711.94/24069/11
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The Japanese Minister, Mr. Wakasugi, called to see me this afternoon at his request.
The Minister first of all stated that he had instructions from the Japanese Government to inform this Government that in its relations with the United States it desired to pursue the policy of the preceding Government and desired to continue without delay the conversations which had taken place between the two Governments with a view to finding a satisfactory agreement to both Governments.
[Page 693]The Minister stated that, in his belief, the new Japanese Government had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense public opinion to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that the conversations be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily.
The Minister further stated that he was instructed to inquire whether this Government had as yet any counterproposals to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Government on September 27.
I stated that I felt it necessary to speak openly and entirely frankly in reply to this message.
I said that the United States had made it fully clear during the past seven or eight months that it was glad to hold these conversations with the Japanese Government and that it desired to find the basis for an equitable agreement between the two Governments and that they desired to attain such a desirable objective as rapidly as possible. I said, however, that the Minister must recognize, as clearly as I did, that recent statements made by prominent officials of the Japanese Government and the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy were not conducive to the creation of that kind of atmosphere which would be conducive to the reaching of any satisfactory understanding between the two Governments for the furtherance of the conversations which the two Governments had in mind. I said that, when a responsible officer of the Japanese Navy publicly announced that the Japanese Navy was “itching to fight” with the United States Navy, the result was disastrous in its effects upon public opinion here and particularly in its effects upon the American Navy. I said that I had, to my regret, seen very few statements if any, by high authorities of Japan during the past two weeks which could be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese Government had any sincere desire to reach a friendly and satisfactory understanding with the United States as a result of the present conversations. Furthermore, I said, the whole tone of the Japanese press, as well as articles and editorials appearing in the Japanese press, during the same period could only be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese press was not interested in the furtherance of any satisfactory understanding between our two countries. I said I felt it necessary to make these facts very clear in as much as Mr. Wakasugi would undoubtedly agree that the situation to which I referred created an additional and serious obstacle to any satisfactory outcome of the conversations which have been in progress.
The Minister replied by saying that he had seen only an hour ago on the ticker a statement attributed to Secretary Knox which said war between Japan and the United States was inevitable and that, consequently, the United States Navy was on a 24-hour basis. I stated that I had not seen any statement by Secretary Knox indicating his belief [Page 694] that war was inevitable between our two countries, but that I had seen and read statements attributed to him which implied that the situation was such that some incident might occur and that, consequently, the United States Navy was on a 24-hour basis. I said that the Minister’s reference to these statements attributed to Secretary Knox clearly emphasized the truth of what I had just stated to him. If the Japanese Navy announced to the world that it was “itching for a fight” with the United States, he could hardly underestimate the effect which this would have upon the American Navy.
I said that I felt I must make it very clear that this Government would have to take into serious account statements and press campaigns of the kind to which I have referred in considering the utility of trying to find a successful outcome of the present conversations.
With regard to the second point he had mentioned by instruction of his Government I said that I was confident I had made it entirely plain in my first conversation with him after his return to the United States and that Secretary Hull, in our two succeeding conversations, had made it even more plain that the point of view of this Government had been set forth with complete clarity in communications handed to the Japanese Government on June 21, in the succeeding conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador, and in the statement delivered to the Japanese Embassy on October 2. I said that it did not seem to me that any counterproposals were called for from this Government. In our last conversation with the Secretary of State I said the latter had impressed upon the Minister the value from Japan’s own standpoint of the economic principles this Government had offered as one of the bases for an understanding between our two countries. The Minister had then said that he would transmit this to his Government and let us have their reply.
Mr. Wakasugi said that he had in fact transmitted to his Government the statements of Secretary Hull in the fullest detail, but that he had not yet heard from his Government with regard thereto.
I said that the Secretary of State and I had both said with regard to the Minister’s statement earlier made to me that the phraseology employed in the Japanese project of September 27 had perhaps given rise to misunderstandings and could undoubtedly be modified so as to make it clear that the Japanese point of view corresponded much more nearly to the position of this Government as set forth in its communications on June 21, that we would be glad to sit down with the Minister and consider any such changes in phraseology as he might be willing to suggest. I said that I was optimistic enough to believe that an effort of this kind might result in our ascertaining that the point of view of the Japanese Government was far more [Page 695] nearly identical to the point of view of the United States Government than would appear from the Japanese proposals of September 27.
