500.A15A4 Steering Committee/281½

Memorandum of the Five-Power Conversations at Geneva Regarding Disarmament and the Return of Germany to the Disarmament Conference, December 2–12, 193299

Friday, December 2nd

Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles returned to Geneva from Paris on Friday, December 2nd, following conversations in Paris with M. Herriot and M. Boncour which have been reported in detail. Mr. MacDonald, Sir John Simon and the members of the British Delegation were on the same train. Over the weekend, Mr. Davis had several talks with Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, explaining in further detail the idea of a preliminary disarmament convention on the basis of the draft which had been discussed in Paris with M. Herriot and M. Boncour (Annex “A”).

Saturday, December 3rd

Saturday afternoon Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles had a talk with the Prime Minister, Sir John Simon and Mr. Cadogan with regard to the proposed preliminary convention, and it was decided that on each side they would try to put down on paper how they conceived the convention and particularly how they would deal with the question of the German claim for equality of rights in the convention.

Sunday, December 4th

Sunday afternoon M. Herriot called on Mr. Davis and outlined in a general way the line of French strategy for the Five-Power Meeting. He pointed out that France would not accept any vague formula as to equality of rights which would only lead to misunderstanding in the future and that if the Germans pressed for that, he would be forced to ask them to define in a clear and unequivocal manner what they (the Germans) meant by equality of rights. M. Herriot pointed out that on several occasions German spokesmen had discussed the subject and they had done so in the formal notes of the German Government. Many of these notes and statements were conflicting and France did not clearly know what Germany meant by “equality of right”. If forced to do so, he would smoke them out and then the world would see that what Germany really meant was rearmament.

Sunday evening Mr. Cadogan brought to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles a draft preliminary convention which the British Delegation had prepared (Annex “B”) as their conception of the method of [Page 490] giving effect to the substantive points annexed to the American memorandum (Annex “A”). After discussing this draft with Mr. Cadogan, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles prepared late Sunday evening and early Monday morning a revised draft convention (Annex “C”) which was sent to the British Delegation but not otherwise circulated.

Monday, December 5th

On Monday morning the formal conversations started. There was, however, a preliminary meeting at the Hotel Beau Rivage, the Prime Minister, Sir John Simon, Mr. Cadogan, Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Dulles being present. At this meeting the American draft convention was discussed, article by article. In general the British found no objection to it until they came to the clauses with regard to the prohibition of air bombardment. At that point Mr. MacDonald showed clearly that he personally was opposed to the total abolition of bombardment from the air. He made an eloquent statement of the British position, pointing out the difficulties which they had in policing uncivilized parts of the world; how one aeroplane would take the place, and possibly save the lives, of a whole regiment of soldiers and that for the police of outlying regions and the frontier work which they had to perform, he did not see how they could give up this weapon.

Mr. Norman Davis was called out during this discussion to receive Ambassador Matsudaira, who came to present the Japanese naval plan.1 At 11 o’clock Mr. Davis returned with Mr. Wilson and shortly thereafter M. Herriot and Paul-Boncour arrived and there was a general discussion of the procedure to be followed when the Germans joined the Conference and also some discussion as to when the Italians should be invited to join the three Powers. At this meeting it appeared clear for the first time that the French, mainly for reasons of strategy, were very disinclined to have any questions of disarmament discussed while the Germans were present for fear that the Germans would condition their return to the Conference upon the realization of certain concrete measures of disarmament. Of course the French did not state their position as baldly as this, but it was clear exactly what was in their minds.

At three o’clock Monday afternoon there was a further meeting, the same persons being present as at the morning meeting. At that time there was considerable discussion of the Franco-Italian naval question2 and both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Davis urged M. Herriot to do something concrete to help effect a solution. He frankly admitted [Page 491] that he was not thoroughly conversant with the subject. He said it had, of course, a political and a naval side. As to the political side, he would gladly talk. If we wished to discuss technical naval questions, we would have to wait for him to get his Minister of Marine from Paris. In the discussion, M. Herriot showed a good deal of bitterness at the attitude of Italy. He remarked that Italy had not recognized the gesture made in his Toulouse speech and hinted that he had private information he could not divulge which made him feel extremely apprehensive as to the attitude of the Italians. However, notwithstanding this situation he said he would be glad to do what he could and then turned to a long report which he had from the Ministry of Marine and read a sentence from it to the general effect that France was prepared to negotiate with Italy on the basis of the maintenance of the present relative positions between the two fleets.

After this discussion, the Italian representatives, Baron Aloisi and Signor Rosso, were summoned by telephone and joined the meeting about five o’clock. Mr. MacDonald then called upon Mr. Davis to explain his idea with regard to a preliminary convention. Mr. Davis then read the memorandum which is referred to above as Annex “A”. The reading of this memorandum led to considerable discussion and M. Herriot raised objection to certain points, particularly the reference to the insertion of provisions in the convention to improve Germany’s means of defence. There was no substantial objection, however, to the idea of a preliminary convention but it was agreed that the memorandum as read by Mr. Davis should be gone over by a drafting committee with a view to producing a document which would be satisfactory to the four Powers and which might then be used after the Germans joined the meeting.

That evening, Monday, Mr. MacDonald gave a dinner for Baron von Neurath, who had just arrived from Berlin, and for the two chief delegates of each of the other three Powers, including Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson. After the dinner, Mr. MacDonald explained to the Germans that during the course of the coming meetings they hoped to be able to arrive at concrete recommendations to be made to the Conference to try to hasten along its work. Meanwhile the drafting committee, composed of M. Massigli, Signor Rosso, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Dulles, revised the memorandum presented by Mr. Davis, as indicated in Annex “D”. Later that evening, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles went over with M. Massigli, Mr. Cadogan and Signor Rosso the American draft convention (Annex “C”). M. Massigli, as was to be expected, showed some perturbation and indicated that much of the draft convention was unacceptable to the French on the [Page 492] ground, so often alleged, that many of the subjects dealt with and the solutions proposed had not yet been the subjects of decisions at the Conference. He further expressed with evident sincerity and no little agitation his hope that we would not circulate this draft convention to the Germans. He said that the result would be to create a situation where the Germans would make impossible demands as the price of their return to the Conference. This discussion took place in Mr. Cadogan’s office at the Beau Rivage. Later that evening Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles had a very frank talk with M. Massigli and reached the conclusion, which was concurred in by Mr. Davis, that at the present stage of the discussions the draft convention should not be circulated, but that an effort should be made to get Germany promptly to agree to return to the Conference and then see what positive steps in disarmament could be taken.

Tuesday, December 6th

Tuesday morning at ten o’clock there was the first full meeting of the five Powers. There were present (and the same persons can be assumed to be present at the other meetings except where stated) for Great Britain, the Prime Minister (Mr. MacDonald), Sir John Simon, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Wigram of the Paris Embassy; for France, M. Herriot, M. Paul-Boncour, M. Massigli; for Germany, Baron von Neurath, Baron Weiszäcker, Herr Frohwein, Herr Voelckers; for Italy, Baron Aloisi and Signor Rosso; for the United States, Mr. Norman H. Davis, Mr. Hugh Wilson and Mr. Allen W. Dulles.

At the suggestion of Mr. Norman Davis it was unanimously agreed that Mr. MacDonald should act as Chairman. After explaining the purpose of the meetings of the five Powers Mr. MacDonald called upon Mr. Davis for a general statement and explanation of the idea which had been advanced for a preliminary convention providing for immediate measures of disarmament and machinery for working out a final and general convention which would accord equality of status to Germany.

After a preliminary oral statement Mr. Davis read a memorandum (Annex “D”). In commenting upon this memorandum Mr. Davis stated that while he recognized the importance of reconciling the German demand for equality with the French insistence upon security and its bearing upon disarmament he was convinced that with all the wisdom and good will possible it would require some time to work out a satisfactory solution of these two questions, particularly if there were to be a military and political reorganization of Europe along such lines as those envisaged in the French plan; that in any [Page 493] event the most practical way to proceed to a solution of these questions was through the disarmament Conference or by such machinery as it may set up and this required the presence and cooperation of Germany, He felt, however, that even if all the powers of continental Europe were in agreement as to the advisability of adopting for themselves a uniform military system and a series of treaties of mutual assistance along the lines of the French proposal it was inconceivable that this could be done in less than one or two years. He had felt, he said, that since it would require considerable time to agree upon the method of giving practical application to the German and French ideas we should at least be able in a preliminary treaty to agree upon certain principles and also concrete measures of disarmament and to set up machinery for working out, in an effective and expeditious way, such questions as could not be finally settled now. The immediate steps thus to be taken in disarmament and the agreement to take further steps along a defined course should give Germany an immediate measure of satisfaction and also an assurance that the other nations concerned would endeavor in good faith to work out in the shortest time possible a general convention limiting the armaments of all nations and thus placing Germany on a basis of moral and juridical equality. Mr. Davis further stated that public opinion throughout the world was becoming impatient at the delay of the Conference in producing some concrete results and furthermore that the adoption of some substantial measures of disarmament would contribute greatly to an improvement in the present bad conditions prevailing throughout the world.

