500.A15A4/1535: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Mellon) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5 p.m.]
297. From Norman Davis. Simon’s idea that we might attend proposed disarmament conversations in the role of observer and press reports this morning intimating French proposal for three-power conversations between British, French, and Italians prompt me to suggest following considerations to you. In my opinion we now have a better opportunity than ever before to bring about acceptance of the substance of the Hoover plan and to affect the reduction of world [Page 466] armaments. MacDonald and Baldwin are reexamining the British position with regard to disarmament, Herriot appreciates that France must prepare to reduce its armaments if there is to be hope of successful negotiations with the Germans. I am apprehensive that this real opportunity may be lost if the French are successful in putting over their thesis that there must be a preliminary agreement on security with Great Britain and Italy, to be worked out by three-power conversations, or if the French publicly launch their much advertised disarmament plan which, I gather, provides for elaborate agreements to promote security.
Three-power conversations on the security issue would probably fail through the unwillingness of the British and Italians to underwrite French foreign policy through any real extension of the Covenant, the Locarno Treaty or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. With such failure we would lose the present opportunity of driving for armament reduction and advancing the general security through a gradual and controlled reduction of armaments.
I am convinced that our active collaboration is essential to the success of the Disarmament Conference and that the fate of the Conference will depend upon the conversations which may shortly take place between the leading powers.
If France insists and the British and Italians acquiesce we cannot of course object to conversations among them on the security issue but I feel it is our duty to consider whether we should not now take a stand in favor of serious disarmament conversations.
As a first step we should carry forward the conversations with the British, which are proceeding favorably, to adjust our naval differences. We might then reexamine the possibility of bringing the French and Italians into the naval treaty and take up the question of the reduction of land armaments. If this program succeeds it would be possible to deal with the Germans on the practical basis of a real program for the reduction of armaments rather than indulge in academic and futile consideration of legal equality, and at a more propitious time since the German elections will be over.
I realize that this is an ambitious program and naturally I cannot underwrite its success but in this crisis it is only by measures of this kind that we can hope to relieve the tension here.
If you agree with my analysis of the situation I feel that it will be desirable to let MacDonald and Simon know promptly that in our view the conversations proposed to be held should deal frankly and fully with the question of reduction of armaments and that we would participate in any such discussions. It is unfortunate that these questions come up for decision just at this moment but I do not see how [Page 467] a decision can be delayed without running the risk of losing an opportunity that may not come again. Of course if France persists in her old contention that security, apart from disarmament, is the primary consideration of the proposed conversations we could not usefully participate. [Davis.]