793.94/6266: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
Peiping, May 10, 1933—4
p.m.
[Received May 10—9:40 a.m.]
[Received May 10—9:40 a.m.]
417. Renewed Japanese offensive Lwan River area is difficult to explain. While it is true that units of Chinese forces returned to that area upon withdrawal of Japanese, units were small and presence logical because of disturbed conditions.
- 2.
- When Japanese retired to Wall they left Manchukuo forces in Lwan area under the command of General Li Chi-chun which Japanese described as anti-Chiang Kai-shek forces (see Tientsin’s April 14, 3 p.m.).31 Between April 12 and April 20 interesting developments occurred that area described in the Legation’s 345, April 20, 2 p.m.31 There is reason to believe that Japanese expected, as a result of activities Lwan area, that agents opposed to Chiang Kai-shek would take advantage of situation to organize a movement against Chiang Kai-shek in this area which Japanese Army would support (see Tokyo’s 85, April 22, 11 a.m., to the Department). This plan failed.
- 3.
- General Ho Chu-kuo informed me yesterday that through good offices, apparently initiated by Kailan Mining Company and a British naval officer at Chinwangtao, he endeavored to meet Japanese for the purpose of arranging truce but Japanese refused to meet him. Ho Chu-kuo believes failure of plan for uprising here and at Tientsin so infuriated Japanese military that they made use of presence of small Chinese forces in Lwan River as a pretext for launching present attack Lwan area.
- 4.
- There is reason to accept accuracy of General Ho’s estimate. End of last week General Nakamura at Tientsin informed Hallett Abend that Japanese military intended to launch campaign in this area on unprecedented scale from the direction of Lwan area and from direction Kupeikow extending in latter case southward to cut railway between Peiping and Tientsin with a view to inflicting severe defeat upon National armies and forcing retirement south of Peiping-Tientsin Railway. Implication of Nakamura’s statement was that Japanese hoped blow to Nationalists forces would be so severe as to destroy Nationalist control in this area and permit anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement to materialize.
- 5.
- Suma, First Secretary of Japanese Legation, recently returned from Japan whither he accompanied Ariyoshi, informed me on the 6th instant that Japanese forces infuriated by Chinese resistance at Kupeikow intended to avenge themselves upon concentration at [Page 311] Miyun but would not proceed beyond that point. United Press correspondent informed me that Suma stated to him on the 7th that Japan had certain convictions in regard to situation prevailing in China and would pound away at the Chinese until Chinese accepted these convictions.
- 6.
- It is difficult to estimate extent of Japanese intentions behind Japanese movement south of Wall. On the face of events as they are occurring there would appear to be an indication on the part of the Japanese of a determination to carry their activities beyond Manchuria and areas north of Wall with a view to determining political developments in China proper or at least in that part of China north of the Yellow River. On the other hand Suma informed me on the 6th that the Japanese Government derived considerable satisfaction from the setting up of the branch military council at Peiping under the chairmanship of Huang Fu a returned student from Japan and stated categorically that Japan was not concerned with developments south of Wall, its only concern being the security of the Japanese lines along Wall. If this statement is to be accepted it may be that renewed Japanese activities in the Lwan area and at Miyun are to draw Chinese attention to realities of the existing situation and away from the presence of Soong in Washington and afterwards in London where possibly Chinese-Japanese conditions may be discussed.
To Tokyo by mail.
Johnson