Mr. Davis also emphasized that in the present state of affairs immediate achievement was essential if the world was to continue to have any confidence whatever in the possibility of effecting any substantial measures of disarmament for which there is a growing necessity and public demand; that it was this phase of the problem which chiefly interested the United States, while we realized that it was only fair to give a reasonable period for the working out of such political problems as were involved in the French Plan and the German demand for equality.

M. Herriot followed with a frank statement of French policy, which may be résuméed in a statement which he read summarizing the decision of the Cabinet on the question of equality:

“France agrees that the principle of equality of rights be accorded to Germany and other States disarmed by treaty, within a general system which shall provide for the security of France and for all other States.”

[Page 494]

He then explained that his Government had made a real step forward, had gone beyond the position taken by the Tardieu Government, which had only envisaged the inclusion in the final disarmament treaty of the Versailles Treaty provisions regarding Germany’s armaments just as those provisions now existed. His Government, on the contrary, was prepared to work towards real equality and disarmament under proper safeguards for security.

Baron von Neurath then referred to the fact that Germany had already indicated its willingness to return to the Conference on the basis of the proposals made by Sir John Simon, that the suggestion which we had put forward of a preliminary treaty seemed calculated to postpone the solution of the German claim for three further years, but that quite naturally he did not wish to express his views on this subject until he had had further opportunity to examine this suggestion. (Later, at the afternoon session during the interruption for tea, the Germans explained to us privately that they would find the greatest difficulty in accepting any treaty on disarmament which did not do away with the Versailles Treaty provisions, even though this treaty were for as short a time as three years. This, they said, was one of the difficulties they found with our idea of a short-term preliminary convention, but that they would examine it in the friendliest spirit. It may be well to record at this point that M. Massigli had asked Mr. Dulles at one of the drafting committee meetings, whether under our preliminary Convention, which did not include provision for Germany’s armaments, the Permanent Disarmament Commission would have the right to control the armaments of Germany as well as those of the Powers whose armaments were set forth in the preliminary Convention. This obviously raised a difficult question since Germany might hesitate to consent to a control based on the drastic disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, while the other nations would have control with respect only to relatively modest measures of disarmament to be included in a preliminary Convention.)

To return to the morning meeting, it was closed with a plea by Mr. MacDonald, who was obviously endeavoring to exercise pressure upon the Germans to be patient. He stated almost textually, as the words were so extraordinary as not easily to be forgotten, “that it had never been possible to give France anything satisfactory on the security question.” Sir John Simon interrupted Mr. MacDonald to call his attention to the fact that he had possibly overlooked Locarno, but Mr. MacDonald continued and said, in effect, “Yes, but Locarno was only an agreement of limited scope and I had in mind something of general European application.” He then went on to say that he [Page 495] was going to make a few remarks and would warn Mr. Davis beforehand that he might close his ears if he wished to do so; that what he was going to say was that to give anything satisfactory to France in the way of security, it was necessary to have the Government of the United States with them in the task; that it was obvious that the United States Government could not commit itself now and that any declaration that others might make on the subject would be incomplete without the United States. Hence, any final settlement of the security question must wait for several months; and, q.e.d., both France and Germany must be patient. Without further ado, and after these remarks, Mr. MacDonald adjourned the meeting as it was necessary for most of the persons present to attend the meeting of the League Assembly, which took place that morning.

The conversations were resumed at three o’clock that afternoon. Mr. Davis, feeling that Mr. MacDonald’s closing remarks should not be allowed to pass entirely unnoticed and yet not wishing to make an incident out of the matter, remarked that while he had been given authority to close his ears, he had, nevertheless, not fully succeeded in doing this; that in order to avoid misunderstanding, he wished to state that the views of his Government had been set forth quite clearly in public statements, such, for example, as that of Secretary Stimson on August 8th. He therefore felt that it would be unfortunate if the vitally important work which the meeting had before it should be delayed in the hope that the United States, for example, would undertake further commitments relating to security in Europe or that political changes in any of the governments represented there would create a situation permitting a different method of treating the problems before them. Any such attitude, he said, would tend to take away the prospect of present achievement and he certainly would not recommend that course.

After this statement, Baron von Neurath circulated a memorandum setting forth a German formula for meeting the equality issue (Annex “E”). The German memorandum was given rather short shrift. It was hastily read and immediately followed up by a long statement from Mr. MacDonald to the effect that it would have a disastrous effect upon public opinion. It would lead people to think, he said, that Germany wanted to rearm; a paper like this emanating from a great government would unsettle people’s minds, make them despair of a solution of the problem, etc., etc. The German Delegation took these remarks in good spirit and did not call Mr. MacDonald’s attention to the fact that a large section of their paper was based on a British White Paper and the expressions of Sir John Simon, [Page 496] although they smilingly mentioned that fact to us a few minutes later when the meeting adjourned for tea.

While we were taking tea in the Prime Minister’s room which was next to Sir John Simon’s office where we were meeting, M. Herriot stayed behind and drafted in longhand a formula which he read shortly after the meeting resumed and which was substantially as follows:

“The Delegates of the United States, of Great Britain, of Italy, and of France, having met the Delegates of Germany for informal conversations at Geneva on December 6th.

“Are agreed that one of the aims of the Conference on Disarmament is to accord to Germany and to the other disarmed Powers equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations.”

M. Herriot then proceeded to explain that he felt that this recognition should suffice for the German Delegation. France recognized the principle of equality of rights. Germany had left the Conference because she was not sure that this principle would be recognized. Now that it was recognized, why should she not return?

There was then some discussion as to the desirability of issuing an invitation to Germany to return to the Conference on the basis of M. Herriot’s formula. Mr. Davis stated that he thought it was a mistake to issue another invitation to Germany, at least unless we were sure that the invitation would be accepted. It was undignified to be placed in that position. He felt that it would be more logical to agree upon the basis of Germany’s return and then for the Five Powers to get together and issue a statement. As regards the formula itself, he stated that while he recognized the importance of bringing Germany back into the Conference, the United States would find it difficult to join a declaration which stressed only security and equality of rights and did not stress the matter in which we were primarily interested—namely, disarmament. Mr. MacDonald immediately supported Mr. Davis’ view that it was unwise to issue a further invitation to Germany unless we knew the German attitude. He suggested, therefore, that Baron von Neurath communicate M. Herriot’s formula to his Government and then advise them whether or not Germany was prepared to return on the basis indicated. Baron von Neurath agreed that he would consult his Government.

In connection with M. Herriot’s formula, the question of the French Plan came up and Mr. MacDonald remarked—more or less out of a clear sky—that England could not assume an ounce more of responsibility than it had already assumed. He was, of course, referring to the added guarantees of security which France desired [Page 497] from England. It was obvious that he wished to put France on notice so that there would be no misunderstanding when the further discussions of the French Plan came up. The Germans took careful note of this statement and it was later referred to by Baron von Neurath as one of the reasons which made him feel that the attaining of French security as conceived by the French might be complicated by the British attitude and that it was hardly to be expected that Germany could wait for the realization of a plan which a statement such as that of Mr. MacDonald made, in part, at least, unrealizable.

In view of the time that was passing without a discussion of any concrete measure of disarmament, Mr. Davis frankly stated that unless the Five Powers were able to get together on some such program as had been suggested by us for reaching immediate concrete results, there was little reason to suppose that we could do so in January or February of next year, and that if we were to adjourn before Christmas without some agreement on concrete measures there was danger that it would threaten the ultimate success of the Conference. On this point M. Herriot told Mr. Davis privately that if the matter of Germany’s return to the Conference was settled he was quite willing to discuss our plan.

At this meeting and in connection with Mr. Davis’s remarks referred to above, the French showed signs of considerable annoyance. They were obviously most apprehensive that the Germans would do the logical and natural thing of coupling their acceptance of the Herriot formula with some earnest of good faith on the part of the Powers that they were really going to take steps to reduce their armaments. For some strange reason, the Germans never seemed to have any real interest in bringing this to an issue and it was rather unfortunate that they did not do so as they thus failed to use their influence to bring about some constructive action.

