500.A15A4 Steering Committee/168: Telegram
The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
466. From Davis and Wilson. Supplementing our 465, November 21, 3 p.m. We have been considering what could be contained in the “convention”35 of short duration to be immediately concluded pending the eventual working out of a “general disarmament treaty”. The results which we foresee are based on a considerable amount of optimism, are predicated on the continuance of the good will and desire to succeed which have animated the discussions in the last 2 months and take into account the speed and frankness which should result from private negotiations.
The “convention” might contain the following
- (1)
-
Effectives
- (a)
- The determination of element “a” for the metropolitan component (the “police” forces foreseen in President Hoover’s proposal for home countries”.)
- (b)
- The acceptance of approximately the status quo for oversea forces.
- (c)
- The immediate reduction of element (b) (defense contingent) of total forces can hardly be achieved within a brief period.
- (d)
- An agreement not to increase the total land forces.
- (e)
- Agreement on principle of common types of armies for continental Europe.
- (2)
-
Artillery
- (a)
- A limitation by numbers of all mobile land artillery above 105 mm. This presumably would be on the basis of present numbers.
- (b)
- An undertaking not to construct mobile land artillery above 155 mm. Possibly some scrapping might be arranged.
- (3)
-
Tanks
- (a)
- Scrap tanks above 18 tons.
- (b)
- Limitation by numbers of tanks below 18 tons.
- (4)
-
Air
- (a)
- Universal abolition of aerial bombing.
- (b)
- Prohibition of peace time preparation and training in bombing.
- (c)
- Conversion or possible scrapping of bombing planes.
- (d)
- Limitation by number of military planes.
- (e)
- Full publicity as to type and characteristics of civil planes registered or constructed with possibly some further measures of control applicable to Europe.
- (5)
-
Chemical warfare
- (a)
- Universal abolition of use of chemical warfare.
- (b)
- An agreement not to make preparation for or to train in the offensive use of chemical warfare in peace time (this to include the right of every state to adopt necessary measures of protection against illegal use of chemical warfare).
- (c)
- Both (a) and (b) above are contingent on finding a solution satisfactory to the continental powers of the questions of control and sanctions.
- (6)
-
Navy
- (a)
- Completion of London Treaty by France and Italy.
- (b)
- The extension if necessary of the Washington and London Treaties to coincide with the expiration of the “convention”, (a) and possibly (b) would be separate instruments.
- (c)
- Nations not parties to the Washington and London Treaties to accept a limitation of types so as not to prejudice the restrictions on type which already govern the leading naval powers.
- (7)
- Manufacture of and trade in arms
- (Since we are contemplating a convention to be concluded in
the near future we will have to confine ourselves under this
point to acceptance in principle only as detailed formulation
will require several months).
- (a)
- Recognize the principle of state supervision of private manufacture.
- (b)
- Recognize the principle of equality of publicity for state and private manufacture.
- (c)
- Recognize the principle of control and publicity for export and import.
- [(8)]
- The Permanent Disarmament Commission to be set up as envisaged in the draft convention with amendments as now being drafted after recent discussions in the Bureau.
The foregoing eight points are by no means sure of achievement but represent what we consider within the bounds of possibility for the immediate future.
In our thoughts the “convention” might embody something approximating these eight points. In addition an agreement should be reached between the states to set up at once without waiting for ratification of the “convention” the Permanent Disarmament Commission. This Commission should have for its task the preparation of the general disarmament treaty using as a starting point the “convention” and the American, French, British and other plans of broader scope which have been or may be submitted. After ratification of the “convention” the Permanent Disarmament Commission would have all the powers provided for in the convention but until that time it would have only the task of preparing the general disarmament treaty. It could further be specified that after a fixed period the states would confer if ratification had in the meantime not taken place as to whether the work should be continued or abandoned.
We contemplate a “convention” of a limited duration, say from 3 to 5 years, and envisage it apart from the immediate achievement to be registered therein as a method of preventing the situation from growing worse and as an earnest of the reality of the desire to achieve a more far reaching general disarmament treaty. The very existence of this convention which because of its limited duration will be easier of acceptance by many states particularly under present financial conditions will facilitate the drafting of the general disarmament treaty. With the existing intergovernmental debt and national budgetary situation few states would have the temerity to state that they contemplated an increase in armaments within the proposed life of the convention. A convention of this character might be put into effect as between the parties upon ratification by the key states of Europe, the United States and Japan without awaiting universal acceptance except of course as to provisions where universal acceptance is a prerequisite.
Now as to the specific problem of Germany. We believe Germany should be given some inducement to cooperate and suggest the following: [Page 404]
- (a)
- That in the “convention” the enlistment provisions for the Reichswehr be ameliorated and perhaps certain other concessions be made in regard to part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles subject to determination by negotiation.
- (b)
- That assurances be given to Germany that the limitations for Germany will be incorporated in the general disarmament treaty under the same conditions and for the same duration applicable to other states. Further that on the coming into effect of the general disarmament treaty part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles will lapse.
- (c)
- Ambassador Sackett now here suggests to us that if any way could be found to bring Germany into the general framework of the Washington and London Treaties it would insist on it meeting her views regarding equality of status and that as a participant she might be willing to accept under these conditions even less tonnage than the Versailles Treaty naval provisions. This might also furnish opportunity to ameliorate the French position as regards the pocket battleship question. We think this is an interesting thought and hope you will consider it. If we succeed in completing a Franco-Italian naval agreement this might furnish an occasion for bringing Germany into the picture.
It is our idea that the provisions appearing in the convention should form a transition ground between the provisions of part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles and those provisions of general limitation which are applicable to all states, Germany included, which will be found in the “general disarmament treaty” to be drafted.
On the basis of a convention such as outlined we feel that we should be on firm ground in refusing even to discuss as far as we are concerned any such far reaching political objectives as contained in chapter I of the French plan. However it is quite probable that they will ask some form of reaffirmation of the willingness to consult as set forth in the platforms of both parties.