793.94/4166
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The French Ambassador called and read me certain cables, of which the following is a summary:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A telegram dated February 10, from Shanghai, relates to the different kinds of mediation that have been tried in a rather confused manner through different channels. The French Minister complains of this lack of unity. He enumerates the different attempts which have been made: (1) Consul General Ciano di Cortellazzo (son-in-law of Mussolini) made a proposal to Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister, for a neutral zone; (2) the British Admiral, Howard Kelly, who arrived only three days ago, has been very active. He had interviews with the Japanese and Chinese. All that was of no result. In the conversation with the French Minister, Mr. Wilden, the Admiral said [Page 288] there was nothing to be done for the present; (3) the bankers of Shanghai made an approach to the British and American Consuls General, which had been related in a former telegram; (4) the defense committee of Shanghai sent two propositions to Admiral Kelly, the first one proposing a neutral zone between the Chinese and Japanese troops, agreeing to the following principles: (a) that such an attempt would be impossible unless the Japanese refrain from bringing up any further troops; (b) if those conditions were fulfilled, a practical result could be reached, resulting in the evacuation of the salient (“the tongue”) of Hongkew by the Japanese, occupation of this tongue by a neutral force, the withdrawal of the Chinese troops for three kilometers west of the Railway; (c) it is not possible, owing to the labyrinth of crooked streets, to have an occupation by neutral troops in the area west of the tongue. The second resolution pointed out the danger of having international troops become implicated in the conflict. The only way to avoid this would be to have the Japanese troops evacuate the International Settlement. The defense committee does not explain how to accomplish this. The French Minister says he does not see how any local negotiations can be successful because the Japanese are evidently resolved to have a decisive success before they listen seriously to any negotiations.…
In respect to the confusion of counsels which the French representatives had reported from Shanghai, I begged the Ambassador to notice that none of these confusing proposals had been made by an American, and I then read him the substance of the telegram which I sent last night to Shanghai11 to the effect that we did not think any peace parley was under contemplation by the Japanese, nor could we see any hope for doing anything ourselves in that direction and that the American effort should be confined to the endeavor to protect the International Settlement by all appropriate means. I told the Ambassador that this summed up my views; that I believed, as evidently his Minister did, that the Japanese had made up their minds to fight this thing out until they had made a sufficient success to wipe out the disgrace of the setback they had suffered. I then told him that my thoughts were going on a different line; that I was hearing very alarming news from my Minister in China12 as to the effect the Japanese attack on the sovereignty of China was having on the people in China, and the imminent danger which Americans and other foreigners in China would be subjected to in case the Chinese people became suspicious that we were either sympathetic with or assisting the Japanese efforts to dismember China. I summed up the actions which were attributed to Japan against the Nine-Power Treaty, as well as the announcements [Page 289] which had been made against it by the spokesman of the Foreign Office, and I told him that I had under consideration an action under the Nine-Power Treaty to offset this danger which had been suggested by our Minister. He at once grasped the idea and said, “In other words you are thinking of a démarche by the four powers under the Nine-Power Treaty.” I replied that I had not reached the point of suggesting that, but I should think of it and I should like his Government to think of it.
The Ambassador then brought up the question of the protection of the Settlement. He told me he had lived in Shanghai and he knew the very grave danger which would exist in case the Chinese were forced to attack the Settlement or were driven into it by the Japanese. He said it was intolerable that the Japanese should use the Settlement for a base of operations against China; that there was plenty of room in China for them to fight elsewhere; that the Settlement was not intended for such purposes; and that their use of it both for means of landing forces and as a base of supplies was a complete violation of the purpose and charter of the Settlement. I told him that I realized all that; that we had protested from the beginning against using the Settlement as a base; that the British had supported us and I supposed the French also supported us. He said he supposed they had, but he thought now that a great battle was imminent and that the danger was extremely great; that another protest should be made in public against the use of the Settlement as a base. He thought the Japanese should retire from it and leave the protection of the Japanese element to the other nations; that that was the only way in which the Settlement could be protected from the danger of reprisals by the Chinese. I told the Ambassador I would consider it.