500.A15A4/896: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 2—6:15 p.m.]
54. It may be useful at this stage to give you certain views as to probable developments in the future.
Thus far progress through the general discussion and the setting up of Conference machinery has been normal in speed. For the moment we are unavoidably slowed up by the meeting of the Assembly which is occupying the major portion of the thought of the delegates. Further than this our confidential discussions disclose the fact that there is not only a general reluctance to come to immediate grips with the major problems but that both France and Germany are determined not to deal with essentials until they have disposed of their elections, this without prejudice to their desire to stage a public battle on certain carefully chosen questions for political purposes [Page 51] in both countries. I think it important to realize that far from indicating any disheartening hostility these battles have been carefully worked out and localized in frank visibility [discussion?] between Tardieu and Nadolny and they both feel that the elite [formal] debate they propose to stage will not prejudice ultimate agreement.
In view of the foregoing and of the acquiescence of the other powers it is clear that, although committees will be put to work on problems of secondary importance in order to keep up the appearance of activity, there will be no definite progress until after the French and German elections, or at least until after the holidays which terminate on April 4th.
We have thus far refrained from trying to push other delegations into discussion of essential problems before they are ready for them and for the present, at least, we feel that that course should be continued. This is dictated to us by two considerations, first, that it seems highly improbable that we could induce the European powers to come to grips with the problem once they have made up their mind that the best hope of achievement lies in another direction, and in the second place, because if we press for immediate action they will almost inevitably counter with embarrassing conditions relating to America’s part in security as the price of accepting any sacrifice. Strategically, therefore, we are convinced that acquiescence with their desires for the time being is essential, particularly as we feel that the principal powers are desirous of coming to some sort of agreement which will best be promoted by refraining from undue insistence as to times and methods. Furthermore, much private conversation and shaping of views on essential problems are going on day by day and are going on in an increasingly favorable atmosphere.
It is generally realized here that this protraction of the work of the Conference will cause criticism but it is felt that this is a reasonable price to pay for the opportunity to tackle the problems only after acute nationalistic feeling has been given a chance to die down with the elections.