Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I
500.A15A4 Steering Committee/227
The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 6.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s telegram No. 676, November 29, 11 a.m. [1 p.m.],91 I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of the confidential conversation concerning various aspects of the disarmament problem which took place between M. Herriot and the Honorable Norman Davis at the Quai d’Orsay on November 28th.
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum of a Conversation at the Quai d’Orsay, November 28, 1932, Between the President of the Council, M. Herriot, and Mr. Norman H. Davis 92
Mr. Davis stated that he wished to take this opportunity to discuss with M. Herriot the proposed Five Power conversations at Geneva and the possibility of having these conversations developed in such a way as to bring satisfactory concrete results. But before taking up this question he desired to refer to the section (Chapter I) of the French plan93 which related to the assurance to be given by the United States. Mr. Davis had heard that in preparing this Chapter of the French plan M. Herriot had acted on the advice of Mr. Politis that the United States could and would give assurances of the character desired by France. He wished M. Herriot to know that he (Mr. Davis) had never discussed the matter with Mr. Politis and he felt quite sure that Mr. Politis had no mandate to express the American viewpoint on these questions. (Note: Mr. Davis raised this question as he had heard from Lord Tyrrell that M. Herriot had [Page 482] been assured by Mr. Politis, who had been instrumental in drafting Chapter I, that the United States could and would do all that was required to give effect to this chapter and that he (Politis) had had some assurances on this point from American circles).
M. Herriot stated that he had, in effect, consulted Mr. Politis with regard to certain phases of the plan, not, however, because Mr. Politis was in a position to express the American viewpoint as he knew this was not the case, but rather because Mr. Politis was the Vice-President of the Disarmament Conference, knew the temper of the Conference, and was in a position to help guide him as to what was feasible from the Conference point of view.
Mr. Davis then stated that, in his opinion, it was a great mistake to attempt to push the United States faster or further than it was prepared to go in connection with the legalistic formulation of the doctrine which had been associated with Secretary Stimson’s name on account of the Secretary’s speech of August 8th last.94 In fact, the United States had made a long step forward and the success of this step should not now be jeopardized by the attempt to make precise, through treaty provisions, a doctrine such as that set forth in the Secretary’s speech. In the United States, policies of this nature often evolve and become strong through precedent and through the support of public opinion. If in their infancy they were subjected to Senatorial scrutiny on the basis of legalistic formula the basic ideas might be defeated through failure to agree upon the terms of their formulation.
M. Herriot would recall that it was the duty of the Executive to indicate what he conceived to be the duties of the United States under its treaties. Secretary Stimson had done this so far as the Briand-Kellogg Pact was concerned. There had been no dissent in the United States from the interpretation which had been given and France should be content with this and recognize what a step forward it constituted.
The United States, he said, is not only definitely committed now to the principle of consultation in case of a violation or threat of violation of the Peace Pact, but it has already established a precedent of consulting, as in the case of the Sino-Japanese controversy, and it is watching with keen interest just how other powers look upon their obligations in this respect.
While the doctrine of neutrality and belligerent rights has been modified by the principles established in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, a disarmament treaty is not the place in which to attempt to codify the principles which shall regulate the conduct of nations in the case of a violation of the Peace Pact.
[Page 483]M. Herriot said that he recognized the force of Mr. Davis’ remarks. The French plan did not state that the principles of Chapter I must necessarily be set forth in a treaty. All that France wanted was that they should be definitely a part of American policy. In effect what he had been trying to get at in this section of the French plan was that Great Britain should state clearly what it understood by Article 16 of the covenant of the League of Nations and that the United States should state with equal clarity its interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Then France will know better where she stood and could proceed with some plan for cooperative action in continental Europe. To repeat, M. Herriot emphasized that he did not insist upon a treaty, a declaration would be quite sufficient if there was no doubt that the declaration represented the determined policy of the United States Government. M. Herriot said that he had read with close attention Secretary Stimson’s speech of August 8th, his Pittsburgh speech and also the declarations of President Hoover. He felt that on certain points the declarations made by the President did not go quite as far as the speech of Secretary Stimson. He fully understood our difficulties as to a treaty. What he was afraid of was that Great Britain would hesitate to give a clear interpretation of Article 16 until they felt sure of our position with regard to the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Mr. Davis remarked that after Secretary Stimson’s speeches he did not feel that the British had any real justification in claiming that we were the obstacle which prevented them from taking such action as they might be disposed to take under Article 16 or any other articles of the covenant.
Referring to the French plan, M. Herriot said that he fully realized its defects. They had hurried him too much; Henderson had insisted the plan must be produced and Lord Tyrrell had also pressed him. Matters as difficult and delicate as this could not be worked out in a few days or even a few weeks. He wished again to emphasize that he did not insist that the French plan was the only basis for discussing the disarmament question, but there was one point he wished to make absolutely clear, namely, that we could not take out of the French plan the provisions relating to the equality of right for Germany and leave the rest aside. Further, he would never admit that the question of German equality should be considered abstractly and apart from the whole question of disarmament. In his conception the question of security as presented by France and of “equality” as demanded by Germany should occupy the same position in relation to the whole disarmament problem. They were objectives to be reached at the end of the road. To try to settle the question of [Page 484] equality as a preliminary and isolated question was absolutely inadmissible and he for one would never acquiesce in this method of procedure.
