763.72119 Military Clauses/91
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
[Washington,] September 18, 1932.
Mr. Osborne, the British Chargé,
called at Woodley at nine o’clock and left with me a statement, annexed
hereto, of the views of the British Government on questions arising out
of the notes exchanged between the German Government and the French
Government regarding the work of the Disarmament Conference. This paper
was printed by the press on the Monday morning following. When Mr.
Osborne
[Page 433]
handed it to me, I read it
through and told him one thing was clear about it,—that it was the work
of an able lawyer. He said yes, he thought Sir John Simon had done it himself. I told him that the
analysis of the purpose and effect of the Versailles Treaty which it
contained seemed to me, on this quick reading, to correspond
substantially with my own view. I then called Mr. Osborne’s attention specifically to
the sentences in the last two-thirds of page five61 and said that these statements seemed to me to
indicate that the British proposal would refer the question of whether
or not the Versailles Treaty was to be amended, as well as the naval
treaties of Washington and London, to the Disarmament Conference and
that burning question would come up there; that otherwise if they were
not amended those old treaties would stand. I said the paper indicated,
however, that London thought the best result would be to have them all
embodied into a general convention. Mr. Osborne replied that he had not gathered that impression
before but when he looked it over he rather agreed with me. I said to
him, however that I did have this slight question about the British
note,—that possibly it was a little too diplomatic to make an impression
on German psychology. I said there was an impression floating around
that Great Britain was backing Germany on the question of equality of
rights; that this had come to me from the Italian Ambassador, as well as
from others; and that in view of this I was not quite sure whether the
language of this document would make a sufficient impression to rebut
and replace it but I hoped that it would, and I gave him some examples
of cases illustrating the German psychology in question. This one
statement of possible difference on my part made an impression on him
for he repeated it, and for that reason I think it probably will be
reported to his government.
[Annex]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
Statement of the views of His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom on questions arising out of the Notes
exchanged between the German Government (August 29th) and the French
Government (September 11th) regarding the work of the Disarmament
Conference.
- 1.
- The exchange of notes which has recently taken place between
the German and French Governments on the subject of “equality of
status” in the matter of disarmament and the announcement made
by the German delegate at Geneva that his Government regarded
this question as necessary to be dealt with forthwith if their
collaboration
[Page 434]
in the
work of the Disarmament Conference was to continue, involve
matters of the greatest importance for the future progress of
the Conference and indeed for the future of disarmament itself.
His Majesty’s Government and the whole British people are most
deeply concerned to promote the success of the Conference and
hold that international agreement (to which of course Germany
must be a party) for the limitation and reduction of armaments
would not only relieve the world from the burden of expense
which is retarding its economic recovery but would be an
immediate and solid contribution towards the preservation of
world peace and the promotion of good feeling between
neighbouring States. With a profound sense of their duty to
promote appeasement and to search for the reconciliation of
different points of view, His Majesty’s Government deem it well
to make the following observations.
- 2.
- His Majesty’s Government feel constrained to state at the
outset that they think it unfortunate that a political
controversy of this magnitude should arise at this moment, when
it is so necessary that attention and energy should not be
diverted from efforts which are being undertaken, and are so
urgently needed, to restore production and the commercial
prosperity of the world. Granted that this question of equal
status would have arisen before the Disarmament Conference
concluded its work, there is a grave disadvantage in forcing it
to the front at this stage. Germany has suffered, and is
suffering, from the prevailing economic depression and
widespread unemployment, and the other Signatories of the Treaty
of Versailles have recognized this and have shown themselves
ready in consequence to abate, and indeed fundamentally revise,
their financial claims upon Germany. In view of Germany’s
economic difficulties, the initiation of an acute controversy in
the political field at this moment must be accounted unwise,
and, in view of the concessions so recently granted to Germany
by her creditors, it must be accounted particularly untimely.
His Majesty’s Government earnestly trust that nothing may be now
allowed to intervene which would retard the process of economic
recovery which is so urgently necessary and which it will be the
task of the approaching World Economic Conference62 to promote by all the means in
its power.
- 3.
