Office of the Historian

893.114 N 16 Manchuria/21: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, May 10, 1933—3 p.m.
[Received May 10—2:25 p.m.]

115. From Fuller. Department’s telegram No. 98, May 8, 5 p.m. Following observations respectfully submitted in regard to proposed recognition of Manchukuo opium import certificates.

1.
Proposal thought to be prompted by desire of parties to the Geneva agreement29 to avoid obligation under article 6 thereof to seize opium passing through territorial waters of Malaya and Netherlands India, American support to condone the evasion being desired because that agreement purports to implement the Hague Opium Convention.30
2.
Existing Manchurian traffic in Persian opium is already underground. Recognition would, to the benefit of Manchukuo finances, aid exploitation of trade in opium admittedly intended for smoking, while the Hague Convention calls for mutual effort to suppress opium smoking. Refusal of recognition should, through deterring exploitation of Persian and Turkish opium by the Manchurian monopoly, aid rather than embarrass international effort to prevent narcotic abuse.
3.
Recognition would be in derogation of article 15 of the Hague Convention.
4.
Under Geneva 1925 and Hague Conventions recognition would necessarily imply recognition of Manchukuo as the government of Manchuria. Under Geneva agreement it would in addition recognize the Manchukuo opium monopoly as “affording sufficient guarantees against the possibility of illegitimate use”.
5.
Recognition would facilitate import of Persian and Turkish opium into Manchuria where comparatively little high morphine opium has hitherto been available. Manchukuo laws and regulations afford inadequate control. Large supplies of the kind of opium in demand in the United States for smoking and for illicit manufacture could thus accumulate in an area which affords menacing possibilities for illicit traffic to the United States.
6.
If the question of recognizing Manchukuo opium import certificates arises in the Opium Advisory Committee should I not take the position that strict adherence to the treaties should be observed and requires that Manchukuo certificates be refused recognition unless and until Manchukuo is recognized as the government of Manchuria de jure and de facto?
Gilbert
  1. Signed February 19, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. lxxxi, p. 317.↩
  2. Signed January 23, 1912, Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 196.↩