837.00/3798: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:35 p.m.]
216. For the President and the Secretary. With reference to telegram 206, September 7, noon, and to the President’s message contained in your 90, September 7, 8 p.m., I desire to submit the following summary of the present situation.
The Céspedes Government that was overthrown by the Army mutiny was supported by and participated in by members of the following political parties and independent groups: the Unión Nacionalista, which is the greatest political force in Cuba today and which likewise has the growing support of the old Liberal and Conservative Parties whose members have turned almost unanimously to Meridieta, the leader of the party; the Gómez Liberals, whose strength is concentrated in Habana and Santa Clara; the original A B C, which is a very powerful party organized throughout the Republic and directed by younger men of integrity and idealism; the O C R R, a revolutionary group, particularly strong in Matanzas and Camaguey; the followers of Menocal; the U R and the U N R Revolutionary Societies, which have considerable following in Oriente and Camaguey; the university professors except for six or seven radicals; all commercial and business groups; and all of the Cuban Army officers; in other words, the enormous majority of the Cuban people.
The Army mutiny was originally engineered by a few Communist leaders in Habana under the guidance of Martínez Villena, who got the soldiers to believe that their pay was to be cut and their numbers reduced. At the last moment the student group intervened with the connivance of Carbo and persuaded the non-commissioned officers and the soldiers to depose their officers and join in creating a government installed by the students and committed secretly to the semi-Communist program published by the extreme radical students 2 weeks ago. This new regime is supported by the students, by a few university professors, group called ABC radicals which is chiefly composed of boys from 16 to 20 years of age, by heterogeneous mass of extreme radicals of every shade, and by the enlisted men of the Army in Habana and a few other cities.
[Page 406]At the meeting of the political leaders held last night, which broke up at 4 a.m., and is due to resume at noon today, the leaders of the parties supporting Céspedes held firm except for Gómez who tried to carry water on both shoulders. They urged a return to legality with Céspedes as President and a Cabinet of concentration. No basis for agreement was even indicated.
The ABC leaders state the aviation officers are to seize the aviation camp this afternoon. They expect to seize Sergeant Batista and the other ringleaders at Camp Columbia but if they fail the camp will be bombed by the aviators; the Ferrer plan is to be consummated tonight if no change in the situation occurs and the loyal troops at Matanzas will then march on Habana. It may be that an overturn in government will ensue.
In my considered judgment the present revolutionary government has neither popular support nor any means at its disposal with which it can maintain order. It continues to declare that order exists throughout the Republic notwithstanding cumulative evidence from every province that complete anarchy exists and that where quiet prevails it is the quiet of panic. If this government continues much longer and no counterrevolt is successfully staged by the conservative groups it will be replaced by a soldier-workman which will last until a concerted revolt of the majority takes place.
With regard to the President’s message above referred to, I concur that we should make no promise implied or explicit as to whether we would land troops to maintain order if a counterrevolution to replace the Céspedes Government were successful. I fully agree that we should take no action which would permit the creation of the belief that any Cuban government was installed by us. My previous cables will make plain that I have strictly followed this policy. I wish, however, to make it very clear that Céspedes himself, who had not resigned and is recognized by us as the constitutional President of Cuba, represents no faction but was selected by all political groups after Machado’s overthrow as a man who had the confidence of all and who, since he was known to belong to no political party, could as President guarantee fair elections. Consequently if he were reinstated with the support of all the groups above mentioned and we assisted his Government either financially, economically or through affording police service until the Cuban Government could clean up the condition created by the Army mutiny, we would not be “favoring one faction out of many”, but lending friendly assistance at its request to a Cuban Government presided over by an impartial President and supported by every element of importance in the Republic.
Finally, nothing, in my judgment, would create more disastrous effects in Latin America than a prolonged military intervention in [Page 407] Cuba. If, at the request of the Cuban Government, we temporarily afford them the moral assistance a small number of Marines would create in maintaining order after such Government had established itself and until a new Army could be organized, such assistance should be construed as just as much of a friendly act as the facilitating of a loan. In the one case we would lend the Cubans police and in the other money, neither of which they possess,
I fully agree that no such action should be taken by us unless it appeared indispensable. But I feel it would be a far wiser policy to do this, if necessary, rather than permit [conditions?] in Cuba to slide until complete anarchy prevails and we are forced into a military intervention.
There is, of course, no necessity for decision on this point now. It is, however, a contingency that may arise and it is for that purpose that I requested instructions.
I would appreciate having the President’s wishes communicated to me in the light of the additional considerations above-indicated.