Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume IV
793.94/5616
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 21.]
Sir: In the belief that the observations and impressions of a visitor concerning the situation in North China will be of value to the Department, I enclose herewith a copy of the report made to me by Mr. Neville, Counselor of the Embassy, on returning from his recent trip to Peiping.
Respectfully yours,
The Counselor of the Embassy in Japan (Neville) to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
Sir: As directed in the Department’s telegram No. 166 of September 30, 6 p.m.,8 I proceeded to Peiping, leaving Tokyo on the evening of October 2, and arriving in Peiping on the evening of October 8. I left Peiping on October 28, and returned to Tokyo on November 2. I stopped over night at Tientsin on my way to and from Peiping, and had an opportunity while there to talk with the Consul General and the officers of the 15th Infantry, U.S.A., who are stationed there in accordance with the provisions of the Boxer Protocol. While in Peiping I had opportunity to consult with the Minister and his staff as well as a number of our consular officers in China, including Mr. Vincent who has recently been transferred to Dairen from Nanking.
I found considerable apprehension that the Japanese were contemplating major operations of a military character in the Peiping area. This apparently was due to two reasons. One was that the Japanese were determined to get rid of Chang Hsueh-liang, who has been the dominant figure in North China since the bulk of his forces have been driven from Manchuria. It is said that the Japanese believe that he is at the back of most of the “Volunteer Forces” and anti-”Manchukuo” bands that have recently caused the Japanese so much difficulty in their attempts to pacify the North-eastern Provinces. This would [Page 334] make it imperative for the Japanese to eliminate him completely from the advantageous position he occupies in Peiping. The other reason given was that it was the intention of the Japanese to include the Jehol region in the “State of Manchukuo”. This would require a large military force, assuming that the people of that province would be either unwilling or unable, on account of Chang’s military, to cast their political lot with the new “State”. The best method of subduing the Jehol region, I was informed, was from the south, as the area to the north was so mountainous and cut up that any large body of troops would find great difficulty in operating there, while invasion from the south could be effected with comparatively little difficulty through the pass just to the north of Peiping.
It was this belief that led the legations in Peiping to urge or rather to suggest that some steps be taken to assure the neutrality of the Peiping area in case of invasion by the Japanese. I was asked by the Minister to express my views in regard to the matter. I stated that in my judgment there was little or no prospect of major Japanese military activity in that region (the Peiping area) in the immediate future. At the same time, I did not believe, I stated, that the General Staff could be induced to make any statement on the subject, as anything relating to war plans has always been considered highly confidential. The Minister reported this to the Department.9 I presume that a copy of the telegram was sent to you by the Legation.
I gathered the impression from my talks with the Minister and others that the feeling of tension and of active ill will against the Japanese was much less acute than it had been earlier in the year. That is not to say that it has died out. It still exists and is decidedly a factor to be reckoned with. At the same time there appears to be little danger of an outbreak such as was feared at Tientsin some months ago. I cannot escape the feeling that a good deal of the distrust and ill will which the Japanese have incurred is not due entirely to their political activities, or even to the Manchurian situation. Much of it appears to be nothing but a question of manners. For example, the Japanese troops, both those at Tientsin and the small Legation guard at Peiping, are in the habit of carrying out their drills and marches at all hours of the day and night, and with little consideration for the convenience or susceptibilities of other nationalities. The guard at Peiping is under the control of the commanding officer at Tientsin and not that of the Minister, while the command at Tientsin is directed from Tokyo. This arrangement, while perfectly natural from the Japanese standpoint, is different from that of the other Powers, and places the Japanese Minister in a peculiar position with his colleagues [Page 335] and with the Chinese civil officials. During the past year both foreigners and Chinese got the impression that the Japanese army units in the North China region (outside of Manchuria) were unnecessarily evident. They conducted all sorts of drills and night marches in places where their treaty right to do so was, to say the least, open to question, and irritated local opinion. This behavior, it seems, was the result of general orders to improve or institute certain types of instruction in the army. They made no allowances for the troops in China, and the Japanese troops appeared in full war panoply at times when a desire to improve international relations would have led most people to show more discretion. I am informed that recently there has been a decided improvement in this respect.
This behavior, coupled with the activities in Manchuria, led many thinking people to believe that almost any sort of invasion could be expected from Japan, and undoubtedly explains much of the agitation for action which the Ministers in China have urged upon their Governments. They felt that it was necessary to get the Powers to do something before the whole of China was overrun by the Japanese. This idea is not as strong as it was, and I found a large measure of opinion to the effect that no really useful international action could be taken at the moment. The Lytton Commission had at least this merit; it has staved off action, and has given the world something to talk about. That in itself is a benefit, and as the report is accompanied by a large quantity of factual matter, anyone who reads it will be likely to become acquainted with the problem. There appears to be no prospect of hasty or ill considered action in consequence.
I found that our despatches were greatly appreciated by the Legation. The Minister told me that they were very useful to him and wished in every way to cooperate with the Embassy in furnishing us with copies of the Legation reports. Many of these, of course, have little or no political significance. The work there is to a high degree what might be termed protection work. This is of no interest to us. The political situation does not readily lend itself to analysis in China at the present time. I told the Minister that the Embassy would be glad to receive whatever he thought might be of interest, but that naturally he must be the judge of that. I think that copies of official despatches sent to the Legation might well be supplemented from time to time by informal correspondence.
I feel that my visit to Peiping was decidedly of value, and I am grateful to you and to the Department for giving me the opportunity to make it.
Yours respectfully,