793.94 Commission/461

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

During the call of the French Ambassador we discussed the Far Eastern situation and the Ambassador said there were two cardinal principles which were guiding the French Foreign Office now. One, the necessity of respect for treaties and of standing firmly on that principle. The French Foreign Office believed that Japan, in what it had [Page 299] done in Manchuria, had acted directly against the interests of France, and that France was therefore thoroughly in accord with the principles upon which we were acting. In the second place, he said that her other cardinal principle was the necessity of securing the friendly cooperation of France, the United States and Great Britain, as the three liberal nations of the world, against the forces of the other way. I told the Ambassador that he knew my views on that; that when I went over to France during the War I went because I believed that those were the three great liberal nations of the world and that Great Britain and France were then fighting the battle of civilization against the forces of reaction. The Ambassador then said that France and the Foreign Office believed that the need for this cooperation still existed and believed it should be a permanent principle.

He then reverted to his talk with Mr. Kobayashi.92 I told the Ambassador that Mr. Castle had communicated to me what Kobayashi had said to him. He said yes, he thought it was very significant that Kobayashi said that something might be done and ought to be done to save China’s face, and the Ambassador thought that that indicated a chance for a solution of the Manchurian problem. He said he thought the time had come when something might be done to save Japan’s face—to use the velvet glove as well as the steel inside the glove. Japan had made a very grave mistake and she was suffering for it. The Ambassador then alluded to the fact that the yen had fallen very low and that banditry seemed to be flourishing in Manchuria. I told him that we had no desire to have Japan destroyed and that I had hoped that something might come out of the suggestions of the Lytton Report. I asked the Ambassador if he had read the report and, as he said he hadn’t, I told him I would send him a copy. I told the Ambassador that I wanted his Government to know that I was maintaining silence in order not to irritate Japan and in order to give an opportunity for conciliation on the basis of the Lytton Report; that I considered the work which Briand had done in presiding over the Council a year ago until he succeeded in getting the resolution of December 10th and the appointment of a commission to Manchuria was one of the great works in M. Briand’s life, and that it was now bearing fruit in a very constructive and judicial report which might lead the way out of the Manchurian difficulty. The Ambassador was very much interested and said he would read the report with great interest and thanked me for sending it to him.

H[enry] L. S[timson]
  1. Japanese agent seeking military matériel in France.