500.A15A4 Steering Committee/281½
Memorandum of the Five-Power Conversations at Geneva Regarding Disarmament and the Return of Germany to the Disarmament Conference, December 2–12, 193299
Friday, December 2nd
Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles returned to Geneva from Paris on Friday, December 2nd, following conversations in Paris with M. Herriot and M. Boncour which have been reported in detail. Mr. MacDonald, Sir John Simon and the members of the British Delegation were on the same train. Over the weekend, Mr. Davis had several talks with Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, explaining in further detail the idea of a preliminary disarmament convention on the basis of the draft which had been discussed in Paris with M. Herriot and M. Boncour (Annex “A”).
Saturday, December 3rd
Saturday afternoon Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles had a talk with the Prime Minister, Sir John Simon and Mr. Cadogan with regard to the proposed preliminary convention, and it was decided that on each side they would try to put down on paper how they conceived the convention and particularly how they would deal with the question of the German claim for equality of rights in the convention.
Sunday, December 4th
Sunday afternoon M. Herriot called on Mr. Davis and outlined in a general way the line of French strategy for the Five-Power Meeting. He pointed out that France would not accept any vague formula as to equality of rights which would only lead to misunderstanding in the future and that if the Germans pressed for that, he would be forced to ask them to define in a clear and unequivocal manner what they (the Germans) meant by equality of rights. M. Herriot pointed out that on several occasions German spokesmen had discussed the subject and they had done so in the formal notes of the German Government. Many of these notes and statements were conflicting and France did not clearly know what Germany meant by “equality of right”. If forced to do so, he would smoke them out and then the world would see that what Germany really meant was rearmament.
Sunday evening Mr. Cadogan brought to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles a draft preliminary convention which the British Delegation had prepared (Annex “B”) as their conception of the method of [Page 490] giving effect to the substantive points annexed to the American memorandum (Annex “A”). After discussing this draft with Mr. Cadogan, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles prepared late Sunday evening and early Monday morning a revised draft convention (Annex “C”) which was sent to the British Delegation but not otherwise circulated.
Monday, December 5th
On Monday morning the formal conversations started. There was, however, a preliminary meeting at the Hotel Beau Rivage, the Prime Minister, Sir John Simon, Mr. Cadogan, Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Dulles being present. At this meeting the American draft convention was discussed, article by article. In general the British found no objection to it until they came to the clauses with regard to the prohibition of air bombardment. At that point Mr. MacDonald showed clearly that he personally was opposed to the total abolition of bombardment from the air. He made an eloquent statement of the British position, pointing out the difficulties which they had in policing uncivilized parts of the world; how one aeroplane would take the place, and possibly save the lives, of a whole regiment of soldiers and that for the police of outlying regions and the frontier work which they had to perform, he did not see how they could give up this weapon.
Mr. Norman Davis was called out during this discussion to receive Ambassador Matsudaira, who came to present the Japanese naval plan.1 At 11 o’clock Mr. Davis returned with Mr. Wilson and shortly thereafter M. Herriot and Paul-Boncour arrived and there was a general discussion of the procedure to be followed when the Germans joined the Conference and also some discussion as to when the Italians should be invited to join the three Powers. At this meeting it appeared clear for the first time that the French, mainly for reasons of strategy, were very disinclined to have any questions of disarmament discussed while the Germans were present for fear that the Germans would condition their return to the Conference upon the realization of certain concrete measures of disarmament. Of course the French did not state their position as baldly as this, but it was clear exactly what was in their minds.
At three o’clock Monday afternoon there was a further meeting, the same persons being present as at the morning meeting. At that time there was considerable discussion of the Franco-Italian naval question2 and both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Davis urged M. Herriot to do something concrete to help effect a solution. He frankly admitted [Page 491] that he was not thoroughly conversant with the subject. He said it had, of course, a political and a naval side. As to the political side, he would gladly talk. If we wished to discuss technical naval questions, we would have to wait for him to get his Minister of Marine from Paris. In the discussion, M. Herriot showed a good deal of bitterness at the attitude of Italy. He remarked that Italy had not recognized the gesture made in his Toulouse speech and hinted that he had private information he could not divulge which made him feel extremely apprehensive as to the attitude of the Italians. However, notwithstanding this situation he said he would be glad to do what he could and then turned to a long report which he had from the Ministry of Marine and read a sentence from it to the general effect that France was prepared to negotiate with Italy on the basis of the maintenance of the present relative positions between the two fleets.
After this discussion, the Italian representatives, Baron Aloisi and Signor Rosso, were summoned by telephone and joined the meeting about five o’clock. Mr. MacDonald then called upon Mr. Davis to explain his idea with regard to a preliminary convention. Mr. Davis then read the memorandum which is referred to above as Annex “A”. The reading of this memorandum led to considerable discussion and M. Herriot raised objection to certain points, particularly the reference to the insertion of provisions in the convention to improve Germany’s means of defence. There was no substantial objection, however, to the idea of a preliminary convention but it was agreed that the memorandum as read by Mr. Davis should be gone over by a drafting committee with a view to producing a document which would be satisfactory to the four Powers and which might then be used after the Germans joined the meeting.
