Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, Europe, Near East and Africa, Volume II

711.62/90

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Germany (Dodd)⁷

undated

I called on Chancellor Hitler at one o’clock on March 7, 1934.

I might say in the beginning that I had been requested by two very prominent people in the German Government to speak my whole mind to the Chancellor on the matter of propaganda and also the necessity of better international relations. It was understood that the interview was to be personal and confidential; consequently no third party was present. However, as I entered the Chancellor’s large office, Foreign Minister von Neurath met me, shook hands heartily, wished me well and entered a door to a room next to Hitler’s office.

The Chancellor seemed a little astounded when I asked him whether there was any message which he would like me to deliver to the President when I go back to Washington. He paused a moment and said: “I am very much obliged to you; but this takes me by surprise and I wish you would give me time to think the subject over and let me talk with you again.” We then talked some five minutes about the proposed commission to the United States⁸ and the necessary improvements in the commercial relations between our two countries. He spoke as if he were quite willing to have barriers removed; but the impression I gathered was that on this subject he had no very definite opinions. I stressed the necessity of scientific and able men for the commission, with which he said he agreed entirely.

Keeping in mind Secretary Hull’s letter of February 6,⁹ I then alluded to the unfortunate propaganda which has been made in the United States. He asked me to indicate just what the character of the propaganda was, and I referred to a brochure which the National-sozialistische Korrespondenz released a week or ten days ago, and indicated that it carried an appeal to Germans in other countries to think themselves always as Germans and owing moral, if not political, allegiance to the fatherland. The Chancellor immediately denounced everything of that sort, and went on to say that it was almost certainly put out by Jews. He then talked with great emotion about the Jews, claiming that they were responsible for substantially all of the ill feeling in the United States towards Germany. He added that if he could lay hands on the man who prepared the document referred to above, he would put him out of the country. I said to him: “You know there is a Jewish problem in other countries, and the State Department is lending assistance towards the solution of the problem by unofficial encouragement to an organization which James McDonald is setting up in Lausanne.¹⁰ He seemed not to be acquainted with this fact, and I then described McDonald’s plans as I happened to know that he had given them to von Neurath some three weeks ago. I had been informed that von Neurath had approved McDonald’s work in an entirely unofficial way. I then added that McDonald had at his command some millions of dollars which were to be spent mostly in Germany to assist Jews to leave the country without too much suffering, and that he hoped that over a period of eight or ten years the problem might be solved in a humane way. The Chancellor then came back that nothing could come of such a movement, no matter how much money were put into it; that the Jews in Germany and outside would use the organization to attack Germany and to make endless trouble. I then argued a bit with him about the effects of violent treatment in the United States, and said: “You know a number of high positions in our country are at present occupied by Jews, both in New York and Illinois,” naming some of the eminent fair-minded Hebrews like Henry Morgenthau, senior. I explained to him that where a question of over-activity of Jews in university or official life made trouble, we had managed to redistribute the offices in such a way as not to give great offence, and that wealthy Jews continued to support institutions which had limited the number of Jews who held high positions. I gave as an example Max Epstein of Chicago, and added that the Jews in Illinois constituted no serious problem. My idea was to suggest a different procedure from that which has been followed here—of course never giving pointed advice. The Chancellor came back with a still more vigorous reply, saying that 59 percent of all offices in Russia were held by Jews; that they had ruined that country and that they intended to ruin Germany, and, he added, “if they continue their activity, we shall make a complete end to all of them in this country.” I saw that there was little chance to do more than emphasize the embarrassments which the policy hitherto pursued here creates at home. I now added that public opinion in the United States is firmly convinced that the German people, if not their Government, are militaristic, if not actually warlike, that is, that most people of the United States have the feeling that Germany is aiming one day to go to war. “Is there any real basis for that?”, I asked. He replied: “There is absolutely no basis; Germany wants peace and will do everything in her power to keep the peace; but Germany demands and will have equality of rights in the matter of armaments.” I said to him that the President had emphasized the necessity of all nations respecting the boundaries as now stabilized,¹¹ to which he replied that he was very grateful that the President’s attitude on that subject was exactly his attitude. When I asked whether he would favor a disarmament conference, he waived an answer, and turned once again to attacking the Jews as being responsible for the feeling that Germany wants to go to war. In order to get back to the subject of disarmament, I asked if it were not in his judgement possible to have two points definitely agreed to, namely, that no nation should cross another nation’s boundaries, and that all European nations should agree to a supervisory commission and respect the rulings of such a body. He agreed heartily, he said, to these two points, leaving the matter of a possible conference in doubt. I thought this was due to the fact that Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations.

In conclusion, I raised the point that one of the best means of a good understanding between the United States and Germany consisted in the fact that university life in the two countries had been closely connected for more than a hundred years, and that there is still considerable anxiety in the United States about the possibility of university people here losing their former high status. He hesitated a little, and then said that he agreed to my view and thought that the universities here would not be improperly treated. It was plain that he did not care to talk about the subject. I mentioned the fact that the great Foundations in the United States (Carnegie, Rockefeller, etc.) had been very much concerned, and added that they are still rendering great assistance to German scholars and students, especially exchange scholarships between the two countries. I said such men are apt to give a true picture of problems in their respective countries. He agreed to this point, and said he would do everything he could to see to it that no discriminations against such people were made, and even added that he favored more exchange professorships. I was convinced, however, that this was a little embarrassing.

As I went out of the Chancellor’s room, I met the Prussian Minister of Culture, Rust. We stood and talked for a few minutes, and I reemphasized the last point made with the Chancellor. Rust was a little nonplussed and named one person who had been sent to the United States as representing the German attitude, and I, quite frankly, perhaps indiscreetly, said that that kind of person did harm. I emphasized the necessity of absolute academic freedom.

This closes the story.

W[illiam] E. D[odd]

7. This memorandum is undated; copy received in the Department March 26.
8. The proposed commission failed to materialize; see pp. 400 ff.
9. Post, p. 530.
10. High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany; see pp. 301 ff.
11. See memorandum of February 19 to the British Embassy, vol. i, p. 22; see also telegram No. 50, March 7, from the Ambassador in Germany, vol. i, p. 28.