Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume IV
793.94 Commission/521
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Mellon) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 11.]
Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith, as of interest to the Department, copies of two memoranda prepared after a discussion with Lord Lytton in the office of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on October 26, 1932, Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Ray Atherton likewise being present.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy
Memorandum by the British Foreign Office
Minutes of a Meeting in the Secretary of State’s Room at the House of Commons on Wednesday October 26, 3.45 p.m. to 5.15 p.m.
- Present:—The Secretary of State, Captain Eden, Mr. Orde and Sir John Pratt. Mr. Norman Davis, Mr. Atherton, Lord Lytton.
The Secretary of State explained that a certain reticence was imposed on us by reason of our position as a member of the League of Nations. Our object was to try and get the course of action which we approved adopted by the League as a whole. The right course appeared to be that the League should accept the Report especially as regards its findings of facts. The Report contained proposals as to certain things which China and Japan should do but not as to what the League should do.
[Page 327]Lord Lytton said that he would like to clear up a misconception. Many people criticised the Report on the ground that it threw the whole dispute back to the parties. That was not so. The Report implied that the League should define the conditions under which the negotiations should take place. The League should either accept the 10 principles enunciated on page 130 of the Report or lay down such other principles as might be applicable and then say to the Parties “are you prepared to negotiate within the framework of these principles?”
Mr. Norman Davis said that the Report might be divided into three parts, namely, findings of facts, statements of principles and suggestions of the procedure to be followed in applying these principles. There might be some leeway as regards procedure but the League would have no option but to accept the facts and principles.
There was some discussion on the ten principles laid down in the Report and it was pointed out that Japan was unlikely to accept Principle No. 7 while China might object to Principle No. 4. There was also some discussion as to the procedure that would be followed at Geneva, namely whether the Council would deal with the matter themselves or pass it straight on to the Committee of Nineteen. It was decided to write and consult Sir E. Drummond on this point. It was generally agreed that the Council was the better body to handle the matter.
Lord Lytton said that with regard to the best method of getting the Report accepted some thought that the right course was to make it easy for Japan while others said that Japan would never yield except to pressure. His own view was that the right course was to make it easy—go as far as it was possible to go in the way of conciliation and only consider what form of pressure was possible if conciliation failed.
The Secretary of State said that a strong argument in favour of the “make it easy” policy was that time was on the side of rectification. The burden on Japan’s finances and the weight of the solid block of Chinese sentiment still unreconciled would cause a change of mood in Japan.
Lord Lytton said it depended on the conditions under which time was to work. If all the States said to Japan “we never can recognise what you have done in Manchuria” then he agreed that time could be left to do its work. The Chinese would be encouraged and would work up their boycott. Japan could not stand the double burden of the financial pressure of military occupation and the loss of trade. But he did not agree that time could work if the world were left in any doubt as to the rights and wrongs of the present régime.
Mr. Norman Davis thought that it would be best to find a way to let Japan cool down and feel the pressure of the public opinion of the [Page 328] world and of her position of diplomatic isolation. But it would be difficult to do that if time were running against you, namely, if Japan were all the time becoming more and more entrenched in Manchuria. The Powers, as members of the League, had to decide what were the obligations of the League, but there was something else, namely, the Nine Power Treaty and the question of what would be the practical thing to do assuming that there were no League of Nations and that one did not have to worry about the obligations and the prestige of the League.
Lord Lytton said that any signatory of the Nine Power Treaty could call the other Signatories to a discussion. He had told the Japanese that even supposing the independence of Manchuria had arisen spontaneously they still had no right to accord recognition unilaterally without calling the other Powers into discussion.
The Secretary of State asked whether Mr. Norman Davis suggested a Conference.
Mr. Norman Davis said no, he had nothing to propose. What he’ had been trying to express was that in a way the League was a complication because it was necessary to consider what the League was obliged to do. Was it possible for the League to allow time for the cooling off process?
Lord Lytton thought not. Many delegations would propose definite action. There would be discussions about sanctions under Article 16. When that point was reached an attempt should be made to secure unanimity as to how far the League was prepared to go. If some Powers were not prepared to do anything at all others would want to move drastic resolutions and this lack of unanimity would render the League powerless and would be very bad. The question was how far was it possible for the Powers to go unanimously in the way of protest.
Mr. Norman Davis said that even the pacifists had backed away to a considerable extent from sanctions under Article 16. They were now saying two things:—
(1) If Japan refused to enter into direct negotiations the Powers should expel Japan from the League or withdraw Ambassadors—
Lord Lytton, interposing, said that if it was possible to secure unanimity for that time could be left to do its work but if the Powers were not prepared to go as far as that he could see only deadlock.
