500.A15a3/1532: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cheat Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
131. After dictating Embassy’s 130, May 2, 2 p.m., the Ambassador said to notify you he had arranged a conference with Alexander in order to answer definitely the questions asked in your 112, May 1, 5 p.m., and would continue this telegram when conference had been held this evening.17
[Paraphrase.] In an interview with Alexander this evening he stated that he had no information other than that contained in press reports as to whether the British counterproposal will be accepted by the French. With regard to your inquiry Alexander said that in London full discussion had been given on the proposal to reword the Basis of Agreement to limit until July of 1935 the laying clown of tonnage rather than to limit the completion of tonnage until December of 1936. I then asked him why the Admiralty did not consider that an agreement for 4½ years was better than no agreement at all, and for a detailed statement of their position on the recent French memorandum. He was good enough to comply and wrote out a statement which was approved by Admiral Dreyer, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, who accompanied him. He asked me to inform you, however, that this was not an official statement, but was his personal view to be held confidential by you and me. [End paraphrase.]
“The suggestion communicated to me is not in effect a new one. It means an agreement for 4 or 4½ years for France and Italy, whilst Great Britain remains bound with her two co-signatories at London for 6 years. It means that France could lay down all her present replaceable tonnage of over 160,000 tons in 4 years and would be free in 1935 and 1936 to lay down replacements of existing over-age tonnage whilst the part III treaty powers18 could lay down only tonnage becoming over-age after 1936 (by article 19). This, as pointed out in our reply to France, would involve the invocation of article 21 of the London Treaty. If there is no French-Italian agreement, that invocation would have to be considered now. If there were a 4½-year agreement it would still have to be faced, but Britain would be at the disadvantage of
- (a)
- Entering the next five-power conference with the French construction a fait accompli, and therefore,
- (b)
- In the event of having then to invoke article 21, would have to face too large a building programme in too short a time.
It would, if it is inevitable that article 21 must be operated, be much preferable to spread the incidence of such operation rather than to compress it into 1935 and 1936. Moreover, it must be recognized that it is certain Italy would regard such a 4½-years agreement as a direct breach of faith from the draft French proposals which we took to Rome from Paris.”