Mr. Davis stated that the suggestion in the French plan with regard to an international force at the disposition of the League was foreign to our conception of what was practical. Further, it seemed to him a mistake to attempt to make a super-State out of the League. If some common force was necessary for continental Europe, could this not be worked out in some other way? M. Herriot replied that he felt this was a matter for the technical military men to work out. He saw no reason why the French, German, Italian and other military men should not get together and submit their ideas as to the formation of such a force. It would be interesting to have this study and it might furnish a useful basis.
M. Herriot remarked that he was still very apprehensive about the Geneva conversations. Naturally the German policy disturbed him and he had to consider that, in a day or two, he might be dealing with General von Schleicher as German Chancellor. What the Germans had been doing was, in effect, this: They had been demanding that France and the other Powers go to them with their plans for disarmament while Germany assumed no part in the disarmament work; every time a plan was presented they said that it was not enough and doubled their previous demands. Last April all that Germany asked for was that Section V of the Versailles Treaty be included in the disarmament treaty. Now they were asking for a substantial amount of rearmament. Tomorrow it will be the Polish Corridor. After that the Sarre and then the colonies. He could not understand why the British seemed so blind to all of this. Winston Churchill had understood the true purport of events and realized that the French army was a bulwark in Europe and that if that army were done away with the hope of peace in Europe would be gone. Meanwhile, however, Sir John Simon was promising the Germans equality and sample types of all arms without realizing the terrible danger that this involved. Lord Tyrrell had come to him and asked him for the French disarmament plan. He had told him that he could write this in one line, as follows: France accepts the same relative military strength on land as compared with that of Germany which England is prepared to accept at sea as compared with German naval forces.
Mr. Davis then stated that the matter which he wished particularly to discuss with M. Herriot was the program to be followed in connection with the proposed Five Power Conference at Geneva. It was of vital importance that these conversations be made a success as their failure would, to all intents and purposes, terminate the disarmament [Page 485] work. He agreed with M. Herriot that the purpose of the conversations should not be to discuss the bare theory of equality. Rather the conversations should deal with the disarmament question and the method of handling the question of equality should evolve out of such discussions. Further, it was important that the conversations should mark a definite and concrete step in advance in the work of disarmament, and even if the conversations failed to find far-reaching and all-inclusive solutions, they should in any event mark a definite step in advance.
With this in view, Mr. Davis said he had been giving much thought to the method of procedure and wished to lay before M. Herriot an idea, not an American plan, as to what might be done. Mr. Davis then sketched in some detail the idea of a preliminary convention95 to register the progress already made, leaving problems such as raised in the French plan as well as the question of German equality for the General Disarmament treaty to be worked out by the Permanent Disarmament Commission. At Mr. Davis’ suggestion, Mr. Dulles then read a French translation of the memorandum setting forth these ideas in some detail.
At the conclusion, M. Herriot said he thought the idea immensely interesting and there were points in it which he felt had real value. He liked the idea of a Disarmament Commission carrying on the work. Further, he liked the idea of registering in a convention the principles set forth in the July 23rd resolution.96 He also thought it was logical, on the basis of that resolution, to register the steps that were immediately possible and set up the machinery for working out a more comprehensive agreement which would dispose of the political problems such as French security and German equality, which, after all, were decisions to be reached at the end of the work rather than questions to be taken up at the very beginning of the task. M. Herriot added that he would wish to give the matter further thought and would talk it over with Mr. Paul-Boncour. He stated further that he would greatly appreciate it if Mr. Davis would also go into the matter with Mr. Boncour and that it might then be very desirable to arrange a further meeting at which both he and M. Boncour were present.
Just as Mr. Davis was leaving, Mr. Herriot produced from his desk an elaborate Oriental pipe which he handed Mr. Davis, laughingly remarking that this was a Japanese, and then he corrected himself, “a Manchukuo pipe.” Mr. Davis’ efforts to leave without this rather elaborate present were unavailing as M. Herriot thrust it [Page 486] into his pocket. This little incident led to a brief discussion of the Manchurian situation. M. Herriot said he recognized the connection between the application of the principles of the Covenant as applied to Japan and these principles in the case of the Franco-German relations. We need have no apprehension whatever about his attitude on Manchuria. As long as France could be helpful in working towards a peaceful solution which was in conformity with “right” (le droit), France would do this. But if she had to face the moral issue involved, should efforts at conciliation fail, France would take her position squarely for the maintenance of treaties.
France, M. Herriot said, had been offered all kinds of inducements by Japan as the price of her support, since the Japanese felt they could no longer count on England. These offers had been categorically rejected. M. Herriot said that there were a group of liberal Japanese who had been in touch with him before their return to Japan. These people were in a very difficult position, caught as they were between the military party in control and the Communist movement. They could not actively assert themselves at the moment, but he hoped that as the situation developed and as the financial and political crisis in Japan became more acute these liberal elements would regain control. The situation was fraught with danger. He could see the possibilities of a close working arrangement between the military groups of Germany and those of Japan and this would be most serious.
At the conclusion of the conference, M. Herriot and Mr. Davis briefly spoke to the press reaffirming the cordial and satisfactory nature of their conference.