That evening M. Herriot left for Paris to take up the discussions of the debt issue with the committees of the Chambre, and Mr. MacDonald left to meet the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Paris and also to discuss debts with the French Government.

Wednesday, December 7th

A short meeting was held in the morning at which little was accomplished as Baron von Neurath had received no reply from Berlin, and as all the representatives except the American representative had to make speeches at the Assembly that day, it was decided to adjourn further meetings until Thursday. During the day Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles had conversations with Messieurs Beneš, [Page 498] Politis, Massigli, Paul-Boncour, Sir John Simon and Baron von Neurath and in the evening Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson dined with Baron von Neurath who frankly stated that he desired to re-enter the Conference and gave the impression that he would accept something along the lines of the Herriot statement if they could get one or two necessary additions.

Thursday, December 8th

There was an early morning session at Mr. Davis’s office, the Germans not being present. The purpose of this was to discuss what practical measures of disarmament could be immediately decided upon. The French had been adamant about discussing disarmament in the presence of the Germans. As soon as the subject was raised they would bring up the question of the French Plan and security and no progress was possible. Hence, it was decided to meet without the Germans. But even under these conditions, M. Paul-Boncour proved hardly more tractable. He said that there was really no time to reach definite decisions. The matters were too complicated, they would have to be studied by the Conference and could not be settled outside of the Conference. Further, before they could be settled, it would be necessary to consider some of the far-reaching plans that had been presented, such as the French Plan. If now they should decide upon limited measures of disarmament in the face of the radical measures proposed, for example in the French Plan, the whole world would be disappointed. Mr. Davis remarked that he felt that an announcement that each of the Powers present had agreed to scrap ten heavy guns and give up one thousand men would have more effect upon the world than the formulation of one thousand new plans. M. Paul-Boncour laughingly replied that we could have the ten guns and the thousand men from the French. It was generally agreed to treat the question of Germany’s return to the conference independently from that of the measures of disarmament to be reached, the latter question to be taken up as soon as the former was settled. The meeting thereupon adjourned to reconvene at the Beau Rivage with the Germans.

At this meeting Baron von Neurath explained that he would have his reply from Berlin by two or three o’clock and would be ready for a further meeting then, but that he could unfortunately riot give his answer immediately. As the Assembly was meeting, it was decided that the afternoon meeting would be held at the Secretariat of the League. At the afternoon meeting Baron von Neurath produced his answer in the form of two questions which he felt required replies in order to explain M. Herriot’s formula. These questions were: [Page 499]

  • “(1) Is equality of status to receive practical effect in the future Convention in every respect and is it to be, in consequence, the starting point for the future discussions at the Conference as far as the disarmed States are concerned?
  • “(2) Does the term ‘system which would provide security for all nations’ include the element of security which lies in general disarmament as was recognised by the Assembly?”

In reply to an inquiry from Sir John Simon to Baron von Neurath as to whether Germany would resume its place in the Conference if these questions were answered in the affirmative, the answer was “Yes”. M. Paul-Boncour then said that the German questions forced him to ask a further question, namely, as to the meaning of equality of status “in every respect”. Baron von Neurath agreed to furnish a memorandum on this point, as the French pressed for it, although both Mr. Davis and Sir John Simon, realizing that this meant opening up most dangerous discussions, endeavored to avoid the necessity of circulating written statements as to what equality of rights meant. No further meeting was possible that day, in view of the meeting of the Assembly and it was decided to postpone further consideration until the following day, Friday, when Mr. MacDonald would be present to direct the discussions.

Friday, December 9th

There was a short meeting Friday morning which was again interrupted by the meeting of the League Assembly. At this meeting Baron von Neurath circulated his answer to the inquiry of M. Paul-Boncour as to the meaning of equality of status “in every respect” (Annex “F”).

Just at the close of the Friday morning’s meeting, Mr. Davis suggested that a possible way of getting around the difficulty raised by the German interrogatories was to prepare a statement which would include first the Herriot formula, then a brief statement by Germany as to her conception of equality of rights, drawn up in a form to be unobjectionable to the other Powers, and then the affirmation of Germany’s willingness to return to the Conference. This idea was not debated as there was no time left before adjournment, but it obviously was well received by Mr. MacDonald since that afternoon he asked Mr. Davis to go over it with him and later Mr. Dulles was called in and several tentative formulae were drafted, Annex “G” being the formula prepared by Mr. MacDonald and Annex “H” being that prepared by Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles.

At the close of the discussions with Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, it was pointed out that in view of the fact that so large a part of these formulae did not relate to the United States, we did not [Page 500] wish to be in the position of proposing a formula and hence that our suggestions were merely passed on to Mr. MacDonald for such use, if any, as he might wish to make of them as chairman of the meeting.

Friday evening at nine-thirty o’clock there was a further meeting and there was laid before it a paper which had been circulated that afternoon by Baron von Neurath (Annex “I”). Mr. MacDonald then summarized the questions before the meeting; first, that of Germany’s return to the Conference, and second, what they were going to do with regard to disarmament. He felt it was necessary to isolate the two questions. They must first decide upon Germany’s return, and to do that it was well to see why she had left. Mr. MacDonald referred to various German declarations showing that Germany had left because the principle of equality of status had not been recognized. Now that M. Herriot had frankly recognized this, the British and Italian Governments having already done so, there seemed to be no reason why she should not return. It was quite true that the Conference had gone along rather slowly, but it had difficult problems to meet and Germany had not based her withdrawal on that ground. Baron von Neurath replied that Germany did not leave only because of the slow progress the Conference had made, but rather because Germany did not know whether the Conference would eventually recognize the principle of equality. He felt it was necessary for him to clarify certain, points before returning. Otherwise, they might have to leave again, which would be most unfortunate. Hence, he must frankly state that they could not come back to the Conference solely on the Herriot formula without a clear understanding of what it meant.

Mr. MacDonald replied that to meet the German request for definitions would be entering into the work of the Conference itself. It was unreasonable to ask them to do this. For example, the questions the Germans had raised necessitated in turn the answering of half a dozen more questions and if it went on in this way, there would be no end of things. The debate went along on this line without making any progress for a considerable time, with Mr. MacDonald exercising pressure on the Germans but holding the formula on which he had been working in reserve. Toward the end of the meeting Sir John Simon produced a formula which had been considered by the British Delegation, as follows:

“The Five Powers are agreed that the claim to equality of rights should be made (met?) on the basis of the carrying into effect of the following principles:

(1)
The same Convention for all;
(2)
The same duration of the Convention for all;
(3)
The principle of ‘qualitative equality’ progressively realised;
(4)
The adoption of appropriate measures for the establishment of mutual confidence and the maintenance of peace.”

This was obviously unacceptable to the French and was not discussed in detail.

Mr. Davis emphasized that Germany was more vitally interested than any state in the success of the Conference and that as long as there was any hope of accomplishment Germany should be one of those present, and working for that success. The United States had a far less immediate interest in the Conference than Germany, and yet we had neither left the Conference nor threatened to leave.

Finally, about midnight, Mr. MacDonald said that with the full exchange of views which had taken place the time had come to put on to paper as clearly and as tersely as he could the position of the various parties and then to see whether that would not serve as an answer. He said he would like to have meet with him in the morning one man from each delegation, and not the head of the delegation but a draftsman, and he would work with them all morning and they would try to produce a paper for the full meeting to consider in the afternoon. This idea was adopted and the meeting adjourned.

Saturday, December 10th

At ten o’clock Mr. MacDonald with Sir John Simon and Mr. Cadogan met with M. Massigli, Signor Rosso, Baron Weiszäcker and Mr. Dulles and laid before them for discussion a draft memorandum. (Annex “J”) This memorandum did not introduce any complications as far as the United States was concerned since we were only a party to the concluding paragraph which related to co-operation to bring about effective disarmament. There was, however, one paragraph which gave Mr. Dulles some concern, namely, that which referred to the willingness of the European Powers “to join in a solemn affirmation taken by all European States not to resolve their differences by resort to force”. Mr. Dulles felt that it might raise an implication that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not cover resort to force if a special European agreement was required. He mentioned this point confidentially to Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon before the actual consideration of the memorandum commenced and added that he felt that this paragraph might be used by the Japanese as a basis for a claim that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not cover their activities in Manchuria since there was no declaration of war. Mr. MacDonald caught the point and suggested that the word “affirmation” be changed to “re-affirmation”.

