793.94/4556½
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation46
Secretary: Hello, is that you, Wilson?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, this is Wilson.
Secretary: Well, I have received your No. 51.47 It has just come. I want to say something in clarification of what I told you yesterday.
Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir.
Secretary: My holding back in Shanghai is not predicated upon a desire to wait until the Assembly has acted, although I am naturally anxious to be sure that that matter is going on just as fast as we are on the matter which the others want.
Mr. Wilson: I think if there is one thing humanly sure, it is that the Assembly will act along the lines you want.
Secretary: Well, I am glad you feel that way now. Yesterday when you called you were a little bit doubtful.
Mr. Wilson: I was then, but I am assured now by conversations I have had today.
Secretary: Well, I am glad to hear that, but here is the real point. [Page 512] Are you listening? Here is the situation which is controlling my attitude in regard to the Shanghai conference.
Mr. Wilson: Yes.
Secretary: We made an offer last Sunday48 or Monday on the suggestion of Japan, really coming to us through the British and the League of Nations and it was predicated in general upon an immediate cessation of hostilities.
Mr. Wilson: I am sorry I did not get that, will you repeat it?
Secretary: I said our proposal was predicated upon an immediate cessation of hostilities. At the very time when we were drawing it up, the Japanese Admiral, Nomura, had called a conference on Sunday on Admiral Kelly’s warship and they were advocating an immediate mutual simultaneous truce—cessation of hostilities. On that basis we went into this and the Japanese Government formally accepted this on Tuesday, the first of March. In spite of all that they went on with a very large general attack, the largest one that has been made, and absolutely disregarded—
Mr. Wilson: In spite of the general attack, after that what did you say?
Secretary: The Japanese went on with the general attack after they had instigated this movement and after they had accepted it when it had been formulated, so that the very foundation of what we acted on has been knocked out by them and I am naturally very careful to see that if we go on with this part they want that it is going on under the necessary safeguards to protect China. Do you see?
Mr. Wilson: Yes.
Secretary: I am unwilling to go into any conference until I am sure that the Chinese are willing, otherwise the presence of the four powers will be used as a club to club the Chinese into coming in. In the second place, now that Japan has shown her readiness to go back on the understanding of the cessation of hostilities, I want to be sure that the other limitations on this discussion are also rigidly adhered to.
Mr. Wilson: Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary: Now, particularly I want to be sure that no matters are discussed which would be outside of the limitations we put into the offer of the League of Nations.
Mr. Wilson: I am afraid I lost that, will you repeat it?
Secretary: You remember last Sunday when this proposal of the League of Nations was formulated we had certain conditions. Japan agreed that she had no political or territorial designs and no intention of establishing a Japanese Settlement in Shanghai or otherwise advancing the exclusive interests of Japan, and you will remember in the [Page 513] discussion that I had with you over the telephone, I also wanted it to be clear that the other foreigners should not be trying to enlarge the Settlement under the cover of Japan’s offensive.
Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir.
Secretary: I am very much afraid that if this conference comes on without these restrictions being agreed to beforehand, when they get together Japan will bring up those things and will likely be backed up by powers in the International Settlement, so that they will be trying to get something out of China.
Mr. Wilson: The action of the Assembly this afternoon has clarified that situation.
Secretary: Tell me what it is.
Mr. Wilson: They have adopted a resolution reading as follows:
[Here follows text of resolution quoted in telegram No. 101, March 4, 9 p.m., infra.]
That is the end, Mr. Secretary. You see that under this resolution the Assembly is concentrating only on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.
Secretary: Yes. Well now, I understand that but it does not get what I am talking about.
Mr. Wilson: The Assembly called for the resolution of February 29th.
Secretary: Say that again.
Mr. Wilson: This resolution concentrates on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. Those are conditions precedent to the adoption of the measures called for in the Council’s proposal of February 29th.
Secretary: Well now, just let me make this further step clear to you. When this conference comes on I don’t want anything taken up there of a permanent nature of interests like the enlargement of the Settlement, because I think that it is only fair to China that any such propositions as that should be taken up at the same time that her own claims against Japan are taken up of a permanent nature.
