Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I

500.A15A4 Steering Committee/144: Telegram

The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, November 15, 1932—noon.
[Received 3:50 p.m.²¹]

455. Delegation has today received Conference Document 146 entitled “Memorandum by the French Delegation”. First part of this document consists of a lengthy statement along the lines of Boncour’s speech (see my 434, November 4, 8 p.m.) then follow the proposals:

Proposals

Chapter I

All the powers taking part in the work of the Conference shall be called upon to establish in an effective manner the following principles, which are generally recognized to be a necessary consequence of the Pact for the Renunciation of War:

(a) Any war undertaken in breach of the Paris Pact is a matter of interests to all the powers and shall be regarded as a breach of the obligations assumed toward each one of them.

(b) In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Paris Pact, the said powers shall concert together as promptly as possible with a view to appealing to public opinion and agreeing upon the steps to be taken.

(c) In application of the Pact of Paris outlawing war, any breach of that Pact shall involve the prohibition of direct or indirect economic or financial relations with the aggressor country. The powers shall undertake to adopt the necessary measures to make that prohibition immediately effective.

(d) The said powers shall declare their determination not to recognize any de facto situation brought about in consequence of the violation of an international undertaking.

Chapter II

The application of the principles laid down in the previous chapter will make it possible to give full effect to the obligations devolving upon the members of the League of Nations under the Covenant and under the treaties they have concluded in conformity with the principles of the Covenant: the general convention on means of preventing war, the convention for financial assistance.

France considers the effective and loyal application of article 16 of the Covenant as an essential element of the plan she has worked out.

Chapter III

The special organization for Europe, which has already received a first realization in the Locarno treaties²² which it must be understood must not be affected by any of the present plan—will involve political arrangements and military arrangements. This organization entails in the first place their acceptance by a sufficient number of powers, regard being had to their importance and geographical position, in order that the security of each of them should be ensured in all circumstances.

Section (a)

The fundamental object to that political arrangement will be to define the conditions in which each of the states forming part of the European organization will be entitled to the cooperation of the other contracting states.

(1) —These arrangements will establish the right to assistance when a territory under the authority of one of the signatory powers is attacked or invaded by foreign forces. An aggression as thus defined cannot be taken to include certain cases such as the existence of an agreement to the contrary, the case of self-defense i. e. the repulsing of armed forces which have entered by violence the territory of the state which is defending itself, and action undertaken in execution of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations or specially authorized for any other reason by the Council or Assembly of the League.

(2) —The object of the assistance will be to put an end to the aggression, and to create a de facto situation which will allow of a fair settlement of the consequences of the aggression.

(3) —The Council of the League of Nations will decide that assistance shall be given on simply ascertaining that an attack or invasion has taken place. In order to facilitate any steps that may be necessary to ascertain the facts, there shall be established in each of the signatory states a commission consisting of diplomatic agents and military, naval and air attachés accredited to the Government of that state, the members of this commission being appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. Any state which believes itself to be threatened or alleges that it has been attacked may demand that the necessary measures be taken to establish the facts.

(4) —The peaceful settlement of disputes between states which have signed the European agreement will be ensured by the compulsory accession of those states to the general act of arbitration. Should one of the signatories refuse to conform to the methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, or to execute an arbitral award or judicial decision, or to take necessary action when the Council of the League has established that there has been a breach of an international undertaking, the other party will submit the matter to the Council, which will decide what steps are to be taken. The contracting powers will lend assistance in carrying the decision into effect.

(5) —In the cases considered above, the Council’s decisions will be taken by a majority vote.

(6) —To enable first aid to be given without delay to any state entitled to the assistance provided for in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) above, the contracting powers will agree to the specialization of portions of their military forces under the conditions laid down in section (b) below.

Section (b)

Corresponding to the political arrangements in section (a) above, there will be military arrangements aiming, on the basis of an equality of defensive status, at:

(1) —Reducing the offensive character of the national forces in accordance with the principle laid down in the American proposal of June 22nd last; Specializing certain elements with a view to the most urgent operations involved in the common action provided for in paragraph 1 of article 8 and paragraph 2 of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(a) The land forces assigned for the defense of the home frontiers of the states of continental Europe will be reduced to a uniform general type—that of a national short service army with limited effectives—not adapted to a sudden offensive.

