Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume IV

894.00/353

The Ambassadord in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State

No. 472

Tokyo , January 29, 1932.
[Received February 13.]

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following comments on the domestic situation in this country. These comments are submitted with some hesitancy, due to the fact that they are not susceptible of direct proof; the only foundation they have is that many Japanese feel that some change of a serious nature may occur in the political field. In some cases it seems to be scarcely more than a vague uneasiness, in other instances there is an attempt at definition.

There are several sources from which it would seem change might come. I have had occasion in several recent despatches to discuss the powers of the Japanese military and the tenor of the military mind, particularly with regard to the more junior officers,—from colonels downward. The Manchurian affair, as I have previously reported^*, is an emanation of the former; of the latter—the abortive plot of last October on the part of younger officers to establish, allegedly, a dictatorship.^†

In this connection I should like to report an incident that is said to have occurred the following month in the office of the Chief of the Army General Staff. Some weeks ago the Embassy received a hint of an untoward occurrence of a nature somewhat similar to the alleged October plot. The usual informative sources of the Embassy, however, seemed ignorant of the matter. It was only a few days ago that I obtained some details in this regard, which I believe to be fairly worthy of credence. At least, those Japanese—with whom I have since discussed the affair—while professing ignorance, unanimously agree that the incident sounds most probable.

In November, I am told, a junior officer entered the office of General Kanaya, who was then Chief of Staff, and drew a revolver. Before he could do any mischief he was seized and disarmed. When questioned as to the reason for his attempted act, he replied that the Manchurian policy of the General Staff was too weak. Instead of this officer being held for possible punishment, he was thereupon told: “You have the right idea”—I quote my informant—“patriotism is a splendid thing, but you misunderstand us. Our policy is not weak. You must give us time.” The young officer was then released. I have little doubt that he was set free because of the fear of the senior officers that his punishment would cause trouble among his contemporaries. For the same reason, apparently, the plotters of October were not punished. On the contrary, I have been reliably informed, a number of them have since received promotions.

This alleged incident may have been given too much emphasis in this despatch, but it is illustrative of the point of view said to prevail among the younger officers.

The Embassy has had occasion to report recently the related information that General Araki, now Minister of War, is the senior officer regarded as having the strongest control over the junior officers^‡, that he is said to be their “idol”, and that for this reason he was made Minister of War, as for similar reasons Prince Kanin, a member of the Imperial Family, was last month appointed Chief of Staff.^‡ Since the time these matters were submitted to the Department as “the opinion of competent observers”, they have come to be regarded as facts by thinking Japanese.

The consensus of intelligent Japanese opinion at present seems to be that General Araki’s popularity with the junior officers has been impaired by his failure to resign after the attempt against the person of the Emperor early this month.^§ Not unnaturally, the younger officers, inculcated with reverence for the Emperor, would expect their “idol” to be the first to resign. Some Japanese believe, however, that it was General Araki who prevented the Cabinet from following the desire of the majority of the Ministers of State to resign, the reason given for his attitude being that the army leaders prefer the subservient Seiyukai Party in power to a return of the less amenable Minseito, which would bring as Foreign Minister the much disliked Baron Shidehara. I have heard several Japanese refer to the present Cabinet as “the Araki Cabinet”, which would seem to signify that the Seiyukai Cabinet, through him, is under Army control. (In this connection it is interesting to note, as possibly relative, that an additional budget of Yen 20,910,000 for the expenses of the Manchurian affair from September 18th to the end of the fiscal year (March 31, 1932) was approved by the Cabinet without opposition and was yesterday approved by the Privy Council.) Whatever may be the facts, it appears that one control of the super-patriotic officers has been weakened.

The foregoing matter is cited because the Army is a very important element in the Government and would be a big factor in any political change. It would seem not inconceivable that the Army might take over the Government in form as well as in substance. This idea is regarded as most improbable by many Japanese; as possible by others. At least, the potentiality is one factor in the general uneasiness to which reference was made at the beginning of this despatch.