That evening, Monday, Mr. MacDonald gave a dinner for Baron von Neurath, who had just arrived from Berlin, and for the two chief delegates of each of the other three Powers, including Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson. After the dinner, Mr. MacDonald explained to the Germans that during the course of the coming meetings they hoped to be able to arrive at concrete recommendations to be made to the Conference to try to hasten along its work. Meanwhile the drafting committee, composed of M. Massigli, Signor Rosso, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Dulles, revised the memorandum presented by Mr. Davis, as indicated in Annex “D”. Later that evening, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles went over with M. Massigli, Mr. Cadogan and Signor Rosso the American draft convention (Annex “C”). M. Massigli, as was to be expected, showed some perturbation and indicated that much of the draft convention was unacceptable to the French on the [Page 492] ground, so often alleged, that many of the subjects dealt with and the solutions proposed had not yet been the subjects of decisions at the Conference. He further expressed with evident sincerity and no little agitation his hope that we would not circulate this draft convention to the Germans. He said that the result would be to create a situation where the Germans would make impossible demands as the price of their return to the Conference. This discussion took place in Mr. Cadogan’s office at the Beau Rivage. Later that evening Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles had a very frank talk with M. Massigli and reached the conclusion, which was concurred in by Mr. Davis, that at the present stage of the discussions the draft convention should not be circulated, but that an effort should be made to get Germany promptly to agree to return to the Conference and then see what positive steps in disarmament could be taken.
Tuesday, December 6th
Tuesday morning at ten o’clock there was the first full meeting of the five Powers. There were present (and the same persons can be assumed to be present at the other meetings except where stated) for Great Britain, the Prime Minister (Mr. MacDonald), Sir John Simon, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Wigram of the Paris Embassy; for France, M. Herriot, M. Paul-Boncour, M. Massigli; for Germany, Baron von Neurath, Baron Weiszäcker, Herr Frohwein, Herr Voelckers; for Italy, Baron Aloisi and Signor Rosso; for the United States, Mr. Norman H. Davis, Mr. Hugh Wilson and Mr. Allen W. Dulles.
At the suggestion of Mr. Norman Davis it was unanimously agreed that Mr. MacDonald should act as Chairman. After explaining the purpose of the meetings of the five Powers Mr. MacDonald called upon Mr. Davis for a general statement and explanation of the idea which had been advanced for a preliminary convention providing for immediate measures of disarmament and machinery for working out a final and general convention which would accord equality of status to Germany.
After a preliminary oral statement Mr. Davis read a memorandum (Annex “D”). In commenting upon this memorandum Mr. Davis stated that while he recognized the importance of reconciling the German demand for equality with the French insistence upon security and its bearing upon disarmament he was convinced that with all the wisdom and good will possible it would require some time to work out a satisfactory solution of these two questions, particularly if there were to be a military and political reorganization of Europe along such lines as those envisaged in the French plan; that in any [Page 493] event the most practical way to proceed to a solution of these questions was through the disarmament Conference or by such machinery as it may set up and this required the presence and cooperation of Germany, He felt, however, that even if all the powers of continental Europe were in agreement as to the advisability of adopting for themselves a uniform military system and a series of treaties of mutual assistance along the lines of the French proposal it was inconceivable that this could be done in less than one or two years. He had felt, he said, that since it would require considerable time to agree upon the method of giving practical application to the German and French ideas we should at least be able in a preliminary treaty to agree upon certain principles and also concrete measures of disarmament and to set up machinery for working out, in an effective and expeditious way, such questions as could not be finally settled now. The immediate steps thus to be taken in disarmament and the agreement to take further steps along a defined course should give Germany an immediate measure of satisfaction and also an assurance that the other nations concerned would endeavor in good faith to work out in the shortest time possible a general convention limiting the armaments of all nations and thus placing Germany on a basis of moral and juridical equality. Mr. Davis further stated that public opinion throughout the world was becoming impatient at the delay of the Conference in producing some concrete results and furthermore that the adoption of some substantial measures of disarmament would contribute greatly to an improvement in the present bad conditions prevailing throughout the world.
Mr. Davis also emphasized that in the present state of affairs immediate achievement was essential if the world was to continue to have any confidence whatever in the possibility of effecting any substantial measures of disarmament for which there is a growing necessity and public demand; that it was this phase of the problem which chiefly interested the United States, while we realized that it was only fair to give a reasonable period for the working out of such political problems as were involved in the French Plan and the German demand for equality.
