500.A15A4 Land Armaments/55: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 16—8:03 p.m.]
188. Your 103, May 14, 3 p.m. I fear that the phraseology of point 5 in No. 182, May 10, midnight, gave rise to a certain misconception of our meaning. What we had envisaged was a treaty of universal application and the use of the word “reciprocal” was under the circumstances unfortunate.
In view of this clarification you may desire to reconsider your decision. It is pertinent to this decision that since receipt of your 108 I have again discussed this matter with Senator Swanson who assures me that if an undertaking of universal application is accepted against the use of toxic gases in time of war there will be the greatest difficulty in these depressed times in persuading Congress to vote appropriation for the preparation of such warfare in time of peace or for the maintenance of a chemical warfare service under these conditions where we have agreed not to use such weapons in time of war and under which we would be prohibited from doing so except as reprisal. He points out that in default of agreement to the contrary other governments may be able to get appropriations for such [Page 130] service in times of peace and such governments would have the United States at a great disadvantage. He added that we have every interest in getting other governments to agree to this prohibition of preparation since in all probability such prohibition would be imposed on us in any event by lack of funds. In addition he continues our refusal to agree to refrain from preparations in time of peace would put us in the attitude of showing mistrust for international agreements—agreements which furnish the only foundation for any success here and the sanctity of which we have repeatedly preached. In his opinion we would be in an inconsistent and undesirable position if we agreed not to use these weapons in time of war and at the same time refused to agree to refrain from their preparation and to get rid of them in time of peace. Our readiness not to prepare is proof of the bona fides of our first undertaking not to use such weapons. This is not any intention on our part to accept any document which would interfere with our civilian industry.
It would seem that the acceptance [by?] all governments of an undertaking not to make preparation in time of peace would leave the United States with its well developed chemical industry in a relatively stronger position in regard to the rest of the world in case of violation by any party to the treaty.
Any provision of this character would presumably be subject to the general provisions which the treaty will contain for accountability to the Permanent Disarmament Commission or other body set up by the treaty in case of violation. Please instruct.