For this purpose, under the conditions defined in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) below, as and when those conditions are fulfilled, the said forces will be organized on the following bases:

Their effectives and period of training shall be fixed so as to secure their defensive character, in conformity with the provisions of article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations—that is, in such a way as to ensure the national security of each state, taking account of its geographical situation and circumstances. In particular, the numerical limitation of the short service effectives will be adapted to the inequalities and variations of the resources of recruitment of the various signatory powers; the same will apply to the period of training, which will have to include, in a form to be determined, the time spent in pre-regimental training or in military training received, for example, in political organization.

(b) Apart from the specialized elements for common action referred to in paragraph (2), no contracting party will be able to retain in the forces assigned for the defense of its home territory units consisting of professional effectives or soldiers serving longer than the period fixed for its national army.

(c) The professional or long service effectives (instructors, specialists and cadres) of the national armies referred to in paragraph (a) will be limited on common bases and in relation to the effectives of those armies.

(d) The effectives of home police forces of a military character, more especially those living in barracks, will be limited on a basis of calculation common to all signatory states. Any excess over the figure resulting from these calculations must be set off by an equivalent reduction in the effectives defined in paragraph (c).

(e) There shall be prohibited, for the national armies of the contracting powers, at least all powerful mobile material, especially such as would facilitate an attack on permanent fortifications (powerful artillery and powerful tanks). It is quite obvious that the general convention will have to be established in conformity with these restrictions of material and with the provisions which follow.

(2) (a) Each of the contracting powers will place permanently at the disposal of the League of Nations, as a contingent for joint action, a small number of specialized units consisting of troops serving a relatively long term and provided with the powerful materials prohibited for the national armies.

In order to be able, at the first call from the League of Nations, and according to plans drawn up by a delegation of the League’s Permanent Advisory Commission, to provide the speedy aid to which any state party to the European arrangements would be entitled in the conditions contemplated in section (a) above, these specialized contingents will be kept constantly ready for action, and will be formed on similar lines. The convention will stipulate the quota to be contributed by each state for such purpose.

(b) Apart from the normal armament of the contingents contemplated above, any mobile land material which is prohibited for the national armies contemplated in section 1 will be stored in each of the contracting states under international supervision. These stocks will if necessary be placed at the disposal of the parties in aid of which collective action is taken.

(c) Any contracting party engaged in legitimate self-defense, as defined in the political arrangements in section (a) above, will regain the free use of the contingent maintained by it and of the stocks of materials in its territory.

(3) In all the contracting powers, war materials, both those of the national defensive armies and those of the contingents for common action, will gradually be made uniform, their manufacture being internationally supervised and organized.

(4) There will be organized among the contracting parties a regular and permanent supervision of the execution of their obligations in regard to their armaments. This supervision will involve an investigation at least once a year.

(5) The general organization—to be established within a period to be fixed—being defined on the foregoing bases, the successive stages of its establishment will be settled, all arrangements being made for any of the parties concerned to be given at any time the necessary safeguards in regard to effectives and the value of the forces to be compared, and to ensure that there is no increase of forces or expenditure on armaments for any state, apart from any exceptions duly justified and accepted by the Conference.

Chapter IV

Naval and oversea forces are evidently not affected directly by a continental system of the kind set out above.

They stand primarily in relation, on the one hand, to the special needs for the protection of the territories for which certain powers are responsible overseas, as well as for the defense of the coast of the home country or colonies and of territorial jurisdiction by sea, and on the other hand to the naval or military forces of such powers as may not be parties to the arrangements proposed in chapter III.

That will not make it any less necessary to maintain the interdependence of the general system of military reductions adopted on the European Continent and of the limitation of sea and oversea armaments.

Oversea forces should strictly therefore be calculated and specialized for the particular tasks incumbent upon them; the resulting limitations shall be fixed by the general convention.

As regards naval forces the solutions to be contemplated, whether in connection with security or in connection with the limitation and reduction of armaments, necessarily find a place within a general framework applying equally to all maritime powers. But the conclusion at the Washington Conference of the Pacific agreement²³ which made possible the signature of the naval treaty of 1922²⁴ has clearly shown the advantage of regional understandings of a political character for the purpose of facilitating the reduction of fighting fleets. If such was the effect of an agreement whose scope was limited to certain restrictions on the use of naval bases and a simple undertaking on the part of the signatories to consult one another, it is reasonable to suppose that very much larger reductions of tonnage would be facilitated by agreements organizing, with all the necessary stipulations of detail, the cooperation of fleets in cases analogous to those contemplated in section (a) of chapter III. This applies in particular to the case of the conclusion of a Mediterranean pact between the naval powers concerned.

