Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II

11.94/24065/11

Memorandum of a Conversation

[Washington,] October 9, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called on the Japanese Ambassador³⁰ conformably with an arrangement made earlier in the day at the suggestion of the Secretary in response to questions which had been raised by the Japanese Ambassador.

The Japanese opened the conversation by stating that they desired to inquire, as they had been instructed by the Japanese Government to do, wherein and on what points the Japanese proposals made on September 25 (a redraft of our document given the Japanese on June 21) were objectionable, unsatisfactory or unacceptable to this Government. They desired to go over the proposals point by point.

Following this introduction and again later in the conversation, we stated that in coming to the Japanese Embassy today we had expected that they would wish to go over our October 2 document in order that we might be able to clarify and elaborate any points in that document which were not entirely clear to them. We added that in the document of October 2 it was pointed out that we believed that renewed consideration of the fundamental principles long advocated by this Government might prove helpful in our effort to find a meeting of minds on essential questions. We remarked that we were still of that belief and that we felt the October 2 document along with previous documents and statements by officers of the American Government should give the Japanese Government a clear outline of our thoughts. There were given, we said, in the document of October 2, some examples of instances wherein we felt the Japanese proposals and explanations of September 6 and subsequent dates served to narrow and to restrict the broad-gauge principles we had been discussing and the general assurances we had received from the Japanese Government.

The Japanese stated that the Prime Minister had accepted “in principle” the four fundamental principles which had been enumerated on several occasions by the Secretary. (The Japanese Ambassador brought out this point several times during the conversation.) They maintained that we were therefore in agreement on principles, and that the Japanese Government accepted those principles “in principle”; but that it was desirable to determine wherein the American Government found objection to the Japanese proposals in order that the Japanese Government could consider the question of meeting, if possible, the desires of the American Government.

This same approach to the problem was repeated by the Japanese numerous times throughout the conversation lasting almost two hours. On each occasion we endeavored in reply to point out the general desirability of laying a firm foundation for any agreement or meeting between heads of state by trying to reach a mutual understanding of what each Government has in mind as relating not only to fundamental principles and general assurances but also as to our concepts of the program and policies to be followed in the practical application of those principles and assurances. We tried in our discussion in so far as possible to point to the October 2 document as embodying the thoughts of our Government, and wherever possible we employed the language of that document. We suggested that it might be desirable from the viewpoint of the Japanese Government for that Government itself to go over its recent proposals in the light of the fundamental principles referred to and the general assurances already given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government. We brought out the desire of our Government to seek a broad general settlement of Pacific problems. On several occasions as opportunity arose in the conversation we referred to previous discussions which we had had, documents which we had exchanged with the Japanese and points which we had made in the informal exploratory conversations. We stated that we believed the Japanese Government, by reviewing those documents, statements and conversations would be able clearly to understand and to visualize the position of this Government. We pointed out that the Secretary had informed the Japanese Ambassador that the position of this Government in regard to the fundamental principles in its relations with other nations was clearly portrayed in the record of those relations, and that we had not from the first held anything back, but had placed our position squarely on those principles.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that when he had talked with the President some weeks ago he (the Ambassador) had expressed his understanding that there were outstanding three points of difference between the American and Japanese Governments as developed in the informal conversations. Those points were, the Ambassador said, enumerated by him to the President and the Secretary as: (1) The question of the Tripartite Pact and the inalienable right of self-defense; (2) the question of the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial affairs; and (3) the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. The Ambassador said that he had expressed his own personal opinion to the President to the effect that only one of those questions would probably present especial difficulty. He went on to say that he believed that Prince Konoye would be able to present some formula in a meeting with the President which would solve the difficult question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. He suggested indirectly that the Prime Minister would find it most difficult to evolve such a formula prior to such a meeting. The Ambassador went on to say that the Secretary of State had pointed out at the time of the meeting with the President that in addition to the three questions which Ambassador Nomura had enumerated there were certain problems of phraseology and the question of bringing the document (our draft of June 21) up to date.

We pointed out to the Japanese that following the interruption of the conversations in July there had developed certain conditions and situations in the world with respect to areas north of Japan as well as French Indochina and other areas and that therefore certain new questions had in fact arisen. We expressed the belief, however, that when the Secretary had mentioned the desirability of bringing the document up to date and of making certain changes in phraseology, the Secretary merely had in mind, in addition to these new situations which had arisen, such changes as we had suggested on September 10 when we gave them a redraft of Section V of the proposed understanding. This redraft, we believed, served to broaden the purport of the document and was to the advantage of Japan. We pointed out that in our belief there had been no substantial change in the attitude of this Government toward questions which had been tentatively agreed upon in the draft of June 21.

