Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume I
500.A15a3/1554
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my cable No. 137 of May 5, 6 p.m.19 on naval disarmament and to transmit herewith copies of texts handed me confidentially by the British Government being (1) memorandum from the Italian Government to the British Government making a reference to the British memorandum of April 25th, (2) memorandum from the Italian Government to the French Government making reference to its memorandum of April 20th, both dated May 1, 1931.
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum From the Italian Government to the British Government
The Italian Government have the honour to refer to the British memorandum of the 25th April and the document enclosed therein, containing the reply of the British Government to the French memorandum of the 20th April.
In expressing their thanks for the courteous transmission of the foregoing, the Italian Government have now the honour to send herewith their own reply to the aforesaid French memorandum.
As the British Government will clearly perceive from a perusal of the latter reply, the Italian Government, in order to do the utmost in their power to maintain the agreement reached on March 1st and with the object of continuing the labours pursued jointly with the British Government for the achievement of success, are willing to accept the invitation extended to them and therefore to agree to incorporating in the “declarations” now in course of being drafted the formula proposed in paragraph 14 of the British reply.
[Page 408]The Italian Government trust that this action may prove to be a valuable contribution to the disarmament question and also to the various problems connected therewith.
Memorandum From the Italian Government to the French Government
The Italian Government have the honour to refer to the memorandum of the 20th April from the French Government on the subject of the difficulties which have arisen during the labours of the Drafting Committee engaged on the text of the Naval Agreement.
The Italian Government have always considered the text of the Bases of Agreement as a document which is final in substance even though it be susceptible of being drafted in different terms. They fully share the anxieties of the French Government at the danger of finding the results of long and laborious negotiations brought to nought, and therefore trust that the agreement of March 1st may be maintained. It is in this spirit, and animated as they are by the most friendly sentiments and the utmost goodwill, that they have examined the arguments and the proposals which have been courteously submitted to them.
In the first part of the memorandum of the 20th April the French Government set forth the reasons for which they are of opinion that the Agreement only governs the construction of tonnage to be completed before 31st December 1936.
The Italian Government cannot refrain in this connection from reaffirming that they have never thought, either during the negotiations or when signifying their assent to the Bases of Agreement, that the Agreement was confined to construction to be completed by the end of 1936.
It was after having ascertained the impossibility, at least for the moment, of reconciling the opposing theses which had been discussed at the London Conference that by July 1930 the Italian and French Governments came to the conclusion that an agreement would only be possible in the practical sphere and that it would therefore be necessary to seek a solution which, while leaving questions of principle entirely unprejudiced, should govern the construction which the two countries intended to carry out in the next six years, that is during the period 1931–1936.
In fact the discussions which took place between the French and Italian experts in Paris during August 1930 had as their objective an agreement regarding their programmes of construction for the next six years, thus taking also into consideration the tonnage which, [Page 409] having been laid down prior to January 31st, 1936, would only be completed after that date.
It is clear that if each of the two countries had wished to preserve liberty to lay down during the latter years of the agreement an undetermined amount of tonnage which would have come into use in the years immediately following, the scope of the agreement would have been so limited that the object which it was desired to attain would have appeared wholly inadequate.
Since August 1930 the Italian Government consequently were justified in considering as settled that the Naval Agreement with France was to govern all construction by the two countries up to 1936 inclusive.
This conception has never been contradicted in the course of the successive negotiations undertaken in a parallel manner between French and British experts and between Italian and British experts. It was in fact confirmed when the British Minister for Foreign Affairs and the First Lord of the Admiralty, after having conferred with their French colleagues came to Borne to place before the Italian Government, the proposals which led to the acceptance of the Bases of Agreement.
The Italian Government fail to see how the text of the Bases of Agreement can give rise to uncertainties of interpretation. Indeed, they do not see how the Anglo-Franco-Italian Agreement which, according to the original intention of the three Governments concerned, was to be incorporated in the text of Part III of the Treaty of London, could have omitted to govern in a restrictive sense, in a way similar to that prescribed in Article 19 of the Treaty of London, the laying down of vessels to be completed after December 31st, 1936.