M. Herriot followed with a frank statement of French policy, which may be résuméed in a statement which he read summarizing the decision of the Cabinet on the question of equality:
“France agrees that the principle of equality of rights be accorded to Germany and other States disarmed by treaty, within a general system which shall provide for the security of France and for all other States.”
He then explained that his Government had made a real step forward, had gone beyond the position taken by the Tardieu Government, which had only envisaged the inclusion in the final disarmament treaty of the Versailles Treaty provisions regarding Germany’s armaments just as those provisions now existed. His Government, on the contrary, was prepared to work towards real equality and disarmament under proper safeguards for security.
Baron von Neurath then referred to the fact that Germany had already indicated its willingness to return to the Conference on the basis of the proposals made by Sir John Simon, that the suggestion which we had put forward of a preliminary treaty seemed calculated to postpone the solution of the German claim for three further years, but that quite naturally he did not wish to express his views on this subject until he had had further opportunity to examine this suggestion. (Later, at the afternoon session during the interruption for tea, the Germans explained to us privately that they would find the greatest difficulty in accepting any treaty on disarmament which did not do away with the Versailles Treaty provisions, even though this treaty were for as short a time as three years. This, they said, was one of the difficulties they found with our idea of a short-term preliminary convention, but that they would examine it in the friendliest spirit. It may be well to record at this point that M. Massigli had asked Mr. Dulles at one of the drafting committee meetings, whether under our preliminary Convention, which did not include provision for Germany’s armaments, the Permanent Disarmament Commission would have the right to control the armaments of Germany as well as those of the Powers whose armaments were set forth in the preliminary Convention. This obviously raised a difficult question since Germany might hesitate to consent to a control based on the drastic disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, while the other nations would have control with respect only to relatively modest measures of disarmament to be included in a preliminary Convention.)
To return to the morning meeting, it was closed with a plea by Mr. MacDonald, who was obviously endeavoring to exercise pressure upon the Germans to be patient. He stated almost textually, as the words were so extraordinary as not easily to be forgotten, “that it had never been possible to give France anything satisfactory on the security question.” Sir John Simon interrupted Mr. MacDonald to call his attention to the fact that he had possibly overlooked Locarno, but Mr. MacDonald continued and said, in effect, “Yes, but Locarno was only an agreement of limited scope and I had in mind something of general European application.” He then went on to say that he [Page 495] was going to make a few remarks and would warn Mr. Davis beforehand that he might close his ears if he wished to do so; that what he was going to say was that to give anything satisfactory to France in the way of security, it was necessary to have the Government of the United States with them in the task; that it was obvious that the United States Government could not commit itself now and that any declaration that others might make on the subject would be incomplete without the United States. Hence, any final settlement of the security question must wait for several months; and, q.e.d., both France and Germany must be patient. Without further ado, and after these remarks, Mr. MacDonald adjourned the meeting as it was necessary for most of the persons present to attend the meeting of the League Assembly, which took place that morning.
The conversations were resumed at three o’clock that afternoon. Mr. Davis, feeling that Mr. MacDonald’s closing remarks should not be allowed to pass entirely unnoticed and yet not wishing to make an incident out of the matter, remarked that while he had been given authority to close his ears, he had, nevertheless, not fully succeeded in doing this; that in order to avoid misunderstanding, he wished to state that the views of his Government had been set forth quite clearly in public statements, such, for example, as that of Secretary Stimson on August 8th. He therefore felt that it would be unfortunate if the vitally important work which the meeting had before it should be delayed in the hope that the United States, for example, would undertake further commitments relating to security in Europe or that political changes in any of the governments represented there would create a situation permitting a different method of treating the problems before them. Any such attitude, he said, would tend to take away the prospect of present achievement and he certainly would not recommend that course.
After this statement, Baron von Neurath circulated a memorandum setting forth a German formula for meeting the equality issue (Annex “E”). The German memorandum was given rather short shrift. It was hastily read and immediately followed up by a long statement from Mr. MacDonald to the effect that it would have a disastrous effect upon public opinion. It would lead people to think, he said, that Germany wanted to rearm; a paper like this emanating from a great government would unsettle people’s minds, make them despair of a solution of the problem, etc., etc. The German Delegation took these remarks in good spirit and did not call Mr. MacDonald’s attention to the fact that a large section of their paper was based on a British White Paper and the expressions of Sir John Simon, [Page 496] although they smilingly mentioned that fact to us a few minutes later when the meeting adjourned for tea.
While we were taking tea in the Prime Minister’s room which was next to Sir John Simon’s office where we were meeting, M. Herriot stayed behind and drafted in longhand a formula which he read shortly after the meeting resumed and which was substantially as follows:
“The Delegates of the United States, of Great Britain, of Italy, and of France, having met the Delegates of Germany for informal conversations at Geneva on December 6th.
“Are agreed that one of the aims of the Conference on Disarmament is to accord to Germany and to the other disarmed Powers equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations.”