[Page 502]

Paragraph (1) of the memorandum raised no serious difficulties. M. Massigli asked Mr. Dulles why the United States was not also a part to this paragraph and Mr. Dulles explained that as the effect of this paragraph would be to change the provisions of a treaty—namely the Treaty of Versailles—to which the United States was not a party, it seemed inappropriate that we should be included. The point was not pressed by M. Massigli and was not taken up by any of the other delegations, so it was unnecessary to make any further statement of our position. It quickly became apparent that the second paragraph of Paragraph (1) was the crux of the difficulty. M. Massigli said that the French could not accept the phrase “permitting the same qualities of arms” and he objected to pre-judging at this time the question of the duration of the Convention. A large part of the morning was spent in discussing this paragraph, but without success in reconciling the French and German positions, and it was decided to pass on to the other paragraphs and leave this paragraph for the consideration of the heads of the various delegations at the afternoon session. Paragraph (3) was accepted with certain drafting changes, M. Massigli suggesting that it was important to make it clear that the so-called “no force” pact did not by any means encompass all the French had in mind in the organization of security. In order to meet this point, a sentence was added that this Pact should be entered into “without prejudice to further and fuller discussions of security”.

Saturday afternoon at two-thirty the conversations were resumed with the chiefs of the various delegations. Mr. MacDonald circulated a paper (Annex “K”) which contained the work of the drafting committee with a blank left for the second paragraph of Paragraph (1). He explained what the drafting committee had done and why they had been unable to reach agreement on one point, namely the wording to define what was meant by “equality of rights”. At the same time he circulated a further document (Annex “L”) which embodied an effort to reconcile the views presented at the morning meeting with regard to the missing paragraph. It will be noted that Annex “L” omitted the reference to “permitting the same qualities of arms” which had appeared in the original draft submitted in the morning.

There was practically no difficulty in the adoption of the drafting committee’s report with one or two minor modifications. As the points under discussion did not directly interest the United States and as the question of our joining in the formula regarding equality and security or in the “no force” pact was not raised, Mr. Davis was not called upon to take an active part in the early phase of the discussion.

[Page 503]

Mr. Davis suggested the elimination of the phrase “In these circumstances” which introceeded [introduced?] the Five Power declaration on disarmament in paragraph (4) in order to avoid the implication that this paragraph was tied in with the preceding paragraphs to which we were not parties and which related to security, equality and the “no force” pact.

The question was raised by M. Paul-Boncour as to the time for the signing of the “no force” pact. He suggested the insertion of the word “immediately” in the first sentence of the paragraph, dealing with the pact. The German Delegation demurred to this and at first took the position that this was one of the acts to be concluded at the time of the signature of the Disarmament Convention. The French took violent exception to this, indicating that this, of course, did not constitute the organization of security as they conceived it and that the “no force” pact was something to be done immediately as a step toward the amelioration of present conditions rather than as a step toward the realization of the French Plan.

After some discussion the Germans stated that the matter was not one of great moment. In principle they had no objection to the early signature of the pact, but assumed it was not to be signed now as no one had yet formulated the details of the text. It was finally agreed to leave the text substantially as it stood with the informal understanding that the four Powers would immediately endeavor to get together on a text which they would then sign and leave open for the signature of other European States, it being of course clearly understood that upon entering into effect, the pact would be binding only as “between the signatories”, and the text was amended to bring out this point. After clearing this point and approving the concluding paragraph relating to the decision of the Five Powers to work together for substantial disarmament, the discussion then turned upon the missing paragraph.

M. Paul-Boncour then presented in some detail the French position, to which reference has already been made, namely, that France was not willing at this time to enter into a discussion of the details of the application of “equality of rights”. M. Herriot had frankly recognized the principle. It was for the Conference to decide its application. Further, the detailed application of the principle, as well as the working out of French security, were both aims and goals of the Conference rather than matters to be finally determined now. France would not ask an immediate decision on measures to insure its security. Germany had no right to prejudice the form which would be given to equality of rights. On this point his instructions were categorical. Hence he could not accept the phrase in [Page 504] the formula proposed by the chairman, namely, that the Convention “should last for the same period in the case of each”.

It was pointed out to M. Paul-Boncour that M. Herriot in his statements had clearly recognized the equal duration principle as an inevitable result of granting equality of rights and every effort was made to induce the French to change their position as the Germans seemed determined to insist on at least this satisfaction of their demand that equality of rights be in some way defined.

Mr. Davis stated that the discussions had convinced him of the sincerity of France’s desire to accord equality to Germany as soon as she feels that this can be done without menacing her national security. To work out the problem it would be necessary to do away in France with the fear of Germany and in Germany of the resentment against France. After all, both security and equality were abstractions and as such were never absolutely attainable. Now that a general working basis had been found, it would be a great pity to let the meeting break down because of the failure adequately to define conceptions which defied definition.

In private conversations with the French while the discussion was going on, we pointed out to them that the concluding phrase of Mr. MacDonald’s formula which stated that the object of the Disarmament Conference was to bring about disarmament and “not to authorize the increase of armed strength”, was of great value to France as constituting a voluntary acceptance by Germany of substantially the Versailles Treaty levels. These arguments, however, produced no results and the meeting reached a complete impasse with the Germans demanding that the French recognize the equal duration of the new disarmament convention for all States and the French refusing to go beyond the Herriot formula.

At this point Mr. Davis suggested an adjournment for tea, which relieved the atmosphere, and during the intermission there was some very useful private discussion between the various delegates.

Upon resuming the discussion, it was decided to endeavor to simplify the formula and see whether by doing so it would not be possible to find agreement. And finally, after several hours more of discussion, the Germans agreed not to insist at this time upon inserting the phrase with regard to the duration of the Convention on the understanding that all the last part of the formula, including the phrase about not authorizing the increase of armed strength be abandoned.

It was quite obvious that the Germans were anxious to reach an agreement and to avoid responsibility for breaking up the meeting, particularly as the substance of the demands they had made when [Page 505] they left the Conference in July was met by the Herriot formula. As the French proved quite unyielding, as time was short and as it would obviously be extremely difficult to obtain the necessary instructions from M. Herriot by telephone, each side eventually accepted the compromise formula of saying as little as possible and leaving events to take care of themselves, each being in a position to claim that the principles for which they fought had been maintained. Finally, the disputed paragraph was drafted to read:

“This declaration (i.e., the Herriot formula) implies that the respective limitations of the armaments of all States should be included in the proposed disarmament convention. It is clearly understood that the methods of application of such equality of rights will be discussed by the Conference.”

Both the French and German delegates accepted the formula ad referendum and agreed to communicate the definite replies of their governments not later than the following morning. The Italian delegate also requested time to consult his government and it was decided that a further meeting would take place on Sunday morning at eleven o’clock.

Sunday, December 11th

At the Sunday morning meeting Mr. MacDonald, who had agreed to act as “stake-holder” of the replies, announced that both the French and German governments had agreed to accept the proposed declaration and the Italian government received its authorization during the course of the meeting. At Mr. MacDonald’s suggestion six original copies of the documents3 were then signed, one being reserved for Mr. Henderson, the President of the Disarmament Conference.

Mr. MacDonald then suggested that the remaining time be devoted to discussing what could be done to put new life into the Conference. He said quite frankly that it was impossible to blink the fact that very little had been done during the past year, that something must be done to push the work forward and that the responsibility for this would rest very largely upon the Powers that were sitting there with him.

Mr. Davis endorsed Mr. MacDonald’s remarks and described the impatience and the skepticism of the American people as a result of the interminable debates at Geneva which had produced no results. He felt that our Congress would be more and more reluctant to make appropriations to maintain a delegation at the Conference if at the end of a year’s work we could show no appreciable progress. He [Page 506] added that it would require some early concrete evidence to restore the confidence of the American people in the reality of the Geneva disarmament work. It was for this reason that he had proposed the early conclusions of a preliminary agreement, not with the idea of terminating the Conference, but for the purpose of registering some immediate progress and providing appropriate machinery for carrying the work forward. Further, this would give the time for the study of the more comprehensive plans which involved the issues of security and equality.

During a large part of this discussion the French Delegation was absent, as M. Massigli had gone to Paris and M. Paul-Boncour was talking on the telephone with M. Herriot. When they arrived, the proceedings were summarized to them and Mr. MacDonald suggested that in order to quiet any apprehension that these private meetings had been carried on in disregard to the Conference machinery the President of the Conference, Mr. Henderson, be invited to join their deliberations and advised of the results of their meeting and that he should confer with them as to the best method of helping to promote the work of the Conference. The suggestion that M. Beneš, the rapporteur, be invited as well as Mr. Henderson was made, but was not pressed in view of the silent but none the less expressive disapproval of the Germans, whose facial expressions indicated their attitude.

