800.51W89 France/729
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the French Ambassador (Claudel)
The Ambassador handed me the note of France75 asking for a review of the debt obligation owed by that country. After handing it to [Page 729] me, the Ambassador said he wanted to call to my attention the hard facts which existed, recognizing them, he said, as facts and not as justice. He recalled that the preamble of the French Law, ratifying the Berenguer Agreement,76 made a direct connection between debts and reparations and that M. Herriot was under this strict mandate, as had been the other previous French governments. The Ambassador said that the present French Chamber was even stronger on the subject than the former one. He then pointed out to me that in spite of this, M. Herriot in his present note was more conciliatory than his instructions and did not simply say “No reparations, therefore no debts.” The Ambassador said he wanted to point out to me the serious dangers that adhered to the situation:—first, the danger of a head-on conflict between the French Parliament and the American Congress; second, the danger of driving the situation into a position of default with its consequent effect upon the defaulting countries. He quoted Mirabeau on the subject of such dangers. The Ambassador referred to the possible bankruptcy of Europe caused by default as an “awful danger”. At the same time he said that he recognized the position of the typical Congressman from Kansas who felt he could not go back to his constituents after giving up foreign debts without some quid pro quo. The Ambassador mentioned Disarmament as a proposition legitimately connected with debts as a quid pro quo. I then asked him what he had to say about the President’s suggestion of concessions in debts in exchange for concessions in favor of our trade. The Ambassador said he was not very much taken with that, as he did not think it feasible. He then, of his own motion, mentioned the words “lump sum” as being a possible way, and he pointed out that a settlement which was final on this subject would have a very marked beneficial effect upon the world. He likened it to getting through the last line of breakers, and repeated this similarly [simile?] several times.
The Ambassador then urged that Mr. Hoover should endeavor to take up and settle this question of the debts within the remainder of his term, saying that it would be a final crown to Mr. Hoover’s great work as President, and after this he urged upon me that I should use my influence in the same path. I pointed out to him the fact that this debt settlement could not even be negotiated except with the action of Congress and, in any event, that action was required for ratification. I pointed out that both the present Congress and the coming Congress were not under the control of the President’s [Page 730] Party but were both under the control of the supporters of Mr. Roosevelt in both Houses. I said that under these circumstances I did not see how those debts could be settled without the influence and cooperation of Mr. Roosevelt, and I told the Ambassador that as soon as the British note came I had taken steps energetically to bring about such cooperation and I felt that was the only way it could be accomplished. We discussed the question of when the notes would be made public, and I told him I thought they should not be published until we all did it together and that the British had agreed with us to do this in the Monday’s newspapers. He said this was very agreeable to him as his country was not anxious to do it before then.
- Supra.↩
- Debt agreement signed April 29, 1926. For text, see Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, 1922–1926, p. 257. See also Foreign Relations, 1926, vol. ii, pp. 91 ff. The agreement was ratified by France on July 27. 1929.↩