500.A15A4/1083: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
220. You will readily recall from your own experience that the necessary atmosphere of compromise and concession in an international [Page 146] gathering can only be after it has reached the point of despair and stalemate. It seems that the situation in Geneva has touched bottom this week. However, it is like a log jam with no telling when it may be broken. It is quite possible that the conversations in 2 weeks may accomplish this all at once and in particular should MacDonald put into discussion a broad program such as that outlined by Baldwin the whole picture would change.
In order to prepare for any such conversations which would be held before the Lausanne Conference it seems necessary to take account of stock. Our present authority is as follows:
We were authorized to make the nine proposals contained in the opening speech,21 three of which indicated an advance over our previous position namely those which referred to the possibility of limitation of expenditure as a complementary method to direct limitation, that which suggested a new method for the computation of effectives which we have not as yet had an opportunity to present, and the suggestion that we advocate special restrictions for tanks and heavy mobile guns of peculiarly aggressive character. Only the first of these showed any modification of our previously announced principles and this is made conditional.
Encouraged by the many tangible proposals made by other governments we elaborated and were authorized to bring forward the proposals on the subject of the abolition of tanks and heavy mobile guns which called for concession on our part. On these three subjects we have not gone as far as a majority [of?] the delegations here present including certain of the great powers.
With respect to naval limitation we have expressed a willingness to extend existing treaties while maintaining the ratios established at Washington and London and maintain our attitude on the abolition of submarines. The majority of the great naval powers desire to go further.
With respect to air we have made no tangible proposals and expressed no opinion except the announcement of our initial proposal to participate in measures to protect the civilian population against aerial bombing. With respect to this arm our attitude is definitely way behind the majority of the delegations here including the great powers among whom there is an increasing tendency to feel that abolition of military aviation on land and sea is the only possible way of combating the menace it affords to the feeling of security. Thus far our only instruction on the subject has been that of coupling the abolition of bombing aviation with abolition of the submarine.
In view of the statements by the President that the United States is willing to [go?] as far as others in relative reductions and your [Page 147] own statements along similar lines it seems essential that we have the benefit of your instructions before we are suddenly faced with any possible coincidence of views among the leaders who will presumably meet here about the 12th as it would be a great pity to lose the advantage of any agreement among them through the cooling off that might take place and the doubts that might arise which [while?] we are seeking instructions on the points as they come up.
It does not seem likely as long as the administration is working for any form of limitation of armament that it will be able to obtain, by compromise and reservations on concessions support from big army and navy groups. Only the liberal minded people in the United States can be expected to support any measure of disarmament and organizations representing these, according to the indications we receive here, are thoroughly discontented with the situation and intend to express their dissatisfaction with the policy very vigorously at Chicago when the two convention platforms are being drawn up (see my 212, May 26, 8 p.m.).22
We are not advocating any specific plan of a comprehensive nature, neither are we convinced that initiative in such a matter should come from us—it might well be that initiative by a European Power would be more effective or that the best course would be a joint plan put forward by several powers which we might or might not join. However, we feel that we must be in a position to take immediate advantage of any unexpected events of this kind and avert any possibility that the United States should be held up as the obstacle in the way of realization of drastic and definite steps in disarmament. Therefore, we feel that our Government ought to examine with the greatest care what real concessions the United States might be willing to share with other countries in order to bring about an easing of the political and economic tension of the world.