- But as Germany’s claim to a status of equality has been put
forward prominently and threatens to impose an obstacle to the
smooth and harmonious working of the Conference, His Majesty’s
Government consider that they should offer some comments on the
subject and make some suggestions as to how the claim might be
dealt with. First, it is necessary to be clear as to what the
claim
[Page 435]
involves and as
to the actual treaty position. His Majesty’s Government can give
no countenance or encouragement to disregard of treaty
obligations. Although His Majesty’s Government do not understand
the German memorandum to have stated the contrary view, they
desire to associate themselves with the opinion that it could
not be maintained as the correct legal construction of the
Treaty of Versailles and connected correspondence that Germany
is legally entitled to abrogate Part 5 of the Treaty of
Versailles by any Disarmament Convention to be concluded or by
the failure to conclude any Convention at all. If the preamble
to Part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles is looked at, it will be
seen that the Allied Powers, in requiring these limitations on
Germany’s armaments, had in mind the object or reason therein
indicated. That object or reason was to “render possible
initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations.”
To state what the object or aim of a stipulation is is a very
different thing from making successful fulfilment of that object
the condition of the stipulation. Still less is it possible to
deduce, as a matter of legal interpretation of the Treaty, that
the manner in which the object—general limitation of
armaments—was to be fulfilled, was to be precisely the same
manner in which Germany’s armaments had been limited by Part
Five, for the only indication in the Treaty of the manner in
which general disarmament is to be brought about is to be found
in the very general words of Article 8 of the Covenant. The
correct position under the Treaty of Versailles is that Part 5
is still binding and can only cease to be binding by
agreement.
- 4.
- So much has been stated for the purpose of clearing the
ground. But His Majesty’s Government do not understand that the
case put forward by Germany is a legalistic deduction from the
language of the Treaty of Versailles. It is rather an appeal for
adjustment based on the fact that the limitation of Germany’s
armaments contained in the Treaty was intended to be, and
announced to be, the precursor of general limitation by others.
His Majesty’s Government do not deny the fact and do not seek to
minimise the force of the contention. So far as the Government
of the United Kingdom are concerned, very large reductions in
all departments of armaments have been made since the Treaty of
Versailles was signed. Nevertheless the United Kingdom
Government are earnestly collaborating at Geneva in promoting to
the utmost of their power measures of further disarmament, both
in the qualitative and quantitative sense, which would all tend
in the direction of greater equalization.
- 5.
- It is the hope of the United Kingdom Government that there may
result from Geneva, in spite of the difficulties that have been
encountered
[Page 436]
and that
are inherent in the effort of reaching world agreement, a really
valuable measure of disarmament in which each nation will bind
itself to a strict limitation, both in kind and in quantities,
of its weapons of war. Such a result can be attained only if due
allowance is made both for the needs and for the feelings of all
the sixty-four States concerned. The objects to be aimed at are,
in the case of the more heavily armed Powers, the largest
possible reduction and, in the case of lightly armed States, at
any rate no material increase. It would indeed be a tragic
paradox if the outcome of the first Disarmament Conference was
an increase in armaments and the actual rearming of any State.
The United Kingdom Government therefore conceive the object of
the Conference to be to frame a Disarmament Convention upon the
principle that each State adopts for itself in agreement with
others, a limitation which is self-imposed and freely entered
into as part of the mutual obligations of the signatories to one
another. There will thus be, as a result of the Convention, no
distinct status: everyone’s armaments will be controlled by the
same process: and the limitations which have already been
prescribed by existing treaties—such as the various Peace
Treaties or the Naval Treaties of Washington and London—will,
save so far as they are modified by mutual consent, reappear in
the voluntary and comprehensive compact about to be negotiated
at Geneva. It will then be this last named document which is the
effective obligation binding upon all. This conception of the
work and purpose of the Disarmament Conference gives the answer,
in the view of the United Kingdom Government, to the question of
status raised in the communication of the German Government of
August 29th.
- 6.
- Questions of status, as distinguished from the quantitative
question, involve considerations of national pride and dignity,
which deeply touch the heart of a people and keep alive
resentment which would otherwise die down and give place to more
kindly feeling. In the interests of general appeasement,
therefore, it is much to be desired that any such questions
should be disposed of by friendly negotiation and agreed
adjustment, not involving either disregard of treaty obligations
or increase in the sum total of armed forces. But this desirable
consummation cannot be attained by peremptory challenge or by
withdrawal from deliberations which are about to be resumed. It
can only be reached by patient discussion through the medium of
conference between the States concerned.
Washington,
September 17,
1932.