M. Herriot then proceeded to explain that he felt that this recognition should suffice for the German Delegation. France recognized the principle of equality of rights. Germany had left the Conference because she was not sure that this principle would be recognized. Now that it was recognized, why should she not return?
There was then some discussion as to the desirability of issuing an invitation to Germany to return to the Conference on the basis of M. Herriot’s formula. Mr. Davis stated that he thought it was a mistake to issue another invitation to Germany, at least unless we were sure that the invitation would be accepted. It was undignified to be placed in that position. He felt that it would be more logical to agree upon the basis of Germany’s return and then for the Five Powers to get together and issue a statement. As regards the formula itself, he stated that while he recognized the importance of bringing Germany back into the Conference, the United States would find it difficult to join a declaration which stressed only security and equality of rights and did not stress the matter in which we were primarily interested—namely, disarmament. Mr. MacDonald immediately supported Mr. Davis’ view that it was unwise to issue a further invitation to Germany unless we knew the German attitude. He suggested, therefore, that Baron von Neurath communicate M. Herriot’s formula to his Government and then advise them whether or not Germany was prepared to return on the basis indicated. Baron von Neurath agreed that he would consult his Government.
In connection with M. Herriot’s formula, the question of the French Plan came up and Mr. MacDonald remarked—more or less out of a clear sky—that England could not assume an ounce more of responsibility than it had already assumed. He was, of course, referring to the added guarantees of security which France desired [Page 497] from England. It was obvious that he wished to put France on notice so that there would be no misunderstanding when the further discussions of the French Plan came up. The Germans took careful note of this statement and it was later referred to by Baron von Neurath as one of the reasons which made him feel that the attaining of French security as conceived by the French might be complicated by the British attitude and that it was hardly to be expected that Germany could wait for the realization of a plan which a statement such as that of Mr. MacDonald made, in part, at least, unrealizable.
In view of the time that was passing without a discussion of any concrete measure of disarmament, Mr. Davis frankly stated that unless the Five Powers were able to get together on some such program as had been suggested by us for reaching immediate concrete results, there was little reason to suppose that we could do so in January or February of next year, and that if we were to adjourn before Christmas without some agreement on concrete measures there was danger that it would threaten the ultimate success of the Conference. On this point M. Herriot told Mr. Davis privately that if the matter of Germany’s return to the Conference was settled he was quite willing to discuss our plan.
At this meeting and in connection with Mr. Davis’s remarks referred to above, the French showed signs of considerable annoyance. They were obviously most apprehensive that the Germans would do the logical and natural thing of coupling their acceptance of the Herriot formula with some earnest of good faith on the part of the Powers that they were really going to take steps to reduce their armaments. For some strange reason, the Germans never seemed to have any real interest in bringing this to an issue and it was rather unfortunate that they did not do so as they thus failed to use their influence to bring about some constructive action.
That evening M. Herriot left for Paris to take up the discussions of the debt issue with the committees of the Chambre, and Mr. MacDonald left to meet the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Paris and also to discuss debts with the French Government.
Wednesday, December 7th
A short meeting was held in the morning at which little was accomplished as Baron von Neurath had received no reply from Berlin, and as all the representatives except the American representative had to make speeches at the Assembly that day, it was decided to adjourn further meetings until Thursday. During the day Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles had conversations with Messieurs Beneš, [Page 498] Politis, Massigli, Paul-Boncour, Sir John Simon and Baron von Neurath and in the evening Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson dined with Baron von Neurath who frankly stated that he desired to re-enter the Conference and gave the impression that he would accept something along the lines of the Herriot statement if they could get one or two necessary additions.
Thursday, December 8th
There was an early morning session at Mr. Davis’s office, the Germans not being present. The purpose of this was to discuss what practical measures of disarmament could be immediately decided upon. The French had been adamant about discussing disarmament in the presence of the Germans. As soon as the subject was raised they would bring up the question of the French Plan and security and no progress was possible. Hence, it was decided to meet without the Germans. But even under these conditions, M. Paul-Boncour proved hardly more tractable. He said that there was really no time to reach definite decisions. The matters were too complicated, they would have to be studied by the Conference and could not be settled outside of the Conference. Further, before they could be settled, it would be necessary to consider some of the far-reaching plans that had been presented, such as the French Plan. If now they should decide upon limited measures of disarmament in the face of the radical measures proposed, for example in the French Plan, the whole world would be disappointed. Mr. Davis remarked that he felt that an announcement that each of the Powers present had agreed to scrap ten heavy guns and give up one thousand men would have more effect upon the world than the formulation of one thousand new plans. M. Paul-Boncour laughingly replied that we could have the ten guns and the thousand men from the French. It was generally agreed to treat the question of Germany’s return to the conference independently from that of the measures of disarmament to be reached, the latter question to be taken up as soon as the former was settled. The meeting thereupon adjourned to reconvene at the Beau Rivage with the Germans.
