500.A15A4/1005¼
Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis, Member of the American Delegation
Monsieur Tardieu having told me that he wanted to have a long talk with me we arranged to meet in his room in Les Bergues at 3:30 P.M. this afternoon.
He began the conversation by stating that since we had gone through the Paris Peace Conference together and had been friends for years he thought it would be helpful to have an exchange of views with regard to the difficulties and possibilities of the Disarmament Conference. He then said he had completed a digest of the principal speeches made so far from which it was evident that each country had laid stress upon one point, namely the importance of curbing aggressive war by doing away with essentially aggressive instruments of war. While France as he had indicated, is sympathetic to this idea he thought it was very difficult to separate entirely offensive from defensive weapons and he did not think this was getting at the real root of the problem which was to establish a political foundation for peace from which disarmament would automatically follow.
I told him that while the world must ultimately be organized for peace, if war and preparations for war are to be eliminated it was in my opinion necessary to make progress in every possible direction. Whether security should precede or follow disarmament is somewhat academic. It would, of course, be desirable to get all political questions settled at once and to organize the world for peace but that is not possible. Any steps that can be taken, however, to relieve the tension that exists on account of the fears and resentments that are bred by inequality in armaments and even in security will foster good will, improve political relations and reduce the danger of armed conflict. Even agreements to stop competition and to eliminate the most aggressive weapons of war—to say nothing of actual reductions—would [Page 35] contribute to the creation of a state of mind that would make it easier to clear the political atmosphere and establish a greater measure of goodwill and understanding which after all would be the best security.
Tardieu said that France was prepared to do everything in her power to bring about understandings which would make it possible and practicable to reduce the size and the burden of her military forces but that he was not clear as to what was going to be the attitude of the United States and the role which it would be willing to play in changing the world definitely from a war to a peace basis. For instance he said he had gotten the impression that we consider this Conference as of secondary importance to us and that we seem so satisfied with what had been accomplished at the Washington Disarmament Conference as to feel that we had done our part, when as a matter of fact his own opinion confidentially was that what was done there had been one of the chief causes of trouble ever since in that it placed France in a difficult position for arriving at agreements with both Italy and England.
I told him he was entirely wrong in thinking the United States considers this Conference of secondary importance; that I could assure him that not only are the President, the Secretary of State and the entire Delegation keenly interested and desirous of doing everything which seems wise and practicable to achieve success, but that there is a growing sentiment in the United States in favor of reducing the menace and the burden of armaments. I further said that the American Delegates were not only prepared to consider with an open mind every proposal submitted but that we were willing to do everything in our power to contribute to the success of the Conference; that while we are interested in the success of any efforts to remove the obstacles to political appeasements in Europe which would facilitate a general agreement for a limitation and a substantial reduction in armaments we were unable and in fact unwilling, as he must know, to make any commitment whatever to uphold any political settlements in Europe. He said he understood our attitude in that regard but that without the good offices of the United States and its cooperation in establishing a regime of peace it would be impossible to make any substantial progress. I told him that in my opinion it would depend largely upon just what would be involved in the establishment of a so-called regime of peace.
He then told me that with a view of making a constructive contribution towards a solution of the problem of disarmament they had after six months of earnest thought and effort prepared the plan40 [Page 36] which they had submitted and that he would like to know what 1 thought of it. I told him while the time might come when there would be an international police force it would be after all nations have reduced their military forces to a mere police force but that even if it were ever wise and possible to establish such a force the world is certainly not yet prepared for it; and furthermore, that I could not see how an international police force controlled by the League could serve the purpose which he seemed to have in mind since some of the principal powers of the world were not members of the League. He said he realized that such a plan could not be complete unless all principal nations were members of a League but he thought that a step might be taken in that direction and at least that it would be of value to get the world to thinking more about it. I told him that it raised many difficult questions but that just now it seemed to me that the Council of the League itself was probably doing more to destroy the French proposal than anyone else, because as long as the Council is unable even to pass a moral judgment on such a flagrant violation of the League Covenant as has happened in the Far East41 there was not much ground for believing that it would be easier for it to pass proper judgment with regard to the use of an international armed force.
He said that is one reason why he had suggested the necessity of strengthening the League. I told him that what was needed just now more than anything else was moral and not military strength. I also told him that I thought this question was a matter of considerable importance to France which has laid so much stress upon the sanctity of treaties because if France does not show her willingness to uphold the sanctity of the Covenant of the League, the Paris Peace Pact and the Nine Power Treaty there is apt to be an impression that she is only interested in the sanctity of treaties which directly effect her own security.
