500.A15a4/71
The Minister in Switzerland ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 5.]
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Council finally finished its Disarmament discussion, and I did not telegraph the complete text of the resolution adopted2 since it was carried by the American press, and since its principal points were covered in my telegram No. 14 of January 23, 8 p.m.
When I left Geneva on Wednesday the 21st the situation seemed to be set for at least a strong recommendation in favor of direct conversations. It appears now that after my departure, Mr. Henderson got it firmly in his mind that in spite of your declaration that you “had taken no position for or against the nomination of officers,” [Page 489] nevertheless your talks with Lindsay had made it plain to him, Henderson, that you did not want the Beneš nomination. There is some reason to suppose that the wish was father to the thought, as it is understood that Mr. Henderson has never been very favorably disposed toward this nomination, although Lord Cecil and Cadogan3 both were. Whatever the reason that inspired this thought, Mr. Henderson was convinced that with German and Italian opposition and with what he considered American reluctance, the nomination should not be made. It was therefore decided to pass over any nominations at least until the next session of the Council.
Regarding a resolution in favor of direct conversations, the Rapporteur originally inserted an article in this sense in his recommendations, but at a meeting held last night among certain members of the Council definite opposition thereto developed. Those who were opposed to its insertion, including Mr. Henderson, pointed out that direct negotiations, unless they were somewhat manipulated by a mediating officer or Power, ran the risk of reaching deadlocks which would bring the Powers to the Conference already persuaded that nothing could be done, whereas, if these situations were brought out in the Conference itself, there would be an overwhelming pressure of public opinion on the Powers concerned to reach an agreement. This opposition to the resolution prevailed and the resolution was not included in the final proposal of the Rapporteur.
The protagonists of this opposition do not by any means discard the possibility of direct conversations in certain instances, but feel that those circumstances must be carefully scrutinized by some outsider and carefully prepared so that the risks will not arise of deadlocks between the States in advance of the Conference.
In this I am being the Devil’s advocate, as I entirely agree with your contention that without such preliminary direct conversations the Conference holds out no hopes. It may be possible, none the less, to bring about such conversations as a result of the preliminary investigations of the Secretary General and the Rapporteur so that the Council in its meeting in May can recommend them for specific cases. But we can hope for little in this direction, I fear, before May at the earliest.
The present intention, as I understand it, of the British Government is to discuss these matters more thoroughly with you and to endeavor to persuade you that the safer method of preparation is the one which the Council is adopting.
I have been informed confidentially of the origin of the suggestion made to you for an American Vice President. It appears that Lord Cecil wrote the instruction under which Sir Ronald Lindsay first [Page 490] introduced the subject to you, forwarding it from his country place to London with a strong covering letter urging that it be sent. It was decided to follow his suggestion.
The suggestion for an American Chairman of the Conference brought about little debate in the actual sessions of the Council, even in secret meetings, as the members were already convinced that nothing definite could be accomplished now. The idea, however, gave rise to wide discussion informally and met with a high degree of enthusiasm in many quarters, especially in Germany and among the small neutral states, and there are some indications that it is agreeable to the British. On the other hand, the French press on the whole was not enthusiastic about the idea. One of the Paris papers declared that they feared that an American would be “trop simpliste” in his ideas and consider that the natural solution of the difficulties in land armament lay in equality of force among France, Germany and Italy. It is very possible that the suggestion may be presented and urged at some subsequent occasion, and for this reason I bring the matter to your attention.
I am sending copies of this letter to General Dawes and to Mr. Gibson for their information.
Respectfully yours,