500.A15A4 Permanent Disarmament Commission/20: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the American Delegate (Wilson)
242. I have the greatest sympathy with your difficulties during the debates on chemical warfare. As I see the problem it is an attempt to do away with a new method of hostilities which is potentially so dangerous as to threaten our civilization. It is type of warfare that can be used not only against military forces but with devastating effect against civilian populations. Our best efforts must be directed toward effectively removing this menace. Obviously we must start with a renunciation of the use of chemical warfare, universal if possible, but in any event binding the principal military powers. Once this is agreed to, three subsidiary questions arise on which you seek guidance: (a) our attitude toward reprisals or retaliation in kind; (b) our attitude toward peacetime preparations or training for chemical warfare; and (c) our attitude toward the involved rules covering supervision, penalties, sanctions, etc.
- (a)
- Retaliation. Should the provisions for chemical warfare be treated as an ordinary contract, which when breached releases the injured party from its provisions, or is this a special case where a violation does not confer on the injured party freedom of action? As a practical measure, I feel that in warfare when passions are inevitably inflamed it would be beyond human nature to prohibit retaliation in kind. The provision which would seem to offer the best hope of observance would be one whereby retaliation would be forbidden against the civilian population, assuming that gas has been illegally used, but only against the armed forces of a state.
- (b)
- Preparations. You report that we are alone in declining to prohibit peacetime preparation and training for chemical warfare, and that every other power is prepared to agree to such a prohibition in principle. You further indicate that defensive measures will be permitted. In other words, what is under discussion is the prohibition of peacetime preparation and training for offensive chemical warfare. If this is correct we cannot put ourselves in the position of blocking such a move or of refusing to accept it in principle. Our position simply is that we do not think, as a practical matter, that a provision covering such a prohibition could be framed with sufficient clarity as to leave no room for misinterpretation or to permit a clear distinction between defense against chemical warfare and preparation for its offensive use. We query whether provisions can be drawn which will so clearly define the rules that a nation will be able to know whether it is complying with them or not. No formula which we have yet seen seems to us to be satisfactory. For example, the provisions in the sub-paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of Part 2 of the Conclusions of the Report would so interfere with adequate training and preparation for defense against gas that they would be unacceptable. In order to prepare for defense against gas one must [Page 377] produce gas, experiment and devise new types of gas in order to test your defensive equipment and to train men in the use of the equipment under exposure to the actual gas. Insofar as these provisions relate to private manufacture, etc., they seem to us so unreal as to be valueless.
- You may, however, in your discretion, continue to explore the possibilities, whether in technical committee or in the Bureau, or devising a formula which will meet our preoccupations.
- (c)
- Violations and sanctions. The intricate provisions of the report dealing with violations and sanctions, were, as I understood it, intended for European application alone, as, for instance, to be inserted in the inner concentric circle of the French plan as outlined by Boncour. I have not yet had an opportunity to consider thoroughly the new text contained in your 448, but although public opinion in this country would align itself against the violator of the chemical warfare treaty, I do not think it would be possible for this Government to pledge itself to affirmative action.
- (d)
- The complexities of the problem are such that I would like to revert to our original suggestion of a simple renunciation of chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare, without specific rules for its application. I am strongly of the opinion that the simpler the treaty, the easier will be its acceptance; similarly, the more it depends on the good faith of its signatories, the better will be the chances of its observance. I know that you have suggested this, and that the majority favored an extension of the treaty, but if the debates in the Bureau result in the confusion and complexities indicated in your recent telegrams, an opportunity may arise where you could re-offer this thought as an acceptable solution.