This was precisely the object of the provision inserted in paragraph C (a) (2) (General Provisions) of the Bases of Agreement, where it is stated that France and Italy accept, as far as they are concerned, the provisions of Part III of the Naval Treaty of London which have a general application. It appears to the Italian Government to be incontestable that the concluding part of Article 19 of the Treaty of London, which governs the laying down of tonnage to be completed after the termination of the Treaty, must be considered as a provision having a general application and therefore must be included among those which the signatories of the Bases of Agreement pledged themselves to accept.
The French Government’s memorandum sets forth in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 the three different points of view, of the British, French and Italian experts respectively, which were revealed in the Drafting Committee.
[Page 410]The Italian Government cannot, however, share the opinion expressed in the memorandum according to which “a question which it had been agreed to reserve is in fact disposed of, at least for a given period.”
The final provisions of the Bases of Agreement express two conceptions:—
- (1)
- that the Agreement does not fix any permanent ratio for any category of vessel;
- (2)
- that the Agreement does not create any precedent as regards the final solution of the question whether, and, if so, in what manner, the tonnage which is overage on December 31st, 1936, can ultimately be replaced.
The object of these provisions is therefore to indicate that the question of the adjustment of the maximum levels and of the ratios between the French and Italian fleets shall remain unprejudiced and that questions of principle are to be postponed. Such postponement cannot logically be conceived except for the entire duration of the Agreement, since, if this were not the case, that is, if it be admitted that before the expiration of the Agreement additional tonnage could be constructed, the Bases of the Agreement would be profoundly modified.
As has already been stated, the Italian Government accepted the Agreement essentially if not exclusively on account of the importance which they attribute to it both from the political point of view for the beneficial effects which may be hoped to accrue in the realm of Franco-Italian relations, and as a contribution which Italy and France would have made to the cause of disarmament.
The approaching General Disarmament Conference could in fact have found in the Anglo-Franco-Italian Agreement an example of reduction of armaments which would not have failed to exert a favourable influence on the outcome of that Conference.
The fresh proposals submitted by the French Government under which the right would be reserved to begin additional construction during the final years of the Agreement would, however, destroy all that the Italian Government consider to be the most valuable results of the Agreement. In fact the average annual construction which the Agreement contemplates as 27,000 tons, would be increased, in contrast to the object which the Agreement has in view of securing an effective reduction of naval armaments.
The Italian Government therefore trust that the French Government will note that, notwithstanding the utmost goodwill by which they are animated, the Italian Government find, to their regret, that they are unable to accept the proposal put forward.
[Page 411]In their Memorandum of the 25th instant addressed to the French Government and communicated to the Italian Government, the British Government have submitted to the Italian and French Governments a proposal of their own.
With the object of doing the utmost that lies in their power to maintain the Agreement of March 1st, the Italian Government have the honour to state that they are prepared to agree to the British suggestion, as specified in paragraph 14 of the aforesaid Memorandum, and accordingly to agree that the last part of Article 19 of the Treaty of London should be incorporated in the text of the Agreement by means of the subjoined formula, it being thus understood as regards the two navies, and in accordance with the precise words used in paragraph 10 of the French memorandum, that it would be eventually for the Conference of 1935 to consider whether authority could be given for the laying-down of a certain tonnage from 1936 onwards and that, failing agreement at that Conference, no construction for the replacement of overage tonnage existing on December 31, 1936, could be undertaken before January 1, 1937; that, accordingly, under this last hypothesis, no construction beyond the tonnage for the replacement of vessels which become overage in 1937, 1938 and 1939 can possibly be undertaken before January 1, 1937.
The text of the formula in question, as it appears in paragraph 14 of the above-mentioned Memorandum, is as follows:—
“Subject to any further agreement limiting naval armaments which may be reached at the General Disarmament Conference of 1932, or at the Naval Conference which will take place in 1935 in accordance with article 23 of the Treaty of London, the additional tonnage which France and Italy may lay down before December 31st, 1936, shall be the replacement tonnage of vessels which will become overage in 1937, 1938 and 1939.”
- Not printed.↩