Mr. Henderson then joined the meeting and was given a signed copy of the declaration. After expressing his gratification at Germany’s return, he outlined the program of work, that is, the calling of a meeting of the Bureau either on January 15th or 31st and a meeting of the General Commission two weeks thereafter.

M. Paul-Boncour then pointed out that in fixing the date of further meetings of the Conference it was important to take into account the convenience of the American representatives who had so far to come; in particular he would like to fix a date for a meeting so that Mr. Davis could attend.

Mr. Davis replied that he appreciated M. Paul-Boncour’s desire to suit his convenience in this matter. He hoped, however, that they would not take this into account but would fix the dates of their meetings solely with the view to the effective prosecution of the work and without special consideration of the American Delegation. We would be present whenever the meetings were held. Mr. Wilson would be here in Geneva and Mr. Gibson, who had recently made real progress towards complete recovery, would undoubtedly be available after the Christmas holidays. Mr. Davis then remarked that he felt that the continuance of conversations such as they had [Page 507] had during the past week might be useful in promoting the work of the Conference. After all, the Five Powers, together with Japan and Russia, accounted for approximately two-thirds of the world’s armaments. They were the ones, with the exception of Germany, which would be called upon to contribute the most to the success of any disarmament Conference and if they could decide among themselves what they were prepared to do, the impetus this would give to the work of the Conference would be tremendous. Mr. MacDonald, who warmly supported this statement, believed that further conversations of this character with the presence of Mr. Henderson would be extremely useful. This point of view was not contraverted by either the French or the Italians, although M. Paul-Boncour did raise the point that nothing should be done to substitute private conversations for the conference machinery. No decision as to the time or place of holding further conversations was reached and in fact this question was not discussed at the meeting.

In conclusion, Mr. Davis expressed, on his own behalf and for his colleagues, their appreciation of the able work of the chairman in guiding their discussions. The meeting adjourned to attend a luncheon which was being given by Mr. MacDonald.

This luncheon was attended by all those who had been working on the Five Power meetings and their wives; also Sir Eric Drummond and Mr. Henderson. At the conclusion of the luncheon Mr. Davis proposed the health of the Chairman, Mr. MacDonald, and referred to his effective contribution to the success of the meeting.

After the luncheon Sir Eric Drummond told Mr. Davis that he had become convinced of the fact that the best way to insure the success of the Conference was to take a preliminary step along the lines of the suggestions which Mr. Davis had made. He thought it important, therefore, that the Five Powers get together again before the Conference reconvenes and endeavor to agree upon such a program. He said the French were insisting upon the calling of the General Commission in order that it might take up the discussion of their Plan and that if we had not agreed beforehand upon a more practical program the fat will be in the fire. He said that they had decided to have the Bureau reconvene on January 23 and the General Commission on January 31st. He thought it would be a good idea, therefore, for Mr. Henderson to ask the Five Powers to meet around the middle of January, before the reconvening of the Bureau, and for Mr. Davis to talk with Mr. MacDonald, which he did. Mr. MacDonald seemed surprised that Sir John Simon had not already arranged for such a meeting of the Five Powers, which he had asked him to do at the meeting of that morning as he, MacDonald, had to leave before [Page 508] it was over. Sir John Simon was called in and explained that he had decided it was not possible nor advisable to propose a Five Power meeting without a further talk with the French in order to get their consent, as they had seemed rather nervous at the idea.

Mr. MacDonald said he would be unable to leave London around the middle of January on account of Parliament. It was then suggested that the meeting might be held in London beginning January 16 with Mr. Henderson present and that since the meeting would be before the Conference reconvened there could be no criticism for holding it in London. It was decided that this should be taken under consideration and that Mr. MacDonald would, if possible, speak to M. Herriot the next morning on his way through Paris. That afternoon the news of such a proposed meeting leaked out and the French reacted unfavorably. When Mr. Davis left Geneva on December 13th the situation had not developed further and M. Herriot’s fall on December 14th prevented any further discussion of the matter with the French.

annex “a”

Project of Preliminary Convention as Discussed With M. Herriot and M. Paul-Boncour

Memorandum

(1) A short-term “convention” might be prepared to register the limitation and degree of mutual reduction of armaments which are immediately possible, taking into account the principles set forth in the Resolution adopted by the General Commission on July 23, 1932,4 and the progress made thereafter. It might be concluded without awaiting the political arrangements and military readjustments which are foreseen by such plans as, for example, the French Plan.5 In drafting this “convention”, it would be vital to maintain the utmost simplicity of form, keeping, as far as possible, to a statement of the broad principles agreed to and avoiding, as far as possible, complexities of detail.

There is added to this memorandum a statement of points of substance in the field of land, sea, and air armaments which might be considered in drafting such a “convention”.

(2) It is suggested that the “convention” have a duration of approximately three years—that is, until January 1, 1937. It would [Page 509] thus coincide with the remaining life of the Washington and London Naval Treaties.

In considering the draft of the “convention”, it should not be lost from sight that with a long-term “convention” it might be possible to effect greater reductions of material than would be the case with a short “convention”; but, in order not to provide an undue length of time for the solution of the political questions arising from the French Plan and the German démarche regarding equality of status through a general disarmament treaty, as explained below, a “convention” of limited duration would probably be essential.

(3) The “convention” should contain in its preamble a clear statement of the purpose of the contracting Powers to proceed to a real reduction of armaments, such a statement to be along the lines of Chapter I of the July 23 Resolution but strengthened and made more precise.

(4) The “convention” would provide, among other things, for the setting up of the permanent disarmament commission along the lines of the decision already reached in the Bureau. Upon the ratification of the “convention”, the disarmament commission would assume its duties with respect to the measures of reduction and limitation embodied in the “convention”. Further, the Powers could provide, by a separate protocol, which would not require ratification, that, pending ratification of the “convention”, the Permanent Disarmament Commission should be set up, with the sole task, pending such ratification, to prepare the general disarmament treaty of long duration, which should be put into effect when the “convention” expires. In this task, the Permanent Disarmament Commission should take the “convention” as a starting point and should work toward the far-reaching measures of reduction envisaged in such plans as that of President Hoover, as well as in the French plan and the statements of the British position as made by Sir John Simon in July of this year and, more recently, on November 10 and 17, and that of the Italian Government. The task of the Disarmament Commission would be to bring this work to a close so that the general disarmament treaty might be signed and ratified prior to January 1, 1937.

(5) Germany’s cooperation would be essential, both in the task of drawing up the “convention” and, more particularly, in working on the Disarmament Commission for the drafting of the general disarmament treaty, and it is suggested that the German equality claim be dealt with along the following lines:

(a)
The “convention”, in view of its limited character and short duration, could hardly incorporate Part V of the Treaty of Versailles or include the provisions with regard to Germany’s armaments. It would be necessary, however, to modify the “convention” in certain [Page 510] respects in order to improve Germany’s means of defense without, however, increasing its total military force.
(b)
The “convention” should also contain the assurance that the general disarmament treaty would embody the conditions, to be arrived at through mutual agreement, under which the German equality claim would be worked out and, further, provide that the eventual limitations upon German armaments would be incorporated in that treaty with the same duration as in the case of other States.

In effect, it is proposed that Germany accord a somewhat more extended period than she had contemplated for giving effect to her claim for equality of rights and in return would receive both some amelioration of her present position and the formal assurance that the Powers would in good faith employ the intervening period to work out this question. This would also meet the French position that they are unwilling to concede the bare principle of equality without at the same time formulating the conditions under which that equality would be put into practical application.

Annex

Points To Be Considered in Drafting the “Convention”

1. Effectives.

(a)
The determination of Element “A” for the metropolitan component (the “police” forces foreseen in President Hoover’s proposal for home countries).
(b)
The determination of the number of overseas forces (some reduction over the status quo if possible).
(c)
An agreement not to increase the total land forces.
(d)
An agreement in principle on similarity of type for European continental land armies.

2. Artillery.

(a)
A limitation by numbers of all mobile land artillery above 105 mm.
(c)
An undertaking not to construct mobile land artillery above 155 mm.
(c)
Some scrapping of heavy mobile land artillery and in addition the conversion from mobile to fixed mounts of a certain proportion of the remaining heavy mobile land artillery.

3. Tanks.

(a)
Scrap tanks above . . . . . tons.
(b)
Limitation by numbers of tanks below . . . . . tons.

4. Air.

(a)
Universal abolition of aerial bombing.
(b)
Prohibition of peacetime preparation and training in bombing.
(c)
Convert or scrap bombing planes.
(d)
Limitation by numbers of military planes.
(e)
Full publicity as to type and characteristics of civil planes registered or constructed, with possibly some further measures of control applicable to Europe.

