Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/3959½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁶²

February 5, 1932, 12:15 p.m.

Mr. Atherton: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: Is that you, Atherton. I was in Cabinet when you were talking this morning and was talking about this very matter. I have given consideration to the telegram that you sent last night giving the three points which had come from Sir John. My mind has been working on a rather different line of approach, but I agree with Sir John that there must be no divergence between us.

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir.

Secretary: I think the best way is for each of us to present frankly to the other our views, because I don’t think there is any immediate urgency at this moment. The principal thing which I think we must be very careful not to get into is any intrusion into the boycott question.

Mr. Atherton: No intrusion into it.

Secretary: I think it would be a very serious mistake. What I mean is, as Sir John well states, that is China’s age-long weapon against all aggressors and for four thousand years it has been so successful that no outside Government has ever permanently succeeded in affixing itself or settling itself upon China. One by one every one of them have been gotten rid of eventually by the Chinese vitality.

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir.

Secretary: That is the thing. I don’t see how any argument or suggestion about it would get anywhere frankly except to get the outsider into trouble.

Mr. Atherton: You don’t agree to telegram (A)?

Secretary: I don’t think that telegram (A) would get anywhere; it would get nowhere.

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir.

Secretary: As to the other matter, it is merely a matter of form really. What I mean is in respect to the fifth point about Manchuria, the objection of Japan inevitably ends for the time being at any rate any discussion of that because this was a matter of good offices and either party can veto any suggestion by the outsiders, but I prefer to let it stand. I would not make any statement or do any act which would indicate that we acquiesced with the idea put out by Japan that nothing in Manchuria was of interest or importance to anybody outside, so I should simply not discuss that or say anything about it to indicate any acquiescence in any way with the Japanese position. Now, the third point was in regard to the form which this should take with respect to possibly going on in the negotiations, do you see?

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir.

Secretary: There is a very strong feeling here on the part of the President and all of his advisers against putting the American Government in the position of making further suggestions which are being rebuffed by the people who are over there—Japan and China—and I feel that way myself. I consented to go into this only because a request came from both China and Japan that we should do so and the request from Japan was not only once but twice. We then made a suggestion to them which was the best we could do, and which all the other powers agreed with, and Japan has refused it. I don’t propose to be put in the undignified position of hanging on to the coat tails of anyone in putting forth conditions into a controversy which they may not want. That is the third objection I have to the program as it is put out and that is one which is very strongly felt here. Before I had received these two notes of Sir John, I had drafted one of my own covering these ideas. Have you someone to take it down?

Mr. Atherton: May I repeat it after you?

Secretary: Here it goes. You understand it had not even been through the Department, it is just my own words without diplomatic language, but it gives the idea in which my mind was working. Now, will you get it?

Mr. Atherton: If you read it to me, I will repeat it.

Secretary: All that I am saying to you this morning is subject to the preponderating proposition that I said first: that everything must be subordinated to the two Governments’ working together, but before I leave you I am going to suggest that probably I shall call up Sir John tomorrow and talk to him in person, but I want you to get this into your hands so that you will have a copy so that you can use it either with Vansittart or, if I can’t get Sir John, with Sir John. You see?

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir.

Secretary: “On the request of the Japanese and Chinese Governments for our good offices, the American Government suggested, in company with the British and French Governments, the steps which it believes would not only terminate the critical situation at Shanghai but would ultimately set in course of solution the unhappy controversies between China and Japan out of which this situation has directly grown. The essence of our suggestion lay in the proposal for an immediate cessation of hostilities on the part of both China and Japan and the avoidance of further sacrifice of life. China has accepted this unconditionally. The American Government is grievously disappointed that Japan has declined, but it feels that it would be fruitless to attempt to suggest any modification of details when the essence of the proposition is rejected. Our good offices will always be available to China and Japan when sought. For the present the American forces at Shanghai, working in cooperation with those of the other powers similarly interested, will continue to devote themselves to the protection of the lives and property of the Americans and others who with them are in jeopardy in the International Settlement.”

Secretary: Well now, that was the idea. I had to make it very brief and to cover those points.

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir, that idea was to make a statement to that effect.

Secretary: To send this in the form of a memorandum to Japan, but also to make it public because of course the Japanese have made their note public.

Mr. Atherton: Mr. Secretary, I shall inform Vansittart that first, you feel the need for absolute Anglo-American unity and that you do not accept telegram (A) and that you are not disposed to accept telegram (B), but will put forth this statement which you are considering and will endeavor to suggest it to Sir John tomorrow at Geneva.

Secretary: I would put it this way; rather than to say I reject them, say the objections which I mentioned to you in the other draft.

Mr. Atherton: The reasons you gave for rejecting number (A).

Secretary: Well, the three reasons that I gave you first applied to the general situation which is covered by both telegrams (A) and (B).

Mr. Atherton: In short, Mr. Secretary, you don’t agree to either (A) or (B).

Secretary: As they stand, I am troubled by them both. My idea is not to force an immediate decision on this but to see if I could get hold of Sir John tomorrow when he reaches Geneva. Do you know how long he will be in Paris?

Mr. Atherton: Tomorrow morning he will leave there for Geneva.

Secretary: Does he not stop two or three hours in Paris?

Mr. Atherton: As I understand, he is going directly to Geneva. I will telegraph tonight on that point and let you know.

Secretary: The main thing that I foresee a little trouble in is the difference between us on the method of whether we should let this thing rest right here for the present and devote ourselves to the International Settlement protection, leaving it up to them entirely to make any move, or whether we should hang on to this proposition. In view of the way we look at it here, I don’t think that we could hold on to that proposition. The Japanese have turned down the essence of it; they have used the time, as Sir John in his draft points out, for reinforcing themselves for a new conflict. I don’t think it is a very dignified thing, under those circumstances, to argue about Shanghai when they are kicking our main proposition around the block and I don’t like to do it and that is the very strong feeling here.

Mr. Atherton: Very good, Sir.

Secretary: If Sir John feels very strongly about that, I would rather make no answer myself and let him make what answer he wants rather than to be inconsistent about it.

Mr. Atherton: You would rather he went along without the United States.

Secretary: Yes, I will make a statement to the press and just remain silent so far as Japan is concerned.

Mr. Atherton: If Sir John feels strongly, you prefer that the United States make no answer, but in that case would you issue a statement or not?

Secretary: Well, that I have not considered, but I should probably have to make some statement to the effect that we have been requested for good offices and it has not been accepted and that is all there is to it.

Mr. Atherton: Very good, Sir, I shall telegraph you this evening.

Secretary: All right, but I want you, above all, to make absolutely clear that I am going to make every effort. I have only just received his papers and I have been at work on my own lines for some time and I am not going to allow myself to act on the spur of the moment. I am treating Sir John the way I would and have already treated him in private practice, when we didn’t agree on the first point, but I feel pretty strongly about the dignified way of doing this and I don’t think it is dignified to continue a discussion while Japan is acting in this way here. I think the strong point is that it would be very unwise to get into the boycott.

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Sir, that is all very clear. Good-night, Sir.

62. Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Mr. Atherton in London, February 5, 1932, 12:15 p.m.