The Minister said that he had not as yet received any detailed instruction from his Government, but that he was hopeful he would receive such detailed instructions in the immediate future. He then said that as far back as last April he had urged his Ambassador to try and find practical and concrete bases for agreement with the United States Government on all phases of the situation affecting the Pacific region. He said that certain American gentlemen who were unofficial and certain Japanese gentlemen who were unofficial, and who had (undoubtedly sincerely, as he put it) been endeavoring to further friendly relations between our two countries, had stepped into the picture and devised certain formulas and, he was afraid, had succeeded in obscuring the picture rather than clarifying it. He said he thought these efforts had resulted in a good deal of delay. He consequently wondered whether it would not be advantageous to make a fresh approach and, with full regard for the principles set forth by this Government, to undertake the development of new formulas. I said to the Minister that I thought this suggestion might be very helpful and, if he would prepare the new formulas which he had in mind, they would receive immediate consideration here. I said that everyone, from the Secretary of State down, had made it clear that we would be only too glad to contribute as much time and thought as might be necessary in order to further a satisfactory solution.
I stated that it seemed to me that from the standpoint of expediency and wisdom it might be well to see if we could not, first of all, reach an agreement on the economic principles involved. I wondered, I said, if the statesmen in the new Japanese cabinet understood as fully as he did what the practical advantages to Japan would be if it adopted the economic policies as set forth by Secretary Hull. Surely, I said, they must recognize, if they understood it, how much Japan would profit if, for example, British imperial preferences were abolished and Japan could trade with all of the Pacific nations, including Canada, Australia and New Zealand, on the same terms on which England could trade.
Mr. Wakasugi seemed to be very sincere in emphasizing his own belief in the desirability of Japanese wholehearted agreement in the nondiscrimination commercial policy proposed by this Government. I said that if we could reach an agreement on this front we could then pass with more encouragement to finding a satisfactory agreement with regard to the other principles advanced by the United States. I emphasized my belief that it would be wise to take up the more knotty problems after we had reached an agreement on what perhaps was the principle on which both Governments could agree now.
[Page 696]The Minister then went back to the thread-bare issue of the belief on the part of the Japanese people that their failure to possess certain natural resources under their own sovereignty made them the victims of economic aggression and economic encirclement at the will of other powers. I asked the Minister if he, or any other Japanese, could deny that, during the period of their modern history up to the year 1930, when Japan had a most friendly relationship with both Great Britain and the United States, through that relationship and because of the fact that their national policy was in general alignment with the policy of the two Governments I had mentioned, Japan had not rapidly become one of the great powers of the world and had enjoyed a period of great prosperity. The Minister said that of course that was the case. I said it seemed to me that Japan had never even thought of alleging economic encirclement until the sinister slogan brought forward by Hitler of “have and have not nations” had been dinned into the ears of the peoples of the world and until Japan herself had departed from her traditional friendships and had engaged upon new adventures and policies.
The Minister said that, while it was true that the younger generation in Japan had been responsive to the pernicious disease which was spreading over the world, Japan nevertheless was pursuing her own independent policies and was not to be regarded as being subservient in her national determinations of policy to either Germany or Italy. I said that this might be the case but that Japan nevertheless formally and officially and publicly had placed herself in the Axis camp and that no friend of Japan could deny that, so far as practical results were concerned and so far as the well-being and prosperity of the Japanese people were involved, Japan had not only gained nothing therefrom but had been gravely prejudiced.
Mr. Wakasugi made no denial of this. He remained quiet.
Mr. Wakasugi then changed the subject and said that in his last conversation with Secretary Hull the latter had inquired whether he had any contacts with Chinese friends here in this country. The Minister reminded me that he had replied that while he knew the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, he was not seeing him on account of the situation between his country and China. The Minister said that it seemed to him all important that every approach be undertaken in order to bring about a settlement of the conflict between China and Japan, since nothing would be more conducive than this to a settlement of all of the Pacific problems. He inquired whether—and he stated that this was to be regarded as entirely unofficial—I would be willing to meet with himself and the Chinese Ambassador or any other Chinese officials who might be able to speak for their country. He said that if any official effort was ever to be made by the President [Page 697] of the United States to further the reaching of a peaceful solution between Japan and China it must certainly first be ascertained whether the Government of Chiang Kai-Shek would be disposed to reach an agreement with Japan.
I replied that obviously the Minister did not expect me even personally and unofficially to give him any response to this suggestion without very careful consideration and the opportunity to study this possibility. I said that I would, however, give the matter the most careful thought and that I would be prepared to discuss with him in one of our next conversations what my individual views might be as to the feasibility of the suggestion he had made.
The Minister made no reference to any plans for departure on the part of the Ambassador and I did not question him with regard thereto. He did, however, specifically state that as soon as more detailed instructions were received from his Government the Ambassador would be taking part in the conversations between the two Governments.
The Minister said that as soon as these instructions were received he would immediately let me know and that he would urge his Government to expedite the sending of such instructions.