500.A15A4 Land Armaments/84: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson)
109. The Chief of Staff, with whom we have consulted as to the points raised in your 188 May 16, 11 p.m., continues to feel that we should maintain unchanged our original position as expressed in telegram No. 103 May 14, 3 p.m. The following memorandum sets forth his view in some detail:
“With respect to the possibilities of lack of appropriations for maintenance of the agencies pertaining to gas warfare, there appears no tendency in Congress at present to diminish appropriations for the Chemical Warfare Service, in fact no reduction was made in this item in the appropriation bill now under consideration, but on the contrary references were made on the floor of the House to the necessity for increases. It is our belief that the greater disadvantage to the United States would lie in the scrapping of our existent agencies and materials. The United States will suffer the severest of any nation by a policy of scrapping, a thesis that will doubtless be advocated strongly by those nations with little or nothing to forego. No evidence of good faith by the United States in the nature of scrapping agencies or materials seems necessary if we become a signatory to a treaty in accordance with our enunciated position on gas warfare.
“It is patent that no interference with civilian chemical industry is to be countenanced. If the agreement on gas warfare should contain provisos for regulating experimentation, manufacture, storage, et cetera, of chemical warfare materials, the agreement to be equable in effect must necessarily affect the civilian chemical industry. For example, if a nation which has government owned and operated chemical warfare agencies is called upon to scrap those agencies, then another nation without government agencies must be called upon to restrict the civilian chemical industry that engages in similar work. Note further that existent government chemical agencies are largely engaged in experimentation with and manufacture of non-toxic gases and of various gases and appliances for uses in peace. Another aspect of the problem that cannot be overlooked is provision for use of chemical agents in reprisal. Furthermore, regardless of treaty provisions the peace-time experimentation by civilian agencies will be difficult to discover and control, and may lead to evasions and suspicions, as pointed out in my No. 103, May 14th.”
The principal argument of a political nature in support of these views is the danger that an extension of the treaty along the lines you suggest would be detrimental to its adoption. To come into effect the treaty must not only be universally signed but universally ratified, and experience has shown that in a multilateral treaty, the simpler the principle involved, the easier is its final adoption.
[Page 142]If, following the debates in the Special Committee when the attitude of other powers on these points has been clarified, the Delegation still feels the principle to be one which from an international point of view transcends the domestic considerations above set forth, I should be glad to have you refer the matter to me again.