500.A15A4 Land Armaments/183: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the American Delegate (Wilson)
Washington, November
8, 1932—3 p.m.
234. Your 437, November 7, 11 a.m.12 Answering the points raised in your 429, November 3, 11 a.m.
- (a)
- As indicated in our 103, May 14, 3 p.m.,13 we should continue to press for an agreement that is universal in scope. Failing universality, there are two ways to meet the problem, (1) a reciprocal agreement which would bind states to abstain from chemical warfare only as against states or their Allies which are similarly bound and (2) a general renunciation by the High Contracting Parties of the use of chemical warfare against any state, whether or not bound by the Convention, which we interpret as meaning a general renunciation against initiating chemical warfare, but not against retaliation in kind. Is our understanding of the terminology correct? In accordance with the Hoover Plan we could agree to (2) provided the definition made it very clear that the right of retaliation in kind was implicit, and that this right did not appear merely by implication in the section on penalties.
- (b) and (c)
- The question of the prohibition of preparation or training for chemical warfare in time of peace is one of the most difficult problems we have to face. We must on the one hand avoid blocking progress at the Conference, and on the other hand jeopardizing in any way our national defense. Both the Army and the Navy remain adamant in insisting that we shall not agree to such prohibitions. For our own part, we query whether any such prohibitions, failing complete universality of agreement would be efficacious. [Page 367] Starting from the premise that it is not possible to differentiate between governmental and commercial preparations, and extremely difficult to differentiate between offensive and defensive preparations, we come inevitably to the conclusion that really to abolish peace-time preparations it would be necessary not only to do away with certain types of research, whether in government laboratories or private institutions, but also to regulate the chemical industry, and to adopt so complete a system of control over private manufacture as to be at variance with our policies. We hope that you can present our position as a desire to agree to such measures as will effectively preclude chemical warfare, without entering a domain where there would be an appearance of advance without the reality. We have again considered the arguments adduced in your 188, May 16, 11 p.m.14 and other telegrams but do not at present feel that we can go further toward meeting the recommendations of the delegation unless and until an undertaking of universal application has been accepted by all the nations represented at the Conference.
- (d)
- We leave to your discretion the method of handling any references to lacrymatory gas, provided its domestic use in maintaining order is not interfered with.
Stimson