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 573, November 2, 1933. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 610, December 14, 1933. [Footnote in the original; for despatch, see Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. iii, p. 483.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 606, of December 14, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Baron Takaaki Kato.↩
- Marquis Jutaro Komura.↩
- Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩
- President of the Soviet Council of Commissars (Premier).↩
- Prominent Soviet leader.↩
- Harbin’s despatch No. 2747. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