At this meeting Baron von Neurath
explained that he would have his reply from Berlin by two or three
o’clock and would be ready for a further meeting then, but that he could
unfortunately riot give his answer immediately. As the Assembly was
meeting, it was decided that the afternoon meeting would be held at the
Secretariat of the League. At the afternoon meeting Baron von Neurath produced his answer
in the form of two questions which he felt required replies in order to
explain M. Herriot’s formula.
These questions were:
[Page 499]
In reply to an inquiry from Sir John Simon to Baron von Neurath as to whether Germany would resume its place in the Conference if these questions were answered in the affirmative, the answer was “Yes”. M. Paul-Boncour then said that the German questions forced him to ask a further question, namely, as to the meaning of equality of status “in every respect”. Baron von Neurath agreed to furnish a memorandum on this point, as the French pressed for it, although both Mr. Davis and Sir John Simon, realizing that this meant opening up most dangerous discussions, endeavored to avoid the necessity of circulating written statements as to what equality of rights meant. No further meeting was possible that day, in view of the meeting of the Assembly and it was decided to postpone further consideration until the following day, Friday, when Mr. MacDonald would be present to direct the discussions.
Friday, December 9th
There was a short meeting Friday morning which was again interrupted by the meeting of the League Assembly. At this meeting Baron von Neurath circulated his answer to the inquiry of M. Paul-Boncour as to the meaning of equality of status “in every respect” (Annex “F”).
Just at the close of the Friday morning’s meeting, Mr. Davis suggested that a possible way of getting around the difficulty raised by the German interrogatories was to prepare a statement which would include first the Herriot formula, then a brief statement by Germany as to her conception of equality of rights, drawn up in a form to be unobjectionable to the other Powers, and then the affirmation of Germany’s willingness to return to the Conference. This idea was not debated as there was no time left before adjournment, but it obviously was well received by Mr. MacDonald since that afternoon he asked Mr. Davis to go over it with him and later Mr. Dulles was called in and several tentative formulae were drafted, Annex “G” being the formula prepared by Mr. MacDonald and Annex “H” being that prepared by Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles.
At the close of the discussions with Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, it was pointed out that in view of the fact that so large a part of these formulae did not relate to the United States, we did not [Page 500] wish to be in the position of proposing a formula and hence that our suggestions were merely passed on to Mr. MacDonald for such use, if any, as he might wish to make of them as chairman of the meeting.
Friday evening at nine-thirty o’clock there was a further meeting and there was laid before it a paper which had been circulated that afternoon by Baron von Neurath (Annex “I”). Mr. MacDonald then summarized the questions before the meeting; first, that of Germany’s return to the Conference, and second, what they were going to do with regard to disarmament. He felt it was necessary to isolate the two questions. They must first decide upon Germany’s return, and to do that it was well to see why she had left. Mr. MacDonald referred to various German declarations showing that Germany had left because the principle of equality of status had not been recognized. Now that M. Herriot had frankly recognized this, the British and Italian Governments having already done so, there seemed to be no reason why she should not return. It was quite true that the Conference had gone along rather slowly, but it had difficult problems to meet and Germany had not based her withdrawal on that ground. Baron von Neurath replied that Germany did not leave only because of the slow progress the Conference had made, but rather because Germany did not know whether the Conference would eventually recognize the principle of equality. He felt it was necessary for him to clarify certain, points before returning. Otherwise, they might have to leave again, which would be most unfortunate. Hence, he must frankly state that they could not come back to the Conference solely on the Herriot formula without a clear understanding of what it meant.
Mr. MacDonald replied that to meet the German request for definitions would be entering into the work of the Conference itself. It was unreasonable to ask them to do this. For example, the questions the Germans had raised necessitated in turn the answering of half a dozen more questions and if it went on in this way, there would be no end of things. The debate went along on this line without making any progress for a considerable time, with Mr. MacDonald exercising pressure on the Germans but holding the formula on which he had been working in reserve. Toward the end of the meeting Sir John Simon produced a formula which had been considered by the British Delegation, as follows:
“The Five Powers are agreed that the claim to equality of rights should be made (met?) on the basis of the carrying into effect of the following principles:
- (1)
- The same Convention for all;
- (2)
- The same duration of the Convention for all;
- (3)
- The principle of ‘qualitative equality’ progressively realised;
- (4)
- The adoption of appropriate measures for the establishment of mutual confidence and the maintenance of peace.”
This was obviously unacceptable to the French and was not discussed in detail.
Mr. Davis emphasized that Germany was more vitally interested than any state in the success of the Conference and that as long as there was any hope of accomplishment Germany should be one of those present, and working for that success. The United States had a far less immediate interest in the Conference than Germany, and yet we had neither left the Conference nor threatened to leave.