The Ambassador then stated that he understood from what we had said that in addition to the three questions which remained outstanding there had arisen the question of Siberia and the Japanese attitude toward Russia and Japanese activities in Indochina.

We pointed out that there was also the more general and fundamental question of peace in the entire Pacific area. We referred again to the initial reaction of the Secretary upon receiving the Japanese proposals of September 6 and added that the more we studied those proposals and subsequent explanations which we had received, the stronger our feeling became that those proposals and subsequent explanations narrowed and restricted the broad-gauge principles and general assurances which we had had in mind.

The Ambassador digressed for a moment and spoke of the attitude of Japan toward the Tripartite Pact. He said that the Japanese Government fundamentally desires peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government has indicated its willingness to give a commitment that it will independently interpret the obligations of the Tripartite Pact, and the Ambassador suggested that as the Japanese Government has this fundamental desire for peace in the Pacific the implication in that commitment is clear.

The Japanese, as they did several times during the conversation, pointed out the difficult position in which the Japanese Government will be placed, if it were to meet the position of the American Government on the outstanding questions and then the United States were to raise new questions. They pointed out on several occasions that the principles which we had outlined were “inherently good”, as were the Ten Commandments and other moral precepts, the soundness of which could not be controverted; but that, as a matter of practicality, there were occasions when it was necessary to discuss the question of adjustments in the practical application of those principles to concrete problems.

The Ambassador referred to the Versailles conference, which he said he had attended, and to the proposal of fourteen points by President Wilson, which proposal, he said, led to discussions lasting a half a year. The Ambassador expressed the opinion that there were no insurmountable difficulties in the present situation if both sides were of a mind to overcome differences. He added that he himself had noted some contradictions of “the four principles” in the Japanese proposals of September 6 and inquired whether if a reexamination of those proposals were made, there would possibly arise new points requiring further discussion. He emphasized the necessity of informing Tokyo exactly of the position of this Government.

Mentioning that the Japanese public had suffered the sacrifices of four years of war, the Ambassador said that his Government would necessarily have to present to the Japanese people some reward for that sacrifice or some attractive alternative gain. We replied that, as we had often told the Japanese, our experience led us to believe that Japan stood to gain more by following a progressive and constructive program of peace in the entire Pacific than by any other course. We mentioned that our desire was to build for future stability. We said that we had sought to avoid being placed in a position of possible criticism for having tried to tell the Japanese Government what it must do or must not do.

We agreed that the procedure suggested by the Japanese of taking each question point by point was possibly one way of handling the situation. We pointed out, however, that just as the Japanese had emphasized difficult questions of domestic politics we also were faced with similarly difficult questions in this country. We mentioned that the Japanese had themselves suggested the desirability of avoiding becoming lost in a maze of details; and spoke of the fact that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed Ambassador Grew that he was studying the October 2 document and would later make observations on that document. We pointed out that, on the other hand, another way of approaching this problem, which might serve to avoid becoming lost in a maze of details and minutiae and to get back to fundamental principles, might be to take the October 2 document and to study it in the light of other statements which this Government had made and conversations which the Secretary has had with the Ambassador. We pointed out again the desire of this Government to accomplish a broad-gauge general settlement of Pacific problems based upon the fundamental question of peace in the Pacific.

The Ambassador mentioned that he had received from his Government certain instructions in regard to the June 21 draft which we had given him but that he had been unable to deliver a document based on those instructions owing to the interruption in the conversations. The Ambassador again expressed a desire to obtain concrete information of the views of this Government in regard to outstanding questions and differences. We once more went over the position of this Government as expressed in the October 2 document and referred to previous exchanges and conversations in which the views of the American Government had, we believed, been extensively set forth.

In concluding the conversation the Japanese Ambassador suggested in Japanese to members of his staff that a report should be sent to Tokyo stating that the American Government had no concrete counterproposal to make and that it would seem that the Japanese Government could either redraft its proposals or could prepare a new document on the basis of additional consideration of the fundamental principles which we had discussed.

The Japanese seemed disappointed that we had avoided taking up point by point their proposals of September 6 or the redraft of the proposed agreement which was given Ambassador Grew on September 25. The Japanese, however, expressed their appreciation of our discussion and indicated that they now understood more clearly what the American Government had in mind in its document of October 2 and its suggestion that “renewed consideration” of fundamental principles might be helpful. We expressed our readiness to meet the Ambassador and his associates at any time and to be helpful in any way that we could.

Throughout the foregoing conversation we brought out our views in regard to basic principles and policies, including those relating to the application of the principle of equality of opportunity throughout the Pacific area and to the stationing of troops of one country in the territory of another country.

[Max W.] Schmidt

30. Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Okumura, Mr. Matsudaira, and Mr. Obata were also present.