793.94/5091½
Memorandum of a Conversation85
M. Hymans stated that he was expecting the visit this afternoon of Nagaoka, and that according to what Drummond had told him Nagaoka was going to reply to the President of the Assembly in reference to the Draft Resolution of the Committee of Nineteen in somewhat the following sense:
That Japan could not accept the first paragraph of Article Eleven of the Draft Resolution, but that in a desire to be conciliatory they suggest that the Joint Commission contemplated in Article Four of the Armistice Draft should declare when in its judgment the withdrawal of the Japanese troops might reasonably be expected. This declaration, however, should be made to the Japanese authorities. In the event that the Japanese authorities were in accord, well and good; if not, the matter would be referred to a military technical committee which would examine the question. In the event that the latter committee informed the Japanese authorities in the sense of the Joint Commission and Japan still was not in accord, the matter would be referred back to the Assembly for action.
Mr. Stimson stated that he felt this was putting the cart before the horse; that in western countries at least the principle had long been prevalent that the civilian authorities had the last and decisive word in any case, and that as far as he (Mr. Stimson) was concerned, he could not accept a project which had a military committee revising findings in which the American Minister at Shanghai had concurred. In his thought, the matter should be arranged in the inverse order, namely, a military committee should examine and report to the interested civilian authorities on the Joint Commission, and the Joint Commission could then transmit its decision to the Japanese authorities; and if the Japanese were not in accord, the matter could be transmitted to the Assembly.
M. Hymans seemed to concur in Mr. Stimson’s thought, and stated that he would call in Mr. Wilson to tell him of his conversation with Nagaoka as soon as he had seen the latter this afternoon.
[Page 717]M. Hymans then asked the Secretary whether in these Shanghai negotiations he had any advice or thoughts which he would like to give him. The Secretary analyzed the situation, pointing out that what was needed was continuous and everlasting patience, especially when it was a question of negotiation with orientals, but in the exercise of this patience firmness was also essential, since unquestionably the Japanese would have their hands out from time to time for certain gifts which would sweeten the process of withdrawal. Becoming more specific, the Secretary called attention to the incident last winter of the “demilitarized zones” around the five Chinese cities,86 and stated that he thought the Committee of Nineteen would have to pay particular attention to the Japanese request for an undertaking by the Chinese not to enter those regions adjacent to Shanghai south of the Soochow creek. The Secretary fears that this demand may presage a possible plan for the demilitarization of a zone around Shanghai, and he added that the neutral Ministers in Shanghai felt that Japan’s demands in this connection were unjustified. The Secretary mentioned that Mr. Wilson had seen Matsudaira in the Secretary’s absence yesterday, and sketched some of that conversation, relating to the areas south of the Soochow creek. The Secretary spoke of the attitude of the businessmen of Shanghai.
The Secretary repeated that infinite patience was necessary, as well as a firmness adopted in a series of unanimous decisions by the States of the world. The publication of the letter to Senator Borah (inspired in the first instance by the question of the “demilitarized zones”) had caused Japan to back away, just as it would back away before any show of united determination, but the minute that determination seemed to weaken or relax, they would advance bit by bit.
The Secretary discussed the present conditions in Japan, and pointed out the disappearance from the scene of activities of such men as Wakatsuki, Hamaguchi, Baron Dan, Marquis [Count] Makino, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Inouye, etc. All of these gentlemen of broad international outlook, believing in the sanctity of treaties and full of the endeavor to cooperate with other nations, had either been assassinated by the militarists or were confined to their houses, afraid to go into the streets without armed guards. The Jekyl and Hyde story was apposite—there was a Jekyl Japan and a Hyde Japan, and at present the Hyde Japan was in the ascendency. It was necessary never to use harsh words which would stir up public opinion and give strength to this side which seemed to be for the moment prevalent in Japan.
M. Hymans introduced the broader question of Manchuria, stating [Page 718] that he did not think a solution would be pressed for in the Assembly Committee on May first, nor did he think that such a solution ought to be accepted even if pressed for until the Lytton Committee had had time to make a report. The Secretary concurred, and mentioned the difficulties which the Lytton Committee was experiencing through the obstacles placed in its way by certain Japanese authorities within Manchuria. The Secretary went on to explain that thirty years ago Manchuria was open land, with very few people; that since that time the Chinese population had become thirty millions, and the Japanese two hundred thousands; that one could not escape the conviction that the Japanese were animated by a desire to bring about a state of things in which their interests were altered from economic interests in Manchuria, with which he had a sympathy, into political interests in Manchuria, being domination by this two-hundred-thousand people over the thirty million Chinese; this domination represented a conception of relations of States which he had hoped that we had all outgrown and which, if allowed to continue, would throw us back in the march of history. But of course the attempt to introduce such a system would bring about inevitable interior difficulties, and the Secretary said bluntly that insofar as he could do so he would by public reiteration in conformity with such reiteration on the part of the other States of the world, seek to keep ever before the Japanese people the difficulty of the task they had undertaken, through the non-recognition of what they had done and through the constant focusing of public attention on the violation of the treaty obligations involved. He added that if the United States called attention to a violation of the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty it would have a certain influence but would be speedily forgotten, whereas if the States of the world did this world public opinion could not fail to affect a proud nation like the Japanese.
The Secretary then took up the failure of the Japanese to colonize Manchuria when they had every opportunity for doing so. He pointed out that similar failures were shown in their inability to colonize Formosa and Hakodate [Hokkaido?], to the south and north of them; they were not a colonizing people, and no amount of Government encouragement had been able to make them so. Thus what they had hoped to obtain in Manchuria by infiltration, the advance of commerce and the taking up of land, they were now endeavoring to seek by armed force.
Finally, the Secretary expressed his very high appreciation of the manner in which M. Hymans had conducted the Assembly meetings, told him he was following the march of their progress with the utmost interest and with the most sincere desire to cooperate. He added that [Page 719] the systems in the western world and in Europe had so many contradictory points that it was difficult to see how they could be brought into the same system, but that the immediate problem was to find the means by which those two systems could efficaciously and harmoniously work together for the peace of the world.
M. Hymans gave hearty assent.