Finally, about midnight, Mr. MacDonald said that with the full exchange of views which had taken place the time had come to put on to paper as clearly and as tersely as he could the position of the various parties and then to see whether that would not serve as an answer. He said he would like to have meet with him in the morning one man from each delegation, and not the head of the delegation but a draftsman, and he would work with them all morning and they would try to produce a paper for the full meeting to consider in the afternoon. This idea was adopted and the meeting adjourned.
Saturday, December 10th
At ten o’clock Mr. MacDonald with Sir John Simon and Mr. Cadogan met with M. Massigli, Signor Rosso, Baron Weiszäcker and Mr. Dulles and laid before them for discussion a draft memorandum. (Annex “J”) This memorandum did not introduce any complications as far as the United States was concerned since we were only a party to the concluding paragraph which related to co-operation to bring about effective disarmament. There was, however, one paragraph which gave Mr. Dulles some concern, namely, that which referred to the willingness of the European Powers “to join in a solemn affirmation taken by all European States not to resolve their differences by resort to force”. Mr. Dulles felt that it might raise an implication that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not cover resort to force if a special European agreement was required. He mentioned this point confidentially to Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon before the actual consideration of the memorandum commenced and added that he felt that this paragraph might be used by the Japanese as a basis for a claim that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not cover their activities in Manchuria since there was no declaration of war. Mr. MacDonald caught the point and suggested that the word “affirmation” be changed to “re-affirmation”.
[Page 502]Paragraph (1) of the memorandum raised no serious difficulties. M. Massigli asked Mr. Dulles why the United States was not also a part to this paragraph and Mr. Dulles explained that as the effect of this paragraph would be to change the provisions of a treaty—namely the Treaty of Versailles—to which the United States was not a party, it seemed inappropriate that we should be included. The point was not pressed by M. Massigli and was not taken up by any of the other delegations, so it was unnecessary to make any further statement of our position. It quickly became apparent that the second paragraph of Paragraph (1) was the crux of the difficulty. M. Massigli said that the French could not accept the phrase “permitting the same qualities of arms” and he objected to pre-judging at this time the question of the duration of the Convention. A large part of the morning was spent in discussing this paragraph, but without success in reconciling the French and German positions, and it was decided to pass on to the other paragraphs and leave this paragraph for the consideration of the heads of the various delegations at the afternoon session. Paragraph (3) was accepted with certain drafting changes, M. Massigli suggesting that it was important to make it clear that the so-called “no force” pact did not by any means encompass all the French had in mind in the organization of security. In order to meet this point, a sentence was added that this Pact should be entered into “without prejudice to further and fuller discussions of security”.
Saturday afternoon at two-thirty the conversations were resumed with the chiefs of the various delegations. Mr. MacDonald circulated a paper (Annex “K”) which contained the work of the drafting committee with a blank left for the second paragraph of Paragraph (1). He explained what the drafting committee had done and why they had been unable to reach agreement on one point, namely the wording to define what was meant by “equality of rights”. At the same time he circulated a further document (Annex “L”) which embodied an effort to reconcile the views presented at the morning meeting with regard to the missing paragraph. It will be noted that Annex “L” omitted the reference to “permitting the same qualities of arms” which had appeared in the original draft submitted in the morning.
There was practically no difficulty in the adoption of the drafting committee’s report with one or two minor modifications. As the points under discussion did not directly interest the United States and as the question of our joining in the formula regarding equality and security or in the “no force” pact was not raised, Mr. Davis was not called upon to take an active part in the early phase of the discussion.
[Page 503]Mr. Davis suggested the elimination of the phrase “In these circumstances” which introceeded [introduced?] the Five Power declaration on disarmament in paragraph (4) in order to avoid the implication that this paragraph was tied in with the preceding paragraphs to which we were not parties and which related to security, equality and the “no force” pact.
The question was raised by M. Paul-Boncour as to the time for the signing of the “no force” pact. He suggested the insertion of the word “immediately” in the first sentence of the paragraph, dealing with the pact. The German Delegation demurred to this and at first took the position that this was one of the acts to be concluded at the time of the signature of the Disarmament Convention. The French took violent exception to this, indicating that this, of course, did not constitute the organization of security as they conceived it and that the “no force” pact was something to be done immediately as a step toward the amelioration of present conditions rather than as a step toward the realization of the French Plan.
After some discussion the Germans stated that the matter was not one of great moment. In principle they had no objection to the early signature of the pact, but assumed it was not to be signed now as no one had yet formulated the details of the text. It was finally agreed to leave the text substantially as it stood with the informal understanding that the four Powers would immediately endeavor to get together on a text which they would then sign and leave open for the signature of other European States, it being of course clearly understood that upon entering into effect, the pact would be binding only as “between the signatories”, and the text was amended to bring out this point. After clearing this point and approving the concluding paragraph relating to the decision of the Five Powers to work together for substantial disarmament, the discussion then turned upon the missing paragraph.