5. Chemical Warfare.

(a)
Universal abolition of use of chemical warfare.
(b)
An agreement not to make preparation for or to train in the offensive use of chemical warfare in peacetime.

6. Navy.

(a)
Completion of London Treaty by France and Italy.
(b)
Nations not parties to the Washington and London Treaties to accept a limitation of types so as not to prejudice the restrictions on type which already govern the leading naval Powers.

7. Manufacture of and Trade in Arms.

(a)
Recognize the principle of State supervision of private manufacture.
(b)
Recognize the principle of equality of publicity for State and private manufacture.
(c)
Recognize the principle of control and publicity for export and import.

8. Control.

The Permanent Disarmament Commission to be set up as envisaged in the Draft Convention with amendments as now being drafted after recent discussions in the Bureau.

9. General.

(a)
An agreement not to increase the totals of armaments as existing or as fixed by other treaties limiting armaments, during the life of the Convention, with the necessary exception that, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, certain specified amounts of defensive material might be added to the armaments of those nations lacking such weapons.
(b)
The Convention should likewise specify that the parties to it should neither build nor permit to be manufactured within their territories any types of weapons not expressly stipulated in the Convention.
[Page 512]

annex “b”

Informal British Draft of a Preliminary Convention

The signatories recognising the necessity of eliminating existing inequalities of status in the matter of armaments and desiring to remove those inequalities so as to apply a uniform treatment with a view to the establishment of confidence and the maintenance of peace,

Firmly determined that such uniformity of treatment must be attained by the reduction of armaments and not by exceeding the limits of armed strength already prescribed by any Treaty,

Recognising that this result can only be attained by stages,

Agree, as a first step, to take the following measures, to be put into execution before January 1st, 1937, the details and stages of their execution being laid down and supervised, as indicated in later articles of this Agreement, by the Permanent Disarmament Commission, the constitution of which is provided for hereunder.

Article 1

There shall be set up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission with the duty of ordering and supervising the execution of the present Agreement. It shall consist of representatives of the Governments signatories of the present Agreement. Each Government shall appoint one member of the Commission.

Article 2

The Governments signatories of the present Agreement shall inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of the name of their representative before January 15th, 1933, and the Commission shall hold its first meeting before January 31st, 1933.

Article 3

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall provide the Secretariat of the Commission.

Land

Article 4

The method proposed by President Hoover for the computation of land effectives is accepted. The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall proceed to calculate on this basis for each country the irreducible component of its forces. The forces exceeding the figure thus arrived at shall be reduced by 33I/3 per cent before January 1st, [Page 513] 1937, the method and the stages of such reduction being determined by the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 5

Those States in which a system of voluntary long service has been imposed by treaty may transform their organisation to that of a short term service army, this transformation to be effected by January 1st, 1937, the details and stages of the transformation to be laid down by the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 6

All mobile land artillery exceeding 105 millimetres in calibre shall be limited in number, the numerical limits to be fixed by the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 7

No mobile land artillery exceeding 155 millimetres in calibre may henceforth be constructed.

Article 8

A proportion of existing mobile land artillery exceeding 155 millimetres in calibre must be converted from mobile to fixed mounts. A proportion of such artillery so to be converted shall be determined by the Permanent Disarmament Commission which shall at the same time fix the time limits for the operation.

Article 9

All tanks exceeding 16 tons in weight shall be destroyed, in accordance with arrangements to be determined by the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 10

All tanks of 16 tons and less weight shall be limited in number, the numerical limits to be fixed by the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Air

Article 11

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall at once constitute a committee of representatives of the principal Air Powers to examine the possibility of the adoption of effective measures to preserve the civilian population from the horrors of bombardment from the air.

[Page 514]

Article 12

Pending the deliberations of this committee, all military and naval aircraft exceeding 3 tons unladen weight (with certain exceptions in the case of troopcarriers and flying-boats) shall be destroyed under the directions of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 13

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall be charged with the duty, in the case of the principal Air Powers, of promoting the reduction of numerical strength in machines to a common figure, and the application to that figure and to the existing Air Forces of other powers, of a reduction of 33I/3 per cent. The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall fix the time limits within which such reductions must be made effective.

Chemical Warfare

Article 14

All chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare shall be prohibited and for this purpose the signatories of the present Agreement have signed a special agreement annexed (Annex 2).

Article 15

All preparations for chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare shall be prohibited. This prohibition shall not apply to material intended exclusively to protect individuals against the effects of chemical, incendiary and bacteriological weapons (e.g. gas-masks), or to the training of individuals to protect themselves against the effect of the said weapons.

In order to enforce the aforesaid general prohibition, it is expressly prohibited:

(1)
To manufacture, import, export or be in possession of chemical appliances and substances exclusively suited to the conduct of chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare;
(2)
To instruct and train armed forces in the use of chemical, incendiary and bacteriological weapons and means of warfare, and to permit any such instruction and training in their territory.

Naval

Article 16

The Naval Treaties of Washington and London continue in force until December 31st, 1936, and the principal Naval Powers have contemplated meeting in conference at latest in 1935, i.e. before expiry of the present agreement, to determine the régime that shall prevail after December 31st, 1936.

[Page 515]

The principal Naval Powers shall meanwhile continue to consult with a view to extending the scope of the limitations already imposed by Treaty, and shall keep the Permanent Disarmament Commission informed from time to time of the progress of their consultations.

In the meanwhile States not parties to the Washington and London Treaties accept by the present agreement a limitation of types corresponding to those which already govern the principal Naval Powers.

Manufacture of and Trade in Arms

Article 17

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall elaborate special provisions providing for State supervision of the private manufacture of war material for according publicity to both State and private manufacture and for the control and publicity of the export and import of war material.

Article 18

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall decide at what date the Disarmament Conference shall reassemble in order to elaborate, before January 1st, 1937, a long-term convention by which equality of status of the armaments of the different countries may be practically achieved. The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall prepare the work of the Conference and shall formulate and submit to it the conditions under which the said equality would be put into practical application.

annex “c”

American Delegation Draft of a Preliminary Convention, December 5, 1932

Disarmament Convention 1933

Preamble

Recognizing that substantial and comprehensive measures of disarmament are essential to the establishment of confidence and the maintenance of peace,

Desiring to avoid competition in the power of armaments,

Being determined to proceed with an immediate reduction and limitation of armaments on the basis of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations through consolidating the progress realized [Page 516] as a result of the work of the Conference for the reduction and Limitation of Armaments and as a natural consequence of the obligations inherent in the Briand-Kellogg Pact,

Recognizing that the present convention constitutes a transitional step toward the further measures for the reduction of armaments to be achieved through a General Disarmament Treaty which should promptly be negotiated on the basis of the recognition of uniform treatment applicable alike to all the signatory powers, and desiring to create appropriate instrumentalities for the formulation of the said General Disarmament Treaty and thus to carry forward the work of disarmament and organization of peace;

Have resolved to conclude a Convention for the above purposes and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries . . . . . . . . who, having communicated to one another their full powers:— etc. etc.

Chapter I

  • Article I. There shall be set up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission, consisting of the representatives of the signatory Governments, with the task of supervising the carrying out of the Present Convention. The further duties of the Commission as well as its composition, rules, and powers, are set forth in Annex _ of this Chapter. (Note: This Annex will be the Section 6 of the Draft Convention as modified by the recent decisions of the Bureau.)
  • Article II. In addition to the duties set forth in Annex _ of this Chapter, the Commission shall formulate for submission to the H. C. P., not later than 1936, a General Disarmament Treaty. The said General Disarmament Treaty shall fix the limits for the armaments of all the H. C. P. and provide for the greatest measure of reduction in the scale of armaments set forth in the present Convention. The Commission shall likewise consider the conclusion of special regional agreements which would facilitate bringing about such reductions.

The General Disarmament Treaty shall have a duration of ten years. Upon coming into effect, the said Treaty shall supersede any treaty restrictions respecting the armaments of the H. C. P. heretofore existing, subject only to such provisions as may be made in the case of States now parties to treaties limiting armaments which denounce or otherwise suspend the operation of the Treaty prior to the date fixed for its normal termination or renewal.

