500.A15A4/1030: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Mellon) to the Acting Secretary of State
169. From Gibson. At half-past five yesterday afternoon Davis and I called upon Mr. Baldwin and Sir John Simon at the former’s room in the House of Commons. Simon opened the conversation by asking us our conception of the solutions which might be put forward for the various problems which would inevitably come up in Franco-German conversations.
We replied that in our previous conversation we had expressed doubts as to the feasibility of that approach to the matter but that in pursuance of his request we had given thought to possible solutions, with the result that we were more than ever convinced that we [Page 122] would not get anywhere along those lines; that it was easy to produce a fair and reasonable solution for almost any problem which would come up before the Conference, but that it was quite another matter to secure acceptance of such a solution and that we felt very strongly that the most useful role we could play in the conversations was that of a lubricant facilitating direct conversation between the interested parties, disengaging them from lobbyists and now and then suggesting way through or around the obstacles encountered. We went on to say that it was premature for us to try to formulate solutions until we had a more accurate idea of just what problems were created by the French and German proposals as both of these appeared to have been materially modified since the beginning of the Conference, and that it seemed to us the immediate task was to secure as definite an idea as possible as to what these modified theses are.
To take the French plan first, it was clear from the conversations we had all had with various French representatives that they did not expect to secure the integral adoption of their plan but that there was some doubt as to whether they themselves had finally made up their minds as to how much of the plan was essential to giving them satisfaction; that we thought the first step was to get as far forward as possible in discussion with the French, with a view to determining exactly what their plan is at present; what part of that they would be in a position to discard, and what part would be acceptable to us.
The next step would be to consider our position in the debates upon the subject. Sir John had felt that he must attack the French plan and that he would be able to riddle it as impracticable. We said we were not disposed to join in this method of approach and to think it would be better for both of us to pursue as far as possible the course of letting the French put forward their ideas and see how far they could get in securing agreement upon them; that if they succeeded it would then be time to determine how far these were objectionable and called for opposition; that if without opposition from us, they failed to secure agreement they at least would not be in a position to say that they had failed only because of our attitude and were therefore entitled to some sort of substitute from us. Mr. Baldwin agreed with this point of view and Sir John said nothing further about pressing his attack although he did not definitely say he had changed his mind.
Sir John asked, in the case that we were going to adopt a benevolent attitude towards the French in endeavoring to secure some sort of European agreement, if we could tell him just what sort of agreement we had in mind. We answered that we certainly did not propose [Page 123] to put forward any American conception as to what would constitute security in Europe; that as we considered it a European problem we thought it was up to European Governments to say what they could agree upon and that our attitude was merely to wish them well in reaching agreement among themselves in the hope that we should be able to adapt ourselves to the situation created by such agreements; that we had always advocated regional agreements and that there was nothing new in this attitude on our part.
Mr. Baldwin then said very definitely that Great Britain was not going to take on fresh commitments of any character and he and Sir John developed this idea along lines which are familiar to you, that in honoring its signature England had paid heavily in coming to the help of Belgium and that this made British governments extremely careful about any further undertakings; that in the Locarno agreements6 there had been a precise and limited liability, and that this had been recognized by the French as the liquidation of the security problem; that now the French were talking about a “Mediterranean Locarno” as they did at the London Naval Conference but the British Government considered this a totally different matter as the obligations would be much broader in scope and more difficult to specify and that they were both convinced that nothing along the line of a “Mediterranean Locarno” or other European agreement could be undertaken by Great Britain; whereas they would have the greatest sympathy toward any efforts among the various groups of powers on the Continent to organize peace among themselves.
Mr. Baldwin then said that one question which would always come up in connection with any security agreement would be the possible course of the American Government as regards trade with an aggressor. He felt that provisions for economic sanctions and blockade were the greatest defect in the League Covenant and that agitation for recourse to these measures made him impatient; that he felt that sanctions of this sort were practically equivalent to war, and in talking of blockade we were not talking of realities, as blockade was really a thing of the past. However, in conversation the question came up as to whether the fundamental purpose might not be achieved by prohibition of imports which coupled with prohibition of export of arms and munitions, would have a tendency to shut off trade entirely without need for a navy to enforce it. Mr. Baldwin said it was a matter of indifference how our cooperation was achieved but that American cooperation was essential to any general movement for the long term peace.
[Page 124]Mr. Baldwin then said that he was going to be thoroughly indiscreet in confidence; that he had given a great deal of thought to the whole subject of disarmament, as he felt the course we were now following was straight toward the destruction of our civilization and that something radical had to be done about it unless we were all going down together; that he did not believe there was anything to be accomplished by “pecking at the problem” as the Conference was doing, and that we ought at least to try to agree upon some comprehensive and drastic measures fair to everybody, and then make a definite united drive to secure their adoption. He said that the plan he had in mind after hearing all the arguments for and against, was:
- (1)
- the total abolition of military aviation including pursuit and observation planes;
- (2)
- some agreement to put a stop to subsidies for civil aviation enterprises;
- (3)
- abolition of the capital ship;
- (4)
- abolition of the aircraft carrier, which would follow automatically from item 1;
- (6)
- [sic] drastic reduction of land effectives;
- (7)
- abolition of aggressive weapons such as heavy mobile guns and tanks.
He said that he realized that this was a revolutionary proposal but that whenever these items were attacked separately they were either opposed in toto or their acceptance made contingent on drastic dealing with some other item and that under this method we might go on for years without getting anywhere; whereas the world situation called for action now. He said that he realized the abolition of the capital ship would be shocking to us as it was to many people in this country, but that he felt the continued possession of these vessels by the great naval powers was an insurmountable obstacle to securing action in regard to other categories which we all desired, and that he hoped we would give careful thought to this proposal which he put forward in his own name but with a real belief that it contained the only method by which we could hope to rise to the situation. He said that he hoped we would consider this plan bearing in mind that while some of its features were very distasteful to us they constituted the price we should have to pay for any real relief. He felt the prohibitive cost of replacing these vessels doomed them to early disappearance and that as all our governments were under tremendous pressure to reduce expenditures it would be the part of wisdom to secure the strategic advantage which would come from their present abolition in order to force a general reduction. He repeated that he felt the only hope lay in a united and determined front on the part of our two countries to put over a comprehensive [Page 125] program. If we were successful it would be a long step toward world recovery and if we failed we should have to go back “to scratching at the surface of the problem” as we were now doing, but at least we should have demonstrated our honesty. He spoke with great emphasis and obvious sincerity. He said he quite realized that we could not express an opinion on a proposal of this sort but hoped that we would send it [home] and bespeak consideration for it. [Gibson.]