Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

711.94/2393

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] October 16 and 17, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, Japanese Minister, called by appointment on October sixteenth and seventeenth on the Under Secretary. By prearrangement, Mr. Welles brought him to my office for a conversation which lasted on each occasion for some two hours. The conversation consisted mainly of a rehash of conversations I have had from time to time with Ambassador Nomura. There were elaborations here and there with respect to certain phases of the two documents which had been exchanged between the Ambassador and myself representing our respective Governments. Our document of June twenty-first and an elaboration of it on October second had both been given to the Japanese Ambassador in an informal way with the definite understanding that no stage of negotiations had been reached and that these were really exploratory oral conversations reduced to writing. The Minister referred to the more recent communications from his Government, especially the ones received in September, and to the communication sent to this Government at the time the Prime Minister sent his personal message to the President requesting a meeting between the two to discuss American-Japanese relations.

The Minister sought to keep in harmony with his talks with Under Secretary Welles some days ago, but it was apparent that he was hedging more or less on these phases, especially on the three principal points of difference relating to bringing troops out of China, to applying a non-discrimination commercial policy to the entire Pacific area and to further clarification of the Japanese attitude towards the Tripartite Pact as it might relate to the relations between Japan and the United States.

I emphasized that the proposed peaceful settlement should apply to the entire Pacific area and not to just a part of it, just as United States commercial policy based on the principle of equality and nondiscrimination applies to the entire world, and just as similar utterances apply to the entire world alike, including Japan. I then referred to the different points in Japanese statements to us at the time of and since the communication which accompanied the Prime Minister’s communication to the President requesting a meeting wherein the Japanese were narrowing both the letter and the spirit of their attitude, as clearly expressed to me from March until July by Ambassador Nomura. This narrowing attitude related to the range of the Pacific area to be included in a settlement, to the scope and breadth of the formula prescribing commercial policy based on the rule of non-discrimination, to their interpretation of the application of the Tripartite Pact as it relates to the United States, and to the breadth and spirit and implications of Ambassador Nomura’s many conversations with respect to bringing troops out of China, and to the limitation of Japanese commitments against conquest to the north and south only instead of a broad basic commitment on principles and programs for a satisfactory peaceful settlement pertaining to the entire Pacific area.

The effect of the Minister’s numerous attempts at interpretation of the foregoing and of their application did not indicate progress—certainly not progress as compared with the attitude existing with respect to these questions, as set forth by Ambassador Nomura prior to the disruption of our conversations resulting from the occupation by Japan of Indochina.

The Minister spent much time attempting an unsatisfactory interpretation of the Tripartite Pact as it might affect us, by urging that it was a peace instrument and very slightly implying that, therefore, it was not aimed at us. I reminded him that for months it was proclaimed as intended principally to keep this country out of war with Germany and that it was a joint movement on the part of Japan and Germany to this end. It was, therefore, no easy matter for us to convince this country that it was a harmless document; that Japan herself must say and do the things necessary to disabuse the public mind in this country of the very unfriendly implication of the Tripartite Pact. There the matter rested despite the Minister’s labored effort to give it a different interpretation.

The Minister strove for some time to show the necessity for Japanese troops being retained in China. I brought up the many facts and circumstances showing the great benefit it would be to Japan to get her troops out and mark off some temporary losses in one way or another and begin the work of restoring friendship and trade between the two countries under the broad principles of friendly international relations which underlie the peaceful settlement proposals of the United States. I reminded the Minister that the Japanese invasion has resulted in the establishment of many monopolies in China and many special privileges and benefits in various ways, which probably accounts for the main desire of Japan to keep troops in China, that Japan can never regain the friendship of China while she keeps troops there, that a settlement of the Chinese situation necessarily dovetails into the formula which this Government has suggested for a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, and that the Chinese phase must be included in any such wide settlement. We went over many of the phases that had been discussed between Ambassador Nomura and myself with respect to bringing troops out of China and the Chinese situation generally.

On the question of a broad basic liberal commercial policy such as this Government stands for and has proposed to Japan along with all other nations, the Minister and I discussed numerous phases, pro and con, without anything especially new being brought out, except that I emphasized the earnest desire of this Government for such a provision to be included in any Pacific area settlement by pointing to our recent trade agreement with the Argentine,^32a which gives Japan and all other countries equal access with ourselves to the markets there, and also to the numerous discussions this Government is having with the British and the British Dominions with respect to the removal of empire preferences and other discriminations, including the narrow policy of bilateral trade, and suggested strongly that Japan was more interested in this course than almost any nation, and yet she was opposing the application of the policy of non-discrimination in the Pacific. The Minister finally said that he was not disagreeing and that he would communicate at once with his Government to see if it would not accept this broad proposal. I said that was good and asked him to let me know when he hears from his Government. The upshot of our exploratory conversations left us with the view that the new Japanese Government³³ would have to speak next and before we had further serious conversations with their representatives here. We also derived the definite impression that there were no present signs of the Japanese Government coming back anywhere near the position it occupied in our exploratory conversations when they were temporarily abandoned at the time Japan went into Indochina. We are not very expectant in this line so far as future conversations are concerned, but we shall give them a full opportunity to say what they may have in mind to say.

C[ordell] H[ull]

1. Signed at Buenos Aires, October 14, 1941; Department of State, Bulletin, October 18, 1941, supp. (vol. v, No. 121A).
33. The Government headed by Prince Konoye resigned October 16, 1941; a new Government was formed under General Hideki [or Eiki] Tojo as Prime Minister, with Shigenori Togo as Minister for Foreign Affairs, on October 18.