Mr. Norman Davis thought it would be a mistake to expel Japan from the League.
Lord Lytton asked what other proposal could Mr. Davis make that would satisfy the people who wanted to go a great deal further.
Mr. Norman Davis, after a pause, said he did not know. In a matter of League procedure the United States had no right to interfere. They [Page 329] were ready to cooperate with the League and if the League decided on action they would let the League know if they could join.
Lord Lytton said it would greatly influence the action of the League if it were known that the United States did not approve of expelling Japan from the League.
Mr. Norman Davis said that that was just his own personal view.
Lord Lytton said that Japan might leave the League. If the League accepted the Report and declared that Japan had violated the Covenant and the Pact Japan might leave.
Mr. Norman Davis did not agree. Japan had now got beyond that phase. She realized that if she left the League there would still be the Nine Power Treaty and world opinion.
Lord Lytton asked whether action under the Nine Power Treaty was contemplated.
Mr. Norman Davis said the United States had not thought out any plan of action under the Nine Power Treaty. They wanted the League to handle the matter. They did not want the Nine Powers to handle it.7a It would be bad taste on the part of the United States, not being members of the League, to say whether any State should be expelled from the League, but he did not think it would be good policy to expel Japan. The proper course was to keep Japan in the League and work for a constructive settlement but was it possible for League procedure to allow time for a cooling off process?
Lord Lytton thought that it was not possible in the case of a Covenant breaker.
The Secretary of State said he believed the Report was strongly critical of China. Were the recommendations all corrective of Japan or were there also recommendations for China to carry out?
Lord Lytton said there were, but he assumed the Chinese Government would not make any difficulty about that.
The Secretary of State asked what was it that the Council should recommend China to do.
Lord Lytton said there were certain recommendations the Chinese might not like such as the grant of an amnesty, the autonomy of Manchuria and foreign control of the police.
The Secretary of State referred to the last of the ten principles set out on pages 130 and 131 of the Report where it was laid down that the other Nine principles were all conditional on the establishment [Page 330] of a strong central Government in China. Might not Japan lay hold of that?
Lord Lytton said he would like to explain the genesis of that passage in the Report. He had from the beginning taken the line that their recommendations should be of such a nature that both Japan and China would feel glad that the League had taken up the dispute. He hoped that both sides in after years would be able to look back to the Report and say that from that day began the happy improvement in their relations. He therefore felt that the Report could not confine itself strictly to Manchuria for as regards Manchuria China was not going to get much out of it. She might, however, get something out of it as regards conditions in China itself. He felt that the Report ought to try and help China in her domestic problem. That would be the greatest service the Powers could render her. He had drafted several paragraphs on these lines which his colleagues had rejected for one reason or another but eventually they agreed upon the paragraph to which the Secretary of State had drawn attention.
The Secretary of State remarked that this had brought them back to the Nine Power Treaty again.
Mr. Norman Davis said that the League made no distinction between strong or weak governments and it was because China was in a state of chaos that the Nine Power Treaty had been negotiated. The Chinese Minister in London had told him that China felt the need of the assistance proposed in the Report and welcomed the suggestion.
The Meeting then ended.
Memorandum by the American Embassy in Great Britain
Memorandum of Conversation at the Foreign Office on October 26, 1932
- Present: Mr. Norman Davis, Mr. Ray Atherton, Sir John Simon, Lord Lytton, Mr. Anthony Eden, Sir John Pratt, Mr. Orde.
(It may be well to note that a great part of this conversation took the form of questions which, while discussed to some length, were not brought to any conclusions, but were obviously intended to stimulate trains of thought in certain directions for future consideration.)
