793.94/3785½
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation11
Mr. MacDonald: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary: Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister. The important news as it seems to us, so far as I have been able to go over the cables, is the interview which took place in Tokyo12 between the Foreign Minister there and your Ambassador and our Ambassador and the French Ambassador in that there seems to be implied and pretty strongly expressed a desire for our good offices and I have just been in conference with the President and we think that we should confer with you as to taking that up along the following lines: Have you any way of taking it down?
Mr. MacDonald: Just one moment, I will get someone at the ‘phone to take it down.
Secretary: We think that they virtually asked for suggestions and that we should put out the following which is an attempt to follow the lines already partly worked out in Shanghai. I have got it in very brief form.
Number One. Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides.
(Mr. MacDonald repeats it.)
Number Two. No further mobilization or preparation for further hostilities between the two nations.
(Mr. MacDonald repeats it.)
Number Three. Withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese forces from all points of mutual contact in the neighborhood of Shanghai.
(Mr. MacDonald repeats it.)
Number Four. Establishment of neutral zones in Shanghai by the Settlement and Consular authorities.
Mr. MacDonald: Within Shanghai?
Secretary: No, no, not within the Settlement but protecting it. You know that is the proposition they already have under consideration. These zones to be policed by neutral forces under arrangements to be set up by the Consular authorities.
[Page 154]Number Five. Upon acceptance of these conditions prompt advances to be made in negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and of the resolution of the League of December 9, without prior demands or reservations and with the aid of neutral observers or participants. That is the total. That is the suggestion. I suggest that as a proposal to be made by you and us and if the French will follow it, the French and the Italians, but if there is any delay or the French will not follow it, we will be willing to go ahead with the proposal if you would with us.
Mr. MacDonald: The idea is to get the French and Italians to agree on all conditions and there has to be no delay. If there is any delay you are willing to go ahead provided we cooperate.
Secretary: Let me say one word or two of explanation. The first four points constitute the truce or the original proposal; we try to follow what we understand they have been working on in Shanghai. Now, of course, details of that are subject to change after discussion with you. The whole thing is open to discussion with you. We have necessarily been very hurried in getting this up, but you see it is early morning yet here and the message has only just come in reporting that conference, but it seems to us to be a psychological moment in the light of the Japanese Foreign Minister’s talk to our Ambassador and your Ambassador and the French Ambassador yesterday. Now, will you confirm that with your Foreign Office and see what their impression is and, if you do, will you let us know and we suggest that the advances to France and Italy could be made better by you than us because you have quicker telephone communications.
Mr. MacDonald: We make the communications to France and Italy?
Secretary: Yes.
Mr. MacDonald: We have just received a report, as a matter of fact it was handed to me when I was told you wanted to speak to me on the ‘phone and I have not had time to study it, but we have received a report from our Consul at Shanghai which puts a more sinister light on the whole thing. He has at last come to the conclusion that the Japanese will not agree, the Japanese naval authorities in Shanghai, since his talk with them he is convinced that they don’t mean to come to an agreement; that they want to fight the situation which will mean that they will get extraterritorial concessions there and can use those concessions as a point for advancing Japanese trade in China. As I say, I haven’t studied it but have just looked at it and that is the gist of his message.
Secretary: There has been no suggestion of that to us. Of course, that has been an idea which they have had for many years back but, at [Page 155] the present moment, the thing that is significant is that Japan is hesitating very evidently at the serious position she has gotten into at Shanghai and the further strain that would be put upon her to organize a land force to attack the Chinese in the neighborhood of Shanghai and to rescue her Navy from the predicament they have gotten into. The significant statements that they have made to our Ambassador are very significant on that point. In the first place, the Foreign Minister is reported in the press to have said that the Japanese naval force would be wiped out unless they organize a big land force. There seems to be a clean admission that they are in trouble. He also made a definite statement to our Ambassador that it was not the desire of the Japanese to send any further reinforcements or to send any landing troops, and he also appealed to us at the end, my Ambassador reports, that at the end he laid a special stress upon his request that we use our good offices to induce the Chinese not to move up their troops. That was a direct appeal. I am quoting the language of our Ambassador.
Mr. MacDonald: Oh yes, I will take note of that; that is very important.
Secretary: There was a direct appeal, according to Mr. Forbes our Ambassador, that at the end he laid a special stress upon his request that we use our good offices to induce the Chinese not to move up their troops.
(Mr. MacDonald repeats it.)
Secretary: I will just give you another point here; I have the cable before me. Further back before that our Ambassador used these words that the Foreign Minister expressed appreciation of the good offices of the American and British Consuls General towards stopping hostilities and he requests that the United States use its good offices to induce the Chinese troops not to bring up further reinforcements and to withhold [withdraw] the troops now in Shanghai to a safe distance, to avoid clashes, and he follows that with the definite statement that it was not the intention of Japan to send any further reinforcements or land troops. That is about as definite a request for good offices as a nation could make.
Mr. MacDonald: Yes, that is a definite, precise statement. We are working on that.
Secretary: Now this is our situation. What I have read to you is our suggestion of what we think would be a fair proposal under this suggestion of good offices.
Mr. MacDonald: Very well, I will make the necessary consultations and will study your suggestions and then ring you up again in an hour or half hour. Good-bye.
Secretary: Good-bye.
- Between Mr. Stimson in Washington and Mr. MacDonald in London, February 1, 1932, 10:15 a.m. Memorandum made in the Department of State for its own use; not an agreed record of the conversation.↩
- See telegram No. 31, January 31, 9 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 169.↩