Mr. Wilson: Mr. Secretary, yes, I understand that and have so explained to Simon. Your insistence on a fair deal with China [not?] to enlarge the Settlement is fully understood by him and Drummond and Paul-Boncour.
Secretary: I do not think it would be a fair deal to China to take up matters of that nature at the time when you could not also take up Manchuria, you see?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, certainly.
Secretary: In other words, there are two classes of matters which must be settled. First, the steps which the Assembly is on now, cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of this actual conflict at Shanghai. [Page 514] Secondly, there are other controversies of a general nature between Japan and China which must be taken up separately from the first class of cases.
Mr. Wilson: I agree and it is understood here.
Secretary: When they are taken up they must include the claims which China is interested in as well as the ones of Japan. Of course, one of the most important things that China is interested in is Manchuria. You understand that?
Mr. Wilson: Does that mean that you want in any discussion as to the eventual settlement in Shanghai that the Manchurian thing should be discussed as well.
Secretary: Yes. It is a question of this nature, not relating to this fighting, but relating to general controversies between the other two.
Mr. Wilson: It is only a question of the protection of the Settlement that can be discussed at Shanghai, without bringing in the Manchurian problem.
Secretary: Yes, it is a pure question of military protection and not of any commercial interests. If Japan is trying to get limitations on a peaceful boycott, for instance, not for protection of nationals which is a military matter, but a commercial boycott, why, she has got to discuss that at the same time China discusses Manchuria.
Mr. Wilson: I understand perfectly.
Secretary: Otherwise, we will have China left out on the limb.
Mr. Wilson: Mr. Secretary, Yen has fully approved this resolution of the Assembly.
Secretary: Yen has? Well, one thing more, Wilson—
Mr. Wilson: Mr. Secretary, may I inform Drummond that you are instructing our officials in Shanghai to help in this negotiation called for by the Assembly resolution that I read you?
Secretary: I think I shall probably be able to do that, but you better not do it now.
Mr. Wilson: I will [a]wait a telegram from you.
Secretary: You can tell him what my attitude is. I am not going to instruct my people to go ahead until I am sure it is not going to be used as means of a pressure on China. I understand what you told me about Yen but I want to be absolutely sure.
Mr. Wilson: I think this is illuminating. Sato wanted to insert the words [“]to regulate the details and the conditions of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces[”]. He was fought vigorously by the entire Assembly and finally withdrew his request for the insertion of the words “and conditions” so that no condition in the sense of a political agreement or commercial agreement would be attached to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.
Secretary: Yes, I see. Well, Wilson, I want to say one thing more [Page 515] that this attitude I am taking in regard to the boycott in [and?] Manchuria is made necessary by the recent notice that Japan has served that she proposes to take up the boycott matter now in Shanghai.
Mr. Wilson: I will not leave any misunderstanding on that.
Secretary: No. Remember this, when I speak of the boycott I am speaking of the boycott pure and simple. I am not speaking of violence which made necessary the landing of troops to protect nationals, but I don’t want to have China segregated from her legitimate claims by the action of the four powers.
Mr. Wilson: I understand, Sir.
Secretary: Now, I think you can tell Drummond that you have had this talk with me and you can explain my position and tell him I am going to help along as far as I can, but I don’t say unequivocally that our people will join entirely on what I now hear.
Mr. Wilson: I have telegraphed the details on this thing which you ought to have in an hour or two, so I shall wait for further instructions from you about instructions of the officials at Shanghai.
Secretary: I shall instruct my officials directly.
Mr. Wilson: Of course, but notify me you have instructed them when you do it so that I can notify Drummond.
Secretary: All right, I am very much obliged. I wanted you to understand the real reasons which are controlling our policy in regard to this conference now at Shanghai.
Mr. Wilson: You can be convinced that the whole temper of the Assembly was in line with your thought and everyone had the same preoccupation that it must not be done under the shadow of Japanese guns and China must not be put in an unfair position in carrying out these.
Secretary: Assure them of my utmost desire to cooperate as far as I can be assured that China’s interests are not being jeopardized.
Mr. Wilson: That is right.
Secretary: All right. Good-bye.