However this may be, it is in accordance with the spirit of the Hoover proposals that, in the case of naval as in that of land armaments, the principal reductions should be effected in those categories of vessels which have been recognized as the most offensive by means of the relevant reduction of the characteristics at present fixed for certain types of war vessels.

As regards quantitative reductions since, under the terms of the Hoover proposal, “the naval armaments have grown up in mutual relation to one another”, it will be desirable to look for “real and positive” reductions of tonnage, while leaving this relativity as it stands.

Consequently, subject to a special system applicable to fleets whose aggregate tonnage does not exceed 100,000, the uniform percentage of reduction to be accepted should apply to the aggregate tonnages declared in 1931 by the different naval powers in reply to the questionnaire of the Council of the League as to the position of their armaments.

It is unnecessary, from the standpoint of armaments, to distinguish, in the case of naval forces, between general and specialized forces. But, for the purpose of supplementing at sea the land action provided for in chapter III, section (b), (2), every contracting power possessing naval forces shall, when called upon by the League of Nations, supply the emergency assistance to which any state which is a victim of aggression would be entitled under the conditions laid down in chapter III section (a). Such assistance shall include a certain proportion of vessels of every category, that proportion being stipulated beforehand in the convention.

It is clear that, like the naval forces, the air forces cannot be directly affected by a Continental system like that outlined in chapter III. Nevertheless, in the matter of reduction of air armaments it would now appear possible to take a most important step forward within the framework of the general convention, in view of the fact that the Conference, acting on the proposals put before it for qualitative disarmament (to which were added the proposals of President Hoover), provided in its resolution of July 23rd last for the total prohibition of bombardment from the air, subject to special guarantee of security in connection with non-military aviation.

It will be all to the good, however, if these results are defined, when the time comes, in a regional system, which can be made even more effective in the case of the air, if all the great air powers of Europe—continental and non-continental—agree to participate.

Consequently, in addition to the provisions already proposed in the draft convention of the Preparatory Commission, the French delegation proposes the following body of measures:

(1) —All bombardment from the air shall be prohibited and bombing aircraft shall be abolished under the conditions for which the resolution of July 23rd provides;

(2) —The necessary provisions for this purpose shall be settled in principle by the general convention; but these will be supplemented by a special arrangement with regard to the air, applicable to Europe alone, regarding points which do not form part of the general agreement—in particular, concerning the establishment of a “European air transport union”, which will entrust the management and supervision in Europe of public air transport to an international body, and will ensure the application of a system of safeguards against the use of civil aircraft for military purposes;

(3) —The importance of the obligations assumed in connection with the air is so great, and the consequences of their violation would be so serious, that it appears essential to give the League of Nations, at any rate in Europe, a powerful means of action capable of immediate intervention as necessity arises to guarantee the execution of the obligations in question. Specialized air units, as in the case of the land army, possessing more powerful machines and more powerful equipment than the ordinary air units, will be able to place adequate means of action at the disposal of the League.

Going still further in this category of ideas, certain delegations, including the French delegation, have already suggested the establishment of an organically international air force to be set up and maintained permanently by the League of Nations. The provision of material for the force will be made easier by the abolition of bombing aircraft in the different national air forces, these aircraft being handed over to the League of Nations in accordance with executory regulations to be drawn up. Staff will be provided by direct recruiting from volunteers of different nationalities in accordance with a quota system to be laid down”.

The last paragraph of the document reads:

“In conclusion be it noted afresh that the several parts of this plan constitute one indivisible whole. Examination has shown it to be based integrally on the application of the Pact of Paris and of the Covenant of the League of Nations, from which the French Government has declared its doctrine to be derived. This plan can only be carried out by stages, each of these stages being justified and naturally introduced by the experience gained in the previous ones. This means that its success will depend on the progress of the confidence which must grow up between peoples and on the loyalty with which it is carried out. It presupposes the concentration of efforts and the determination to overcome the inevitable difficulties and not to sacrifice the realities of positive action to facile negations or criticisms”.

Wilson

21. Telegram in five sections.
22. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, pp. 289–363.
23. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.
24. Ibid., p. 247.