[Page 517]

Chapter II

For the purpose of limiting and reducing the personnel of land forces and with a view to the ultimate establishment of a uniform system for the constitution of the armies of Continental Europe, the H. C. P. agree:

  • Article I. That in accordance with the plan for the computation of land forces adopted by the Conference as set forth in . . . . . . . the totals of personnel of Element A for metropolitan forces (the irreducible element) are shown in the figures appearing after the names of the respective countries in Annex _ of this Chapter.
  • Article II. That in accordance with the plan for the computation of land forces adopted by the Conference as set forth in . . . . . the totals of personnel of Element A for overseas forces (the irreducible element) are shown in the figures appearing after the names of the respective countries in Annex _ of this Chapter.
  • Article III. That the totals of personnel of the respective land forces, totals which have taken into account . . . . . per cent of reduction applied to Element B of land forces, shall not exceed the figures appearing after the names of the respective countries in Annex _ of this Chapter.
  • Article IV. That the reductions mentioned in the foregoing paragraph may be made in progressive stages but shall be completed prior to January 1, 1937.
  • Article V. That the modifications of existing provisions with respect to land forces now subject to limitation shall be as set forth in Annex _ of this Chapter.

Chapter III

  • Article I. All mobile land artillery exceeding 105 mm. in calibre shall be limited by numbers and by categories as set forth in Annex _.
  • Article II. No mobile land artillery exceeding 155 mm. in calibre shall be constructed or acquired by any of the H. C. P.
  • Article III. The H. C. P. agree to convert from mobile to fixed mounts prior to January 1, 1937, the numbers of existing mobile land artillery exceeding 155 mm. in calibre set opposite their respective names in Annex __. All such mobile land artillery marked for transformation but not converted by January 1, 1937 shall be destroyed prior to January 1, 1937. All mobile mounts for land artillery, converted or destroyed pursuant to this Article, shall be scrapped prior to January 1, 1934.
  • Article IV. All tanks exceeding 16 tons in weight shall be scrapped prior to January 1, 1934.

The H. C. P. agree to limit the number of their tanks not exceeding 16 tons in accordance with the figures set opposite their names in Annex _ of this Chapter.

Chapter IV

  • Article I. The H. C. P. hereby agree to the total abolition of all aerial bombardment.
  • Article II. The H. C. P. agree to abolish the peacetime preparation for and training in aerial bombardment.
  • Article III. The H. C. P. agree to scrap before January 1, 1934, the bombing planes set forth in Annex _ to this Chapter.
  • Article IV. The H. C. P. agree not to exceed the numbers of military aircraft set forth after their respective names in Annex _ to this Chapter.
  • Article V. Military aircraft constructed prior to . . . . . shall not be included in the numerical computation hereinbefore indicated, and such aircraft shall not be subject to replacement.
  • Article VI. The H. C. P. agree to furnish to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, in the form to be prescribed by the latter, full details as to the type, number, and character of civil aircraft registered or constructed within their respective jurisdictions.
  • Article VII. The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall immediately constitute a committee of representatives of the principal air powers to examine the possibility of radical proportional reduction and eventual abolition of military aircraft, as well as regional measures to prevent effectively the misuse of civil aircraft.

Chapter V

The H. C. P. agree that all chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare shall be prohibited as well as peacetime preparation in and training for such warfare other than preparation for protective purposes in accordance with rules provided in Annex _ to this chapter.

Chapter VI

  • Article I. Considering that the naval Treaties of Washington and London continue in force at least until December 31, 1936, and that the parties thereto have covenanted to meet in conference in 1936, that is to say before the expiration of the present agreement, to determine the regime that shall prevail after December 31, 1936, [Page 519] the H. C. P. which are a party to the said treaties agree that in the meantime they shall continue to consult together with a view to extending the scope of the limitation and reductions already accepted by them in the said treaties and shall keep the Permanent Disarmament Commission informed from time to time of the progress of their consultations.
  • Article II. The H. C. P. which are not parties to either of the said Treaties of Washington and London hereby accept the limitations upon types of naval vessels, unit tonnages and gun calibres which have already been accepted by the naval powers parties to the said Treaties.
  • Article III. The Governments of France and Italy in addition to the measures of reduction and limitation which they have already agreed to in the Washington and London Treaties and in order to complete measures of limitation covering all classes of naval vessels, hereby accept the additional measures of limitation set forth in a separate Protocol, a copy of which is annexed hereto.

Chapter VII

The H. C. P. hereby accept the principle of State supervision of the private manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war, as well as equal measures of full publicity for both State and private manufacture and full control and publicity of the export and import of such material. The H. C. P. entrust to the Permanent Disarmament Commission the task of embodying the foregoing principles in a Convention to be submitted to the H. C. P. at the earliest possible moment.

Chapter VIII

general provisions

  • Article I. The H. C. P. agree to communicate promptly to the Permanent Disarmament Commission all measures which they shall take pursuant to the terms of this Convention with respect to the reduction of personnel, the scrapping or conversion of material, as well as with regard to the fulfillment of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by the present convention.
  • Article II. Recognizing that full information with regard to the armaments of the nations of the world is a matter of legitimate concern to all nations, the H. C. P. hereby agree that they will furnish to the Permanent Disarmament Commission such information relating to their armaments as the Permanent Disarmament Commission may make the subject of a general request to all nations. [Page 520] Such information shall be furnished in the form and to the extent so requested.
  • Article III. The present Convention, of which both the French and English texts shall be authentic, shall be subject to ratification. It shall enter into effect as between the ratifying parties upon ratification by . . . . . . . and shall remain in effect until January 1, 1937.

annex “d”

Drafting Committee’s Revision of the Memorandum Regarding a Preliminary Convention

(1) A preliminary convention should be drawn up to determine the measures of limitation and reduction of armaments which can be the subject of immediate agreement. This preliminary convention may be concluded without awaiting the political arrangements and military readjustments which are, foreseen by such plans as, for example, the French Plan. In drafting this preliminary convention, it will be essential to observe the utmost simplicity of form, keeping, as far as possible, to a statement of broad principles, and avoiding, as far as possible, complexity of detail.

(2) The preliminary convention should have a duration of approximately three years—that is, until December 31st, 1936.

It must be recognised that a long-term treaty would render possible greater reductions of armaments than a short-term convention. However, as it is proposed, during the life of the preliminary convention, to seek a solution of the political questions arising from the French Plan and the German démarche regarding equality of status through a general disarmament treaty, as explained below, the duration of the preliminary convention must not be too long.

(3) The preliminary convention would provide, among other things, for the setting up of the permanent disarmament commission with a system of supervision, along the lines of the decision already reached in the Bureau. Upon the ratification of the preliminary convention, the disarmament commission will assume its duties under that convention.

Further, the signatory Powers should provide, by a separate protocol, which would not require ratification, that, pending entry into force of the preliminary convention, the permanent Disarmament commission should be convened with the sole task, pending such entry into force, of preparing the general disarmament treaty which should come into force on the expiry of the preliminary convention. [Page 521] The task of the disarmament commission would be to bring this work to a close so that the general disarmament treaty might be signed and ratified prior to January 1st, 1937.

(4) The preliminary convention will deal primarily with the measures of limitation and reduction to be applied to the armament of those countries whose armaments are not limited by the Peace Treaties; but it will also contain the assurance that the general disarmament treaty will embody the conditions, to be arrived at through mutual agreement, which would enable the German equality claim to be met and the limitations upon German armaments to be incorporated in that treaty.

Germany would thus receive at once the formal assurance that the Powers would in good faith employ the intervening period to solve the problem raised by her claim to equality of rights. This procedure would at the same time meet the situation of those Powers that are unwilling to concede the bare principle of equality without at the same time formulating the conditions under which that equality would be put into practical application.

annex “e”

Memorandum Circulated by Baron von Neurath

In informal conversations held at Geneva the representatives of . . . . . have examined the situation arising out of the statement made by the German representative in the General Commission on July 22,6 the German Memorandum of August 29,6 the French Memorandum of September 14 [11?],6 the statement made by the British Foreign Secretary in the Bureau meeting of the Disarmament Conference of November 17,6 and the suggestion submitted by the American representative on December 5.

They agree that a prompt and effective solution of the tasks submitted to the Disarmament Conference is indispensable in the interest of the reestablishment of confidence among the nations which is the most important condition for the solution of the economic crisis and for the consolidation of world peace.

They are convinced that the Conference will succeed in achieving its task within a few months as soon as an agreement has been reached on the group of questions which are the subject of the present conversations.

They agree that the Convention on the reduction and limitation of armaments should be based upon equality of status for all nations [Page 522] and should prepare the way to the realization of equal security for all States in conformity with article 8 of the Covenant, such security being the end to be achieved by general disarmament.

For this purpose they contemplate the following points as constituting a common basis of their future attitude at the Conference.