M. Paul-Boncour then presented in some detail the French position, to which reference has already been made, namely, that France was not willing at this time to enter into a discussion of the details of the application of “equality of rights”. M. Herriot had frankly recognized the principle. It was for the Conference to decide its application. Further, the detailed application of the principle, as well as the working out of French security, were both aims and goals of the Conference rather than matters to be finally determined now. France would not ask an immediate decision on measures to insure its security. Germany had no right to prejudice the form which would be given to equality of rights. On this point his instructions were categorical. Hence he could not accept the phrase in [Page 504] the formula proposed by the chairman, namely, that the Convention “should last for the same period in the case of each”.
It was pointed out to M. Paul-Boncour that M. Herriot in his statements had clearly recognized the equal duration principle as an inevitable result of granting equality of rights and every effort was made to induce the French to change their position as the Germans seemed determined to insist on at least this satisfaction of their demand that equality of rights be in some way defined.
Mr. Davis stated that the discussions had convinced him of the sincerity of France’s desire to accord equality to Germany as soon as she feels that this can be done without menacing her national security. To work out the problem it would be necessary to do away in France with the fear of Germany and in Germany of the resentment against France. After all, both security and equality were abstractions and as such were never absolutely attainable. Now that a general working basis had been found, it would be a great pity to let the meeting break down because of the failure adequately to define conceptions which defied definition.
In private conversations with the French while the discussion was going on, we pointed out to them that the concluding phrase of Mr. MacDonald’s formula which stated that the object of the Disarmament Conference was to bring about disarmament and “not to authorize the increase of armed strength”, was of great value to France as constituting a voluntary acceptance by Germany of substantially the Versailles Treaty levels. These arguments, however, produced no results and the meeting reached a complete impasse with the Germans demanding that the French recognize the equal duration of the new disarmament convention for all States and the French refusing to go beyond the Herriot formula.
At this point Mr. Davis suggested an adjournment for tea, which relieved the atmosphere, and during the intermission there was some very useful private discussion between the various delegates.
Upon resuming the discussion, it was decided to endeavor to simplify the formula and see whether by doing so it would not be possible to find agreement. And finally, after several hours more of discussion, the Germans agreed not to insist at this time upon inserting the phrase with regard to the duration of the Convention on the understanding that all the last part of the formula, including the phrase about not authorizing the increase of armed strength be abandoned.
It was quite obvious that the Germans were anxious to reach an agreement and to avoid responsibility for breaking up the meeting, particularly as the substance of the demands they had made when [Page 505] they left the Conference in July was met by the Herriot formula. As the French proved quite unyielding, as time was short and as it would obviously be extremely difficult to obtain the necessary instructions from M. Herriot by telephone, each side eventually accepted the compromise formula of saying as little as possible and leaving events to take care of themselves, each being in a position to claim that the principles for which they fought had been maintained. Finally, the disputed paragraph was drafted to read:
“This declaration (i.e., the Herriot formula) implies that the respective limitations of the armaments of all States should be included in the proposed disarmament convention. It is clearly understood that the methods of application of such equality of rights will be discussed by the Conference.”
Both the French and German delegates accepted the formula ad referendum and agreed to communicate the definite replies of their governments not later than the following morning. The Italian delegate also requested time to consult his government and it was decided that a further meeting would take place on Sunday morning at eleven o’clock.
Sunday, December 11th
At the Sunday morning meeting Mr. MacDonald, who had agreed to act as “stake-holder” of the replies, announced that both the French and German governments had agreed to accept the proposed declaration and the Italian government received its authorization during the course of the meeting. At Mr. MacDonald’s suggestion six original copies of the documents3 were then signed, one being reserved for Mr. Henderson, the President of the Disarmament Conference.
Mr. MacDonald then suggested that the remaining time be devoted to discussing what could be done to put new life into the Conference. He said quite frankly that it was impossible to blink the fact that very little had been done during the past year, that something must be done to push the work forward and that the responsibility for this would rest very largely upon the Powers that were sitting there with him.
Mr. Davis endorsed Mr. MacDonald’s remarks and described the impatience and the skepticism of the American people as a result of the interminable debates at Geneva which had produced no results. He felt that our Congress would be more and more reluctant to make appropriations to maintain a delegation at the Conference if at the end of a year’s work we could show no appreciable progress. He [Page 506] added that it would require some early concrete evidence to restore the confidence of the American people in the reality of the Geneva disarmament work. It was for this reason that he had proposed the early conclusions of a preliminary agreement, not with the idea of terminating the Conference, but for the purpose of registering some immediate progress and providing appropriate machinery for carrying the work forward. Further, this would give the time for the study of the more comprehensive plans which involved the issues of security and equality.
