793.94/3946: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
5. This morning Drummond handed me two memoranda of conversations which he had on Wednesday night with M. Sato and Matsudaira and the other with the Undersecretary General of the League.50 These are of such high importance that I asked his permission to cable them to you verbatim.
Memorandum number 1 follows:
“M. Sato and M. Matsudaira came to see me this afternoon.
M. Sato told me that he had received a telegram from his Government saying that they could not accept the application of article 15 to Manchuria. If that application were limited to Shanghai events the Japanese Government would not oppose it but they definitely refused to allow the Manchurian question to be considered under that article.
I replied that I feared that the Japanese Government were under some misapprehension. This was not a question which lay within their competence to refuse or to accept. China had asked that the dispute as a whole should be submitted to the Council under article 15. There [Page 203] was no option but for the Council to consider the dispute under this article. It was not within the power of the Japanese Government to limit the question submitted by China under article 15. I held the view that contrary to the thesis advanced by M. Sato the other day the Council did not have to seize itself of the dispute under article 15. It was already seized of the dispute under that article by the Chinese submission and now would require either unanimity or majority of the Council to state that it did not intend to proceed with the consideration of the dispute under that article.
M. Sato remarked that as the Manchurian question had been dealt with by the Council under article 11 it could not deal with it simultaneously under article 15.
I replied that I did not think that this was the case. The two articles ran concurrently. Clearly if during the consideration of the dispute under article 15 a danger of war occurred the Council was entirely competent to deal with that danger under article 11, and indeed it was its duty so to do.
M. Sato remarked that apart from the Covenant there was the resolution of the jurists committee (Corfu affair) which had studied questions relating to article 15 and that committee had said that the Council need not unless it so desired deal with a matter under article 15.
I replied that I thought that this was not exactly how the situation stood. The first two paragraphs of article 15 called for automatic action and it was only when the statements were made by the two parties and brought to the knowledge of the Council that the Council could decide whether or not the dispute was of a character contemplated by article 15, viz, a dispute likely to lead to a rupture. But if the Japanese Government had really strong legal doubts on the various aspects of the case I would recommend to the Council that they should ask the court urgently for an advisory opinion on the points raised. This would not, of course, prevent the procedure under the first two paragraphs of article No. 15 continuing. At the same time I felt that I ought to warn M. Sato that I was convinced that my interpretation of the article was legally correct and that an opinion from the court could only go against the Japanese thesis. The position therefore should be carefully considered by the Japanese Government from that point of view.
M. Sato thenceforth said that the Chinese Government had also invoked article 10. Surely as article 10 referred to aggression against the territorial integrity and political independence of a member these were matters of such political importance that the votes of the two parties must be counted.
I replied that for the moment it seemed to me that article 10 was not in question; but the line taken by M. Sato seemed to me to be somewhat contrary to common sense because even if a country violated the territorial or political integrity of another country its representative on the Council would never admit it and it would be intolerable if the vote of that country were allowed to stop action by the Council to preserve such integrity. At any rate it seemed to me for the moment that the question of article 10 could be left on one side.
As M. Sato continued to state very strongly that his country would never agree to the Manchurian questions being treated with the help [Page 204] of any third party, I again emphasized the fact that the Council had no choice according to the terms of the Covenant but to deal with the dispute as submitted by the Chinese representative. Criticism in Japan should be directed not against the Council which was simply performing a treaty obligation but against the terms of the Covenant itself and against China for having invoked article 15. M. Sato knew that the members of the Council had done their utmost to prevent this article being invoked but China had ultimately decided that it was necessary and nobody could gainsay her right.
M. Sato again emphasized the fact that public opinion in Japan was violently excited because they considered that the Council had accepted to treat the Manchurian questions under article 15 in spite of Japan’s protests.
I said that was greatly to be regretted; but I could not see that there was any other alternative. I heard that the Japanese Government was contemplating the very grave step of withdrawing from the League owing to this popular feeling. Nobody could be more sad if such a thing happened than myself; but really I would prefer such withdrawal to the abandonment of the principles laid down in article 15. To agree with the Japanese contention would be simply to destroy the effective value of the Covenant. I hoped at any rate that before any such step were taken the Japanese Government would consider very carefully the third paragraph of article 1 that stated that a state could only withdraw after 2 years’ notice provided it had fulfilled all its international obligations and obligations under the Covenant.
M. Sato answered that while it might be true that Japan was legally bound to remain a member of the League for 2 years it might well be that in practice she might retire and have nothing more to do with the League even if she had not fulfilled her international obligations.
I remarked that even so she would hardly be in a better position than she was in today. Article 17 made provision for states not members of the League engaged in a dispute.
The conversation ended by my saying to M. Sato that I hoped that he would forgive me for having expressed my views very frankly but I thought that it was much wiser to explain the position as I saw it. M. Sato said that he was grateful for this frankness and he would certainly report what I had said and meanwhile he was going to talk to Lord Cecil on the same subject.”
Memorandum number 2 follows:
“M. Sugimura came to see me this afternoon and said that M. Vigier had made a very interesting suggestion to him with regard to the fifth point in the British-American proposals which is as follows:
5. Upon the acceptance of these conditions prompt advances to be made in the negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of December 9 without prior demand or reservations and with the aid of neutral observers or participants.
M. Sugimura thought that the Japanese representatives here might suggest to Tokyo that this proposal might be accepted provided that [Page 205] the members of the Lytton Commission should be utilized as the neutral observers. This Commission had been appointed with the concurrence of the two parties and was therefore in somewhat special position. He would base his arrangements on the fact that under the resolution of the 10th December the Council would in due course have dealt with all the questions at issue between the two Governments including Manchuria. It was certainly preferable that these questions should be dealt with in the Far East rather than at Geneva and he would therefore suggest that the negotiations should take place in the Far East with the members of the Lytton Commission as observers. But if this was acceptable it would be necessary for the Japanese Government to obtain something in return. Would the four powers concerned recommend to the Chinese Government that it should withdraw its submission of the dispute under article 15? I said to him that I did not know whether this was possible; but if such a request were to be made by the Japanese Government it ought to be made, in my view, on the ground that the 6 months allowed under article 12 for the Council’s report under article 15 were not in this particular case anything like sufficient considering the complexity and importance of the questions at issue. If the reason was confined to this practical ground I thought that it might be urged on the Chinese Government with some chance of success. But, of course, I was not in a position to give any assurance or guarantee.
M. Sugimura was very pessimistic as to the situation but thought that perhaps this suggestion might afford a possible way out.”