1.)
The limitations on the armaments of Germany and the other disarmed States shall be contained in the same general Convention as the limitations on the armaments of the other States so that Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding provisions of the other peace treaties would be replaced by the general Convention as far as the disarmed countries are concerned.
2.)
The newly expressed limitations in the case of Germany and the other disarmed States would last for the same period and be subject to the same methods of revision as those of all other countries. The Convention shall contain an undertaking on the part of the signatory States to enter upon negotiations in due course before the expiry of this Convention with a view to concluding a new disarmament Convention for the purpose of further adjustment of armaments.
3.)
The provisions of the Convention shall give practical effect to the principle of equality of status in the qualitative respect, both as to war material including its replacement and to the military organization. The details should be fixed contractually so as to put an end to any discrimination such as it is contained in the peace treaties. As far as quantitative disarmament is concerned the Convention is to make the greatest possible step towards the establishment of the same military security for all countries and to prepare further steps in this direction to be agreed upon by a further conference.
4.)
It is desirable to strengthen the general security also by a further development of the contractual guarantees which exist already not to this effect.

The powers participating in the present conversation will do their utmost, on the basis of the French and British proposals submitted to them, to determine the measures which could be realized at once.

They decide that competent delegates of the five countries participating in the present conversations shall be charged to lay down, in the light of the preceding provisions, the general lines along which the principle of equality of status could be put into effect in the Convention as well as to examine the possibilities of creating any further contractual guarantees of security. The work of these delegates shall be finished by the end of January 1933 at the latest.

The Ministers of the five powers will then meet again in order definitely to put into force, in accordance with the results of these negotiations, the arrangement contemplated above, their attitude at the Conference being henceforward defined by this arrangement.

[Page 523]

annex “f”

Baron von Neurath’s Explanation of “Equality of Rights”

The practical effect which should be given to equality of status (compare question Nr. 1) should in particular include the following points:

1. Form of obligations.

The limitations on the armaments of Germany and the other disarmed States should be included in the same disarmament Convention in which the limitations on the armaments of the other Powers are defined, so that Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding clauses of the other Peace Treaties would be replaced by the new Convention as far as the disarmed States are concerned.

2. Duration of obligations.

The newly established limitations on the armaments of Germany and the other disarmed countries should have the same duration as those of the other countries.

3. Revision.

The Disarmament Convention which must in any case take account, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant, of the necessity for the States of maintaining internal order and of defending themselves against aggression, shall at the same time make provision for the conclusion of a new Convention with a view to realize as rapidly as possible the complete adjustment of armaments.

In this connection the duration of the Convention should be limited to a comparatively short period. After the expiry of this period, the States should enter into negotiations on the subject of the conclusion of a new Convention.

4. Prohibited arms.

The provisions of the Convention relating to the prohibition or admission of certain arms shall be the same for all countries.

5. Manufacture of and trade in arms.

In the same way, the same rules shall apply to all countries as regards the manufacture of and trade in arms.

6. Effectives.

The Convention should either give to all countries the same freedom to fix their own military statute and the organization of their military forces, or bring the military forces to a uniform general type.

annex “g”

Drafts Prepared by Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon

The Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy declare that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on disarmament should be the grant to Germany, and to the other disarmed [Page 524] Powers, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the scheme of disarmament to be agreed upon by the Disarmament Conference.

On the basis of this declaration, Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Conference, and the five Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany declare that they are resolved to co-operate in the Conference with the other States there represented in seeking without delay to agree upon a Convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments, with provision for further revision and reductions. They propose to devote the remaining time of the present conversations to the consideration of immediate measures to be recommended to the Conference to aid in the successful accomplishment of its task.

annex “h”

Draft Prepared by Mr. Davis and Mr. Dulles

The Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy declare that one of the aims of the Conference on Disarmament should be to accord to Germany and to the other disarmed Powers equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations.

On the basis of this declaration, Germany has signified her willingness to resume her place at the Conference for the purpose of cooperating in the work of disarmament and realising the purposes of the declaration. The German Government has declared that in its view equality of rights should receive concrete embodiment in the general Disarmament Treaty; and further, that the security for all nations referred to in the above declaration should include general measures of disarmament as recognized by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

The representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy welcome the decision of the German Government to renew its co-operation in the work of disarmament and agree that upon the reconvening of the Conference, which should be fixed for an early date, the attention of the Conference should be directed to the importance of giving early consideration to the practical application of the above declarations. They propose to devote the remaining time of the present conversations to the consideration of immediate measures of disarmament to be recommended to the Conference.

[Page 525]

annex “i”

Memorandum Circulated by Baron von Neurath

The representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States have held informal conversations at Geneva from December 6 to . . . . .

The French Prime Minister made the following statement:

France agrees that one of the aims of the Conference of Disarmament is to accord to Germany and to the other disarmed Powers equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations.

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, having taken note of this declaration, declared on his part that Germany’s return to the Disarmament Conference could only be contemplated if the following points were to guide the Governments represented at the present conversations during the future work of the Conference:

(1) The equality of status is to receive practical effect in the future Convention in every respect, and is to be, in consequence, the basis for the future work of the Conference as far as the disarmed States are concerned, subject to the reservation that the level of the respective figures relating to armaments should remain open for discussion.

(2) The term “system which would provide security for all nations” includes the element of security which lies in general disarmament as was recognized by the Assembly.

The representatives participating in these conversations agree that these points would henceforth determine the attitude which their respective Governments will adopt at the Conference.

annex “j”

Draft Submitted by Mr. MacDonald to the Drafting Committee

I

(1) The Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy declare that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany, and to the other disarmed Powers, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the convention containing the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.

This principle implies a single convention for all States, lasting for the same period, and permitting the same qualities of arms but leaves open for discussion all questions of stages and quantities, it [Page 526] being clearly understood that the object of the Disarmament Conference must be to bring about the maximum of positive disarmament that can be generally agreed—not to authorize in the name of equality any increase of armed strength.

(2) On the basis of this declaration Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Disarmament Conference and to join in a solemn affirmation taken by all European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between them by resort to force.

(3) In these circumstances the Five Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany declare that they are resolved to cooperate in the Conference with the other States there represented in seeking without delay to work out a Convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for future revision.

II

(Any time available for the continuation of conversations between delegates of these Powers will be devoted to the consideration of practical measures to be recommended to the Conference for the successful accomplishment of its task.)

annex “k”

Formula Prepared by Drafting Committee

I

(1)
The Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy declare that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany, and to the other disarmed Powers, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the convention containing the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.
(2)
On the basis of this declaration Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Disarmament Conference.
(3)
The Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are ready to join in a solemn reaffirmation to be made by all European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between them by resort to force. This shall be done without prejudice to further and fuller discussions on the question of security.
(4)
In these circumstances the five Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy declare that they are resolved to cooperate in the Conference with the other States there represented in seeking without delay to work out a Convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for future revision, with a view to further reductions.

II

(Any time available for the continuation of conversations between delegates of these Powers will be devoted to the consideration of practical measures to be recommended to the Conference for the successful accomplishment of its task.)

annex “l”

Suggestion of Sir John Simon to Complete Paragraph (1) of Annex “K”

The adoption of this Declaration implies the determination of the Governments named to work for a Disarmament Convention which will contain the respective limitations of the armaments of all States and which shall last for the same period in the case of each. It is clearly understood that the application of the principle of equality of rights, referred to in the above declaration, leaves open for discussion all questions of quantities or stages, and that the object of the Disarmament Conference must continue to be to bring about the maximum of positive disarmament that can be generally agreed—not to authorise the increase of armed strength.

annex “m”

Five Power Declaration

(1) The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy have declared that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany, and to the other Powers disarmed by Treaty, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the Convention containing the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.

This declaration implies that the respective limitations of the armaments of all States should be included in the proposed Disarmament [Page 528] Convention. It is clearly understood that the methods of application of such equality of rights will be discussed by the Conference.

(2) On the basis of this Declaration, Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Disarmament Conference.

(3) The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy are ready to join in a solemn reaffirmation to be made by all European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between the signatories by resort to force. This shall be done without prejudice to fuller discussions on the question of security.

(4) The five Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy declare that they are resolved to co-operate in the Conference with the other States there represented in seeking without delay to work out a Convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for future revision with a view to further reduction.

(Signed)
J. Ramsay MacDonald
, Chairman,
Norman H. Davis

John Simon

J. P. Boncour

C. von Neurath

Aloisi

  1. Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Davis under covering letter of December 29.
  2. For text, see p. 410.
  3. See pp. 528 ff.
  4. Annex “M”, p. 527.
  5. Ante, p. 318.
  6. See telegram No. 455, November 15, noon, from the American delegate, p. 380.
  7. Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).
  8. Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).
  9. Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).
  10. Printed in Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Material zur Gleichberechtigungsfrage (Berlin, Gedruckt in der Reichsdruckerei, 1933).