711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)
Mr. Ushiba telephoned me early this morning while I was still dressing and asked whether he might call on me at my house. He arrived as I was having breakfast. He is normally well composed, but this morning he was nervous and excited. He said that he had been up all night helping Prince Konoye to make arrangements for the transfer of office to the incoming Prime Minister.
[Page 690]Mr. Ushiba then handed me, unopened, a personal letter from the Prime Minister to the American Ambassador and asked that I deliver it to Mr. Grew. (Copy of Prince Konoye’s letter and copy of the Ambassador’s reply thereto are attached to this memorandum.) He suggested that I read it, as he had been instructed to tell me in the strictest confidence certain thoughts which his chief had in mind. The substance of Mr. Ushiba’s statement was as follows:
The Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 which had been handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had been a great disappointment to the Konoye Cabinet and the impression had been created inside the Cabinet that the road had been blocked to any hopes that the present conversations could be successfully concluded. Prince Konoye about a week ago had decided to resign in view of the internal situation in Japan. At that time it appeared inevitable that the succeeding Cabinet would be one of an extremist nature but Prince Konoye through intensive effort and “by a miracle” had in recent days been successful in ensuring that the government to succeed him would be composed of persons who did not subscribe to the principle that the conversations with the United States should be broken off.
No Japanese civilian statesman will undertake the task in which Prince Konoye has failed and consequently the succeeding Cabinet must be headed by an Army officer and will be composed primarily of military men. The new Cabinet may even appear to be extremist to persons unacquainted with the set-up of the various groups within the Japanese Army and other factions having influence in the Government. However, Prince Konoye entertains the hope that the Ambassador will stress to the Government of the United States that too great importance should not be given to the outward appearance of the new Cabinet. Prince Konoye also desires the Ambassador to understand that he would not have tendered his resignation at this moment without having convinced himself that the succeeding Prime Minister would be equally desirous of adjusting Japanese-American relations.
The Ambassador would readily appreciate, Mr. Ushiba added, that it would be impossible at the present time to form a civilian Cabinet with a liberal tinge: there is in Japan no civilian of adequate eminence to take over the office of Prime Minister, and even if such a civilian government should be formed, sufficient opposition to bring about its downfall would rapidly arise. Consequently the succeeding Cabinet must be composed primarily of military men by reason of the fact that a Cabinet of this complexion would represent the only element in Japan which at the present time would be capable of bringing about the downfall of the government. Mr. Ushiba emphasized that only as the result of the intensive and miraculous labors [Page 691] of Prince Konoye will the next government not be a military dictatorship bound to the most militaristic and drastic policy.
Mr. Ushiba concluded that Prince Konoye, although out of the government, will from the background continue to use his influence and to devote his best efforts to the achievement of the aims sought for in the conversations between the United States and Japan and he is hopeful that these conversations will be resumed very shortly.
I said that it was a great pity that Prince Konoye had felt it necessary to resign as the conversations in Washington were still in progress, the recent call of Mr. Wakasugi on the Under Secretary of State having had, in my opinion, good results toward further clarifying the position of the Japanese Government. Mr. Ushiba said that he hoped some day to be able to tell me of the events which had led to the Cabinet’s resignation, but that all that he could say for the present was that Prince Konoye had taken the decision in the confident belief that he could thus bring the conversations to a successful conclusion.
I said that it was a great pity that the Japanese Army did not have a great leader, such as Prince Yamagata, who could insure unity within the Army. Mr. Ushiba agreed. He said that General Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff, was being touted as such a leader, but that actually General Sugiyama was too pliant an instrument for his subordinates. In his opinion, General Umedzu, chief of the Kwantung Army, was the most influential man in the Army and would come forward when needed.
As Mr. Ushiba was about to leave, I asked that he convey to Prince Konoye my assurance that I would immediately see the Ambassador.