793.94/4113
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
I sent for Sir Ronald Lindsay and told him that I had done so for the purpose of keeping his Government entirely acquainted with our views and thoughts. I then reviewed the history of what had happened since I last saw him, including the two views of his Government and our Government as to what replies should be sent to the Japanese reply, if any. I told him I talked with Sir John Simon on Saturday about the new Japanese proposal to the three Ambassadors, and I read him my cable to London sent Saturday night, February 6, containing my instructions to Mr. Cunningham in regard to any negotiations arising out of the Japanese proposal. I said that I was surprised that we had not heard anything more about the Japanese proposals and asked him whether he had heard anything about them or whether he knew anything about the truth of the press report that Admiral Kelly had made some negotiations. He said he had heard nothing.
I then told him that while this situation was nebulous and uncertain and I did not wish to do anything which might imperil the dangerous situation of the International Settlement, I recognized that something might happen any day which would reveal a further extension of Japanese activities; that under these circumstances I was thinking over the possible action that might be taken by us, either alone or in conjunction with Great Britain and possibly the other powers, which would have as its purpose the summing up of the situation in Shanghai, including the unjustified bombing of Chapei, the attack on the Woosung Forts (which, so far as I knew, was also indefensible in law) and possibly giving notice, as I had done with regard to Manchuria on January 7, that we should not recognize any treaties or agreements growing out of such a situation of force. I referred to the feeling in this country at the time of the German invasion of Belgium, to which I rather likened the present attack on the Native City of Shanghai by airplanes, and I told the Ambassador that the Nine Power Treaty seemed to offer ample foothold in Article VII thereof for making such a statement as to this attack on Chinese sovereignty and independence. He was very much interested and listened intently and commented in a way to show he understood and sympathized.
I warned him that I was stating this not for immediate action, but to prepare his Government as to the way we were thinking, in order to see whether they would go along with us, and I pointed out to him that any morning we might wake up to find a crisis upon us arising out of the landing of new Japanese troops and a new encircling movement.