During a large part of this discussion the French Delegation was absent, as M. Massigli had gone to Paris and M. Paul-Boncour was talking on the telephone with M. Herriot. When they arrived, the proceedings were summarized to them and Mr. MacDonald suggested that in order to quiet any apprehension that these private meetings had been carried on in disregard to the Conference machinery the President of the Conference, Mr. Henderson, be invited to join their deliberations and advised of the results of their meeting and that he should confer with them as to the best method of helping to promote the work of the Conference. The suggestion that M. Beneš, the rapporteur, be invited as well as Mr. Henderson was made, but was not pressed in view of the silent but none the less expressive disapproval of the Germans, whose facial expressions indicated their attitude.
Mr. Henderson then joined the meeting and was given a signed copy of the declaration. After expressing his gratification at Germany’s return, he outlined the program of work, that is, the calling of a meeting of the Bureau either on January 15th or 31st and a meeting of the General Commission two weeks thereafter.
M. Paul-Boncour then pointed out that in fixing the date of further meetings of the Conference it was important to take into account the convenience of the American representatives who had so far to come; in particular he would like to fix a date for a meeting so that Mr. Davis could attend.
Mr. Davis replied that he appreciated M. Paul-Boncour’s desire to suit his convenience in this matter. He hoped, however, that they would not take this into account but would fix the dates of their meetings solely with the view to the effective prosecution of the work and without special consideration of the American Delegation. We would be present whenever the meetings were held. Mr. Wilson would be here in Geneva and Mr. Gibson, who had recently made real progress towards complete recovery, would undoubtedly be available after the Christmas holidays. Mr. Davis then remarked that he felt that the continuance of conversations such as they had [Page 507] had during the past week might be useful in promoting the work of the Conference. After all, the Five Powers, together with Japan and Russia, accounted for approximately two-thirds of the world’s armaments. They were the ones, with the exception of Germany, which would be called upon to contribute the most to the success of any disarmament Conference and if they could decide among themselves what they were prepared to do, the impetus this would give to the work of the Conference would be tremendous. Mr. MacDonald, who warmly supported this statement, believed that further conversations of this character with the presence of Mr. Henderson would be extremely useful. This point of view was not contraverted by either the French or the Italians, although M. Paul-Boncour did raise the point that nothing should be done to substitute private conversations for the conference machinery. No decision as to the time or place of holding further conversations was reached and in fact this question was not discussed at the meeting.
In conclusion, Mr. Davis expressed, on his own behalf and for his colleagues, their appreciation of the able work of the chairman in guiding their discussions. The meeting adjourned to attend a luncheon which was being given by Mr. MacDonald.
This luncheon was attended by all those who had been working on the Five Power meetings and their wives; also Sir Eric Drummond and Mr. Henderson. At the conclusion of the luncheon Mr. Davis proposed the health of the Chairman, Mr. MacDonald, and referred to his effective contribution to the success of the meeting.
After the luncheon Sir Eric Drummond told Mr. Davis that he had become convinced of the fact that the best way to insure the success of the Conference was to take a preliminary step along the lines of the suggestions which Mr. Davis had made. He thought it important, therefore, that the Five Powers get together again before the Conference reconvenes and endeavor to agree upon such a program. He said the French were insisting upon the calling of the General Commission in order that it might take up the discussion of their Plan and that if we had not agreed beforehand upon a more practical program the fat will be in the fire. He said that they had decided to have the Bureau reconvene on January 23 and the General Commission on January 31st. He thought it would be a good idea, therefore, for Mr. Henderson to ask the Five Powers to meet around the middle of January, before the reconvening of the Bureau, and for Mr. Davis to talk with Mr. MacDonald, which he did. Mr. MacDonald seemed surprised that Sir John Simon had not already arranged for such a meeting of the Five Powers, which he had asked him to do at the meeting of that morning as he, MacDonald, had to leave before [Page 508] it was over. Sir John Simon was called in and explained that he had decided it was not possible nor advisable to propose a Five Power meeting without a further talk with the French in order to get their consent, as they had seemed rather nervous at the idea.
Mr. MacDonald said he would be unable to leave London around the middle of January on account of Parliament. It was then suggested that the meeting might be held in London beginning January 16 with Mr. Henderson present and that since the meeting would be before the Conference reconvened there could be no criticism for holding it in London. It was decided that this should be taken under consideration and that Mr. MacDonald would, if possible, speak to M. Herriot the next morning on his way through Paris. That afternoon the news of such a proposed meeting leaked out and the French reacted unfavorably. When Mr. Davis left Geneva on December 13th the situation had not developed further and M. Herriot’s fall on December 14th prevented any further discussion of the matter with the French.
[Page 512] [Page 523] [Page 525]- Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Davis under covering letter of December 29.↩
- For text, see p. 410.↩
- See pp. 528 ff.↩
- Annex “M”, p. 527.↩
- Ante, p. 318.↩
- See telegram No. 455, November 15, noon, from the American delegate, p. 380.↩
- Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).↩
- Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).↩
- Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).↩
- Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).↩