724.3415/1803
The Minister in Paraguay (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 20.]
Sir: In my telegram of today4 I have had the honor to transmit the significant points of a memorandum handed me yesterday by Dr. Arbo giving Paraguay’s view of the draft-Pact of Non-Aggression5 submitted by the Paraguayan and Bolivian delegations at Washington to their Governments and received here by air-mail on May 25th. I am enclosing, herewith, full text and translation.
The memorandum was at the same time handed to the other Neutral representatives here and later copies were given to the Ministers of Brazil and Argentina. Dr. Arbo informed me that he was not cabling the text to his delegation. I assume that it will go forward by air-mail, if it was not already on its way when the copy was handed me.
On May twenty-eighth I had a conversation with him concerning the draft-Pact, which he said was being studied but that no decision had as yet been arrived at as to instructions to the Delegates. He considered the project “good in some respects”, but was not yet prepared to discuss it in detail. Ayala had told me confidentially that he himself had already discussed it both with Arbo and with the President (Guggiari) and that the agreement had been reached that Paraguay would be justified in signing such a Pact only in case an effective guarantee be provided.
Ayala’s personal attitude toward the question was the subject of my telegram No. 29 of May 3.6 He believes strongly that the only effective guarantee that stands any chance of consideration by Bolivia [Page 14] is the indirect one provided by a mutual reduction of the troops of both countries. That alone would tend to prevent clashes by the necessitated limitation of forces in the Chaco. He does not consider Vasconsellos’ objection wholly ingenuous, and believes that he fears such a proposal would arouse popular protest here and injure him politically. Ayala tells me that, as the result of his country-wide speech-making since his return to Paraguay, in which he has repeatedly introduced this question without sign of popular resentment and with every indication of public approval, he is convinced that public opinion here, even if there should be some agitation by the opposition, would accept the proposal enthusiastically. Arbo, he assures me, would be for it, as would Guggiari, provided of course that the Government here is not put in the position of initiating the proposal. Ayala’s hope is that the Neutral and Associated Representatives at the proper moment may see their way clear to laying formally before the two Delegations a concrete proposal for troop-reduction; this the Delegations must of necessity refer to their two Governments and Ayala is apparently confident that he could control the Cabinet decision here.
I must say that I do not feel so sure of this. Ayala’s idea of troop-limitation has been so long misrepresented to the public and has so far proven so unpopular among the rank and file of the Army, that an immediate unfavorable reaction seems to me certain, and it remains to be seen whether this can be overcome within the limited period and with the Government’s resources of propaganda. In view of this situation it seems to me by no means certain that the Ministers of War and of Interior would countenance the proposal, except in the event of Bolivia’s declared approval.
Dr. Arbo, in our conversations, has avoided giving any suggestion as to the possible character of a direct guarantee which Paraguay would consider adequate or desirable. The two South American Powers contiguous, whose influence and ambitions more nearly balance, Argentina and Brazil, naturally suggest themselves in such a connection. Dr. Ayala is of opinion that Brazil independently would be willing to assume no responsibilities whatsoever, but that at the initiation of Argentina she would agree to take part in any joint action which the other favored. My Brazilian colleague here, however, is convinced that his Government would under no circumstances consider such a proposal.
The only newspaper comment so far on the draft-Pact is that of today’s Orden (Independent) which holds that in Article V the Delegation exceeded its powers, that the Article is a tacit recognition [Page 15] of Bolivia’s usurped positions, and that no agreement can be accepted which does not provide for her withdrawal therefrom.
Tomorrow’s El Liberal (Government) will say editorially: “The reading (of the draft) has caused us an unexpected disappointment. The good-will of the United States and the complete impartiality which animates the personages who have drafted it, and concerning whom it is not possible to entertain a moment’s doubt, are not reflected in its contents.…7 The Washington proposal has nothing of a Pact of Non-aggression except the name.” It will take the attitude of the Foreign Office Memorandum, that if Paraguay signs a Pact it must provide either a guarantee or a provision for an arbitration on the basic question.
Respectfully yours,
- No. 35, June 2, 6 p.m.; not printed.↩
- Supra. ↩
- Not printed.↩
- Omission indicated in the original.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 27 ff.↩
- The Pinilla-Soler Protocol of January 12, 1907, ibid., 1907, pt. 1, p. 87.↩
- Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, p. 3336.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩
- Ibid., 1923, vol. i, p. 308; see also ibid., 1928, vol. i, pp. 644 ff.↩
- Signed April 22, 1927; for text, see despatch No. 275, April 29, 1927, from the Chargé in Argentina, ibid., 1927, vol. i, p. 316.↩
- Ibid., 1928, vol. i, p. 675.↩
- Ibid., 1929, vol. i, p. 659.↩