I then told him I thought the Far Eastern problem had a direct bearing upon the establishment of a regime of peace and upon the Disarmament Conference. He said he thought there was much in what I said and that France wished to be helpful in a solution of the Chino-Japanese controversy but he did not display any keen interest in the matter.
He then told me that so far France is the only power that has expressed a willingness to agree upon a definite limitation on armaments and expenditures for a specified number of years. I told him that we were a party to a Treaty that definitely limited our naval [Page 37] strength and that we were disposed to agree upon a general limitation. He then got out a chart to show that we had increased expenditures more than any other nation. I explained to him how this had happened with regard principally to the navy but that we had not even built up to the maximum limit to which we were entitled and, furthermore, that our navy was not looked upon as a menace and that it was not a disturbing political factor.
He then showed me on a chart that France had reduced her army somewhat below what it was in 1913 and asked if it would not be reasonable if they should agree not to exceed what they now have. I told him that in 1913 they were facing other nations in Europe, all armed to the hilt and plunging headlong into war, but that since the chief enemy, Germany, had since been disarmed it would seem to me that France could at least make a substantial reduction in her army without in any way endangering her security and by so doing she would even increase her security by reducing fear and resentment which breed war and that she would furthermore improve her own economic welfare and that of the rest of the world. He said that so long as they were facing a possibility of a combination between Italy and Germany the French people were afraid to make any reduction.
I then told him that if the Far Eastern situation were solved and France and Italy would settle their differences the Franco-German problem would become isolated and easier of settlement. He agreed with that and said that he was making every effort to reach ‘an agreement with the Italians, that he had had several conversations with Grandi and that he was hopeful that with the good offices of England and perhaps ourselves it would be possible in the near future to bring about an agreement between France and Italy.
He said that they also had some questions to settle with England which was necessary in order to get her cooperation, that they had just reached an agreement with regard to reparations but had some commercial and other matters to settle which he and Sir John Simon had been discussing. He said that if they could just get together with England and Italy, which was not impossible, then he felt the way would be prepared for further progress towards a settlement with Germany that would clear the atmosphere.
I then asked him if he thought France and Germany could get together by themselves and he said no but that he thought that with the help of England and the United States it would be possible to do so once the road was cleared by an agreement with England and Italy. He said it had been very difficult for some time to deal with the British because they had somewhat lost their morale as a result of their financial difficulties but that in spite of that he was hopeful [Page 38] they would iron out their differences. He did not indicate in any more detail just what those differences were.
He then said that one outstanding difficulty was the uncertainty as to what part the United States would play in upholding the peace of the world. I told him that I did not see how this uncertainty could be removed but that if there were some way to fit the United States into a framework for a reduction and limitation of armaments and the promotion of the peace of the world that would not go counter to what we deemed to be our interests and our duties and would not involve obligations which we were unwilling to assume we would be glad to give it every possible consideration. He then said that the United States could be so helpful in settling some of the problems which have such a direct bearing upon the political stability of Europe and upon disarmament. I told him that while the United States Government could not become involved in the political problems of Europe I was sure that the American Delegates would be glad to be of any possible assistance in bringing about a better feeling and understanding. He said that was what he had in mind and also the fact that if there were some way to regularize the cooperative efforts of the United States with the League in cases where we were directly interested it would be helpful. As to that I told him I did not know what more could be done than was being done but that if the League should deal courageously and effectively with the Far Eastern question, which was the first major political problem dealt with by the League in which the United States was directly concerned, it would no doubt have an influence upon American opinion.
He then asked what assurance there would be that the Senate would ratify whatever treaty we might sign here. I told him that while no assurance to that effect could be given the American Delegation would not sign a treaty which would not meet with the approval of the Administration and which it was believed would be rejected by the Senate. He said something about our failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and I told him that just because of that there would be, in my opinion, less probability of the Senate rejecting whatever treaty we might sign here.
In concluding our conversation he said that the talk with me had been very helpful and that once we could clearly understand his difficulties and limitations and he could understand ours we could probably find a basis for effective collaboration and that we must continue our talks and efforts. He said that by working hard and patiently, by taking our time and not attempting too quickly to reach agreements on everything we ought to be able to make genuine progress.
[Page 39]The net impression of my talk with Tardieu was that the French feel on the defensive, that they have about decided they cannot dominate Europe indefinitely, even by predominant military strength, and that they are genuinely desirous now of going as far as they dare in making a real peace, to be accompanied by or followed by a substantial reduction in armaments.
- Conference Documents, vol. i, p. 113 (Official No: Conf. D. 56).↩
- For correspondence regarding the situation in the Far East, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