500.A15A4 Steering Committee/137: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the American Delegate (Wilson)
236. Your 438, November 7, noon. The question of procedure to be followed in presenting our change of position on the proposals for supervision and control of the manufacture of arms must be considered not only in respect to the most convenient and least embarrassing tactics to be followed in making it clear to the Bureau, but also, and particularly, with reference to possible repercussions in this country. The position on the Constitutional limitations of the treaty making power which you took in your statement of October 6 has already been the subject of adverse criticism in the press. See letter from Manley O. Hudson in New York Times, October 16, and editorial in The Nation, October 26. It would be most unfortunate [Page 371] if this constitutional question should become the subject of widespread controversy. That would inevitably result in its becoming a political question, and the opponents of the Government’s disarmament policies might attempt to use it to serve their ends.
I therefore hope that this change of position may be made as soon as possible, with the least possible emphasis, and in the manner best calculated to avoid extensive publicity. The choice of means I must leave to a large extent to your discretion.
From our point of view it would still appear preferable to have the section quoted in your 432, November 3, 10 p.m., deleted from the report and for you to refer to our change of position, if necessary, in a brief informal statement, introduced incidentally into the discussion in the Committee. You might refer to the difficulty of constitutional interpretation in respect to questions on which the courts have not specifically ruled, adding that after further study of the constitutional question involved, we no longer feel justified in maintaining our former position and that you will hereafter discuss the problems of supervision and control on the basis solely of expediency and practical policy. In other words, unless you feel that it is entirely impracticable, I should like you to handle it in this manner, namely, by making it clear informally that we no longer object on constitutional grounds but still reserve decision as to whether as a matter of substance the principle of supervision of control of private manufacture is acceptable to this country. Possibly by a series of talks off the record you could make our position clear without incurring undue publicity.
Should it be impossible to handle this matter in the informal way suggested and should you still decide to make a statement to the Bureau, we will comment later on one or two points connected with your proposed statement.