To make clear our present preoccupation let us assume that MacDonald brings forward here in the Conference or in the conversations either Baldwin’s plan23 or something approximating it and asks us how far we can go with him. According to the President’s statement we would be expected to agree to any measure of reduction provided the relative naval ratios are maintained but under our present directives we should be obliged to say that on land we can join him on tanks, heavy mobile artillery, gas (without foregoing the right to prepare in time of peace which we very much fear might be considered as an evidence of either bad faith on our part or lack of [Page 148] faith in international agreements). Concerning the air we could not accompany him in general abolition of military aviation and would have to state that we are ready to abolish bombing planes providing submarines were also abolished. On the sea we could join him in the abolition of submarines but not in the abolition of aircraft carriers. With respect to the reduction of effectives, while it is understood that no form of reduction would affect the minimum army which we maintain, it would assuredly be necessary in order to maintain reductions from others for us to assume an undertaking not to increase our present forces. Are we authorized to agree to this? On limitation of expenditure we would reply that we can limit our expenditure on land material only if and when other powers have accepted direct limitation of this material. In other words, as things now stand we could express no opinion as to the general scheme but could only take it piecemeal which in view of its presentation as a general scheme is equivalent to a refusal and would be so considered. Therefore we are in urgent need of precise indications how far we can go. For example, what shall be done if the proposition is made by Great Britain to abolish battleships entirely? Shall we accept that or offer a counter proposition? If so what counter proposition? Do you desire us to make an offer as to numbers of capital ships? What are we authorized to agree to on 8-inch gun cruisers; 6-inch gun cruisers; aircraft carriers; submarines; destroyers; and military aviation?
We have no knowledge that the Baldwin program will be brought forward and feel sure that it would not be launched as a surprise. Nevertheless in view of the situation in England and in the world at this time and the acute financial stringency, the possibility must be taken into account. Furthermore we have reason to believe that the new French Government will soon realize the urgent necessity to reduce expenditure which will face them and with this realistic incentive and the knowledge that there is no possibility of obtaining further mutual guarantees it may be easier for Herriot to feel free to join England in the leadership of a great world movement for disarmament. Should the United States be able to go along, it seems that a Left French Government would almost surely be well disposed to such an initiative.
There has been developing recently a strong feeling that something substantial and effective must be done to restore confidence and turn the tide of depression, otherwise all governments will sooner or later be forced to make substantial reductions in expenditures to offset a continuing decline in income in order to balance their budgets and avoid bankruptcy; that the most far reaching and least harmful [Page 149] reductions could be made in military expenditures particularly aviation; that nothing else would give such a measure of financial relief or contribute so much towards reducing political tension, restoring confidence and promoting recovery and that unless this is now done by agreement it may be done of necessity without the revivifying effect that would follow concerted action.
In other words it is believed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity and necessity that exist in order to achieve by general agreement a universal and relative reduction of armaments to the great advantage and perhaps salvation of the world which if not done by agreement may very well be brought by force of circumstances and in a manner disastrous to the world.
Naturally we fully realize that any agreement would have to be absolutely complete and general and that there could be no liberty to pick and choose items in it.
We hesitate to express any specific ideas as to how far we should go in naval matters because we cannot in Geneva estimate how any such measures would affect our relative strength with Japan. We cannot foresee how Japan would react to any drastic proposals of this sort but even if her opposition made acceptance impossible you may feel that a unity of front of the civilized western powers toward drastic reductions would be a further evidence of that unity of purpose between them for which you have been working.
These views represent the opinions of the whole delegation and this telegram has their unanimous and whole-hearted approval, stating as it does very frankly the situation as it presents itself at this moment and represents an urgent plea for the taking of stock so that in case a great opportunity arose we should not miss it.
I want to make very clear that we are not taking exception to the attitude of our Government on different points. Obviously when these different items are treated separately on the agenda of the conference each must be dealt with as if it stood alone. In the course of the past few weeks the discussions in the technical committees have brought us to the conclusion that we shall never get anywhere along these lines because there is so much opposition in dealing with each individual item to prevent progress at any point and we are more and more convinced that the only hope of achievement lies in some general scheme in which everybody gets something he wants by giving up something he wants. This does not mean that we are advocating Baldwin’s scheme specifically, but we submit that we feel you should be considering what general conception we could accept in the interest of agreement.
Naturally we recall from the discussions while you were here that the instructions we have on these various points do not necessarily [Page 150] represent the last word of our Government on the whole subject and that in the face of any general movement for real disarmament the United States would not hold back but we feel with the possibility of this new situation arising very soon that we now need the benefit of your guidance based on consideration of the whole problem and all its component parts.