793.94/3957½

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation59

Mr. Atherton: Hello, Bill, have you got a stenographer there who can take down part of what I say?

Mr. Castle: Yes, all of it is being taken down.

Mr. Atherton: The latest advice from the Military Attaché at Tokyo informed the Foreign Office that two mixed brigades of a total of some eight thousand troops may be expected to arrive at Woosung on Saturday, probably followed by one division of some fifteen thousand men early next week. I talked with Sir John before he left for Geneva this morning and he has prepared two telegrams of instructions to the British Ambassador at Tokyo which I am going to read to you. As soon as your approval to the plan set forth therein has been received, they will be despatched to the British Ambassador at Tokyo, and the British Ambassadors in Paris and Rome will be instructed to urge upon those Governments to take similar action; also Sir John will [Page 220] be there to discuss the matter fully with Tardieu and Grandi when he arrives at Geneva tomorrow morning, for not only does the British Government deem it important to take immediate action but they think it is almost equally important for the League at Geneva to take early action. The Foreign Office hopes that your instructions to Tokyo will coincide with the language of these telegrams of instruction. I shall read them slowly. The following is telegram “B”:

“The British Government is naturally much disappointed with the Japanese reply, inasmuch as the Chinese for their part have unreservedly accepted all five points. We are particularly disappointed with the decision of the Japanese Government to send troops to Shanghai, which, unless every precaution, including the instituting of immediate negotiations, is used, will widen the conflict and intensify the danger already so manifest. As regards the first three paragraphs of the Japanese reply which refer to the difficult situation, you should inform them that the Chinese have accepted our proposal and should urge them to modify their attitude …60 You should therefore ask the Japanese Government to instruct their representatives on the spot to adopt the most moderate and conciliatory attitude, and in particular to make as little difficulty as possible in regard to the neutral zone.

“As to point five, the Japanese Government would seem to be under a misapprehension. It is not contemplated that the discussions thereunder provided for shall extend beyond the point of conflict at present, causing acute danger, and so intensibly, of international interest at Shanghai and in the Yangtze Valley. It is the considered view of the British Government that they are legitimately entitled to and must take part in any such negotiations, together with the other powers concerned.

“His Majesty’s Government have no desire to occasion either undue complications or undue delay in this matter, and they therefore take the view that the best means of international participation in such negotiations will be by taking advantage of the good offices of the League Commission of Inquiry now on its way. It will be borne in mind that the Commission was appointed with the consent of Japan and that its scope was at the request of Japan and not [extended?] to cover such areas as Shanghai on the ground that boycott activities should come within its purview. At such a meeting it is considered that these representatives will play a useful part in helping toward a solution of outstanding local difficulties and complaints.”

Mr. Atherton: That was telegram “B”. Now I will read you telegram “A”.

“You should also concurrently with the United States, French and Italian colleagues urge the following considerations upon the Japanese Government at the same time you make representations set forth in telegram (B). The Japanese Government claims, as we understand it, that one of the chief sources of friction and causes of conflict has been the anti-Japanese boycott. We are anxious to arrive by negotiations [Page 221] at the removal of this obstacle if it continues, together with any other that may be found to exist. We are unanimously of the opinion that this end can best and probably only be arrived at by participation of the League Commission who are impartial and are equally and demonstratively interested in the restoration of peaceful conditions at the earliest possible moment.”

Mr. Atherton: Bill, as soon as we get your reply, if you agree to send similar instructions to Tokyo we will send these off, so I will wait on the other end of the telephone to hear from you.

Mr. Castle: Yes, you wait and as soon as the Secretary gets back from the Cabinet meeting, and by that time the notes will have been written up and he can consider them. Our feeling was that perhaps at the moment it was not wise to do anything. After he sees what the British want to send he may change his mind on that.

Mr. Atherton: I think the feeling is that something ought to be done before this heavy troop movement.

Mr. Castle: There is a heavy troop movement already under way.

Mr. Atherton: It will arrive tomorrow morning.

Mr. Castle: Yes. We will ring you up after the Secretary gets back and considers this.

Mr. Atherton: Just one more thing. I have just received Mr. Mellon’s agrément61 from the Foreign Office.

Mr. Castle: I am glad because the President wants to send it up to the Senate today.

  1. Between Mr. Castle in Washington and Mr. Atherton in London, February 5, 1931, 11:10 a.m.
  2. Apparently poor telephone connection at this point.
  3. Andrew W. Mellon was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain on February 5, 1932.