An important proportion of the Army apparently regards capitalists with suspicion and dislike and since capitalists (the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi interests, chiefly) are believed to be behind the political parties, the Seiyukai and the Minseito receive a share of this feeling. It would not be surprising if, in its arrogance, a part at least of the Army should feel that civilians are less capable than the military in government. Certainly the increasingly critical economic situation that exists here might easily be regarded as proof of the failure of parliamentary government and political parties. The Army must further be aware that an appreciable number of intelligent civilian leaders view with alarm the grandiose expedition on which the Army has been embarked since September 18th. They feel that it will lead to eventual economic and financial ruin. These civilians may be expected, when an opportunity is presented, to attempt curtailment of the powers of the Army. Of this even the Army must have some realization. There seems to be an increasing opinion among thinking Japanese that the Army may fail in Manchuria. If this should happen the Army might blame the failure on the civilian government and oust it so that the powers of the military may not be cut down and so that—in its opinion—the Emperor’s Government may be efficiently administered. This would be virtually a military dictatorship.

There are factors that would run counter to such an ambition were it entertained. For example, the Army is said to be disunited. The senior officers and the junior officers are not mutually sympathetic. It has been stated that military affairs in Manchuria are in the hands of four comparatively junior officers (mentioned as being Lieutenant-Colonel Ishiwara, Colonel Itagakii, Colonel Doihara, and Major-General Miyake, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army) who disregard the desires of General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. United action might be difficult in respect to a coup d’état, lessening the probability of success. I shall attempt to obtain further information along this line, but it is, of course, difficult, for the military, despite an astonishingly naive frankness in some aspects of their plannings, is in others very secretive.

In my despatch No. 473 of January 29, 1932,¹ I have dwelt at some length on the serious economic and financial situation of the agriculturists of Japan, who form approximately half of the population of this country. The extreme docility of this class beneath increasing burdens—which is indicated by their lack of organization—leads one to believe that possible disorders in the rural districts would be of a sporadic character and more or less confined to tenant farmers, with scarcely any other objective than injury to those whom they feel to be immediately responsible, namely, landlords, and without any definite desire for political change. However, should trouble break out elsewhere, it would not be impossible that the tenant farmers might assist. A military coup d’état might be welcomed by them, particularly if they come to a realization a few months hence that the inflation policy of the present Government will not bring them relief.

Mention should again be made, as the Embassy has indicated in the past, that prediction with respect to action by Japanese is next to futile, except as an assurance that—if they do anything—it will be unpredicted. There is this to be said, however, on the other side: the Japanese may be amazingly long-suffering and give no indication of dissatisfaction—only to exhibit it suddenly and actively. In the Navy, for example, there have been instances of apparently acquiescent sailors suddenly throwing overboard an officer against whom they have conceived a grievance. In the American navy such resentment would probably be noticeable in many ways before an outbreak of violence.

Despatches are now in preparation, for submission in the near future, dealing with social unrest among the laboring classes and allegedly increasing radicalism. I shall not go into detail here, but one indication of apprehension in regard to labor’s dissatisfaction is the police guard maintained at the houses of those families of the Mitsui interests that profited by the “dollar coup” of last month.^║ In regard to the “red” movement, I have been reliably informed that the Court is genuinely perturbed. It is possible that the fear of the Mitsuis may have no more solid foundation than a guilty conscience, for their profit was at the expense of the country’s interests, or, at least, of no assistance to the economic situation. The Court, too, may have no real reason for its apprehension.

Yet, whether or not the foregoing may ever become pertinent in the light of subsequent events, it is at least a partial explanation of the atmosphere of possible change of which many seem to be conscious.

Respectfully yours,

W. Cameron Forbes

1. Despatch No. 423 of December 18, 1931. [Footnote in the original; for text of despatch, see Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. iii, p. 689.]
2. Despatch No. 382 of November 7, 1931. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
3. Despatch No. 440 of December 30, 1931. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
4. Despatch No. 440 of December 30, 1931. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
5. Despatch No. 460 of January 16, 1932. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]
1. Not printed.
2. Despatch No. 422 of December 17, 1931. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]