The conversation started with the uncertainty as to whether the League Council would be prepared to receive the Report on November 14, or whether a delay might be asked until November 21. It was agreed that this question should be referred to Sir Eric Drummond. Lord Lytton pointed out that he understood that Mr. Matsuoka would be present on November 14 but that the written report which would [Page 331] follow him would not reach Geneva until a later date. Sir John Simon said that he conceived that in spite of the fact that it had been later referred to the Assembly on the Chinese request, the Report would be accepted and considered first by the Council under whose original instruction the Lytton Commission had been set up. This view was generally held after considerable discussion back and forth. Lord Lytton then said, in his opinion, the Report must be accepted right away by the League, but that it should also be borne in mind that the small countries of the League who had no responsibilities would be far more violent in their open denunciation of Japan at Geneva than would the larger countries whose responsibilities in the matter were far greater. Lord Lytton felt this should be curtailed in so far as possible, but Mr. Eden pointed out that he felt Japan would recognize that the barking of the smaller dogs was not worthy of any great consideration. The question was then raised as to what would be the attitude of the greater Powers towards the Report. Mr. Davis felt that there should be no attempt to reach an immediate judgment, a point of view which was obviously very much shared by Sir John Simon, who also pointed out that the Report also made observations regarding China as well, and that the Report must be accepted not only by Japan but by China likewise. Lord Lytton then pointed out that in his opinion, in the conclusions reached by the Lytton Report, Article 4 might cause some perturbation on the Chinese side, while Article 7 would certainly cause considerable hesitation on the part of Japan. He stated that in the preparation of the Report General McCoy had been of the utmost assistance to him, and added that the French member would never change his viewpoint to meet the English and American delegates until he had sought the counsel of his Italian colleague, who obviously, as a Latin, had a sympathetic mentality, and whose rank as Ambassador had earned his respect. Lord Lytton said that he had discussed a good portion of the Chinese part of the report while he was in Peking, and he felt there was nothing that the Chinese, for the sake of a final settlement, would not be prepared to consider favorably. Sir John Simon brought up the first paragraph of Article 10 of Chapter 9, relating to international cooperation in Chinese reconstruction, and stated that that indicated that the development of the central government was really a factor in the Manchurian situation[,] would not be overlooked by Japan, and in view of the recommendations in the Report could not be overlooked by the League.
Lord Lytton then went on to say that in his view of the matter for League procedure, the Report must first be accepted by the League; and then, in conjunction with Sir John Simon, outlined the following possibility for consideration at Geneva.
After the acceptance of the Report by the League a Resolution [Page 332] should be passed that the Manchurian question was sub judice, and pending its final settlement the position of any nation arrived at contrary to the violation of treaty rights would not be recognized by the members of the League. Then Lord Lytton felt that under the aegis of the Lytton Report Japan and China should be invited by the League to carry out the suggestions contained therein and open direct negotiations for the settlement of the Manchurian situation. Presumably it was Lord Lytton’s belief that this might well take place at Geneva and the conditions laid down for the negotiations might be drawn from material in the Lytton Report. This would be, in his opinion, accepted by China, and he felt it would create a difficult situation for Japan if she consistently refused such an invitation.
In the course of this conversation Lord Lytton asked Mr. Norman Davis what was the attitude of the United States. Mr. Davis explained that the United States desired to associate itself in so far as it was possible with the League in the matter, but that it was not a member of the League, and for that reason it was obviously impolitic for the United States to give advice to 54 nations who were debating the Lytton Report which had been prepared in accordance with the laws of the organization of which they were all members. Mr. Davis then repeated that his own personal opinion was that no action should be taken which would drive Japan into the open, since within the Manchurian question itself there lay such economic problems as well as social problems in the tacit resistance of the Chinese inhabitants of Manchuria to Japanese control; that Japan would find, once relieved from the pressure from without, that the internal pressure would become more and more conscious and would drive her to a settlement of relief. Lord Lytton then said that for his part he would regret very much any action taken by the League that would force Japan to resign. Upon a question by Sir John Simon to Sir John Pratt as to his opinion, Sir John Pratt said he did not think Japan wanted to resign from the League at all, an opinion which Mr. Davis shared. It was then pointed out that Japan would obviously still less desire to resign from the League if she realized that she would then be confronted by united opinion of those nine Powers who had signed the Nine-Power Treaty. Lord Lytton then asked what the United States was prepared to do under the Nine-Power Treaty, and Mr. Davis replied that that question had not arisen up to the present moment, and that he hoped for a continuing period the United States would be able to cooperate with the League and the other question was in abeyance pending that decision. Sir John Simon then pointed out that the Nine-Power Treaty had envisaged, and in fact was in great measure occasioned, by the weakness of the central Chinese government, which condition still existed today, and that this must be borne in mind in considering how [Page 333] far in any settlement of the Manchurian question China would be able to carry out engagements which that Government undertook.
In a letter of November 30 Mr. Atherton informed Mr. Orde of the British Foreign Office that Mr. Davis had asked that this statement be corrected to read:
“It seemed to Mr. Davis, since the League is now handling the matter, it should continue to do so, and that the United States would not in any way want to interfere with the League’s handling of the matter. Mr. Davis said that in so far as he knew the United States Government had no thought now of taking action under the Nine Power Treaty.” (793.94 Commission/733)
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