711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon.
The Minister began by saying that although he had given careful study to the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 he had encountered some difficulty in seizing the point of the memorandum. He had, however, come to the conclusion that the three questions concerning which the American and Japanese Governments held divergent views were as follows: (1) the maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China, (2) the respective attitude of the United States and Japan in regard to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China. The Minister added that on October 3 he had instructed the Japanese [Page 678] Ambassador in Washington to ask the Secretary whether the United States Government would set forth in precise terms the obligations which the United States Government wished the Japanese Government to undertake with reference to the three questions mentioned above. Having heard nothing from the Japanese Ambassador, he had again on October 6 instructed Admiral Nomura to approach the Secretary in the above sense. On October 9 the Japanese Ambassador had telegraphed the Foreign Minister that he had seen the Secretary on that date but that the Ambassador was unable to provide the information which had been requested by the Foreign Minister. Admiral Toyoda added that a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received, would have measurably accelerated the present conversations. The Foreign Minister had today sent further instructions to Admiral Nomura to continue his efforts to obtain the desired information, but at the same time, in order to prevent further delay, he was requesting that I ask my Government to provide the desired information in reply to the following statement:
The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United States with reference to certain questions proposals which are apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government which would be satisfactory to the American Government?
At this point in the conversation I took occasion to reply to the criticism in the Japanese press concerning the absence of progress in the present conversations, by stressing to Admiral Toyoda that the American Government in the determination and execution of its policy continuously considers and gives due worth to the development and state of American public opinion. Admiral Toyoda remarked that public opinion even in Japan could not be disregarded but that it would be a comparatively easy matter to control public opinion in this country provided, as a result of the suggested meeting between Prince Konoye and the President, some agreement were arrived at. The Minister gave me his assurances that the Japanese Government would find it possible to make commitments of a far-reaching character at such a meeting but that under present conditions the full extent of the undertakings which the Japanese Government was willing to assume could not be set forth prior to the meeting. He reiterated his concern lest the Government be unable to control extremist groups in Japan if matters remain in their present undetermined conditions.
The Minister having at the beginning of the conversation expressed his appreciation of the message which I had sent him yesterday [Page 679] concerning the reported plan to send additional Japanese forces into French Indochina, I reverted to this point and strongly emphasized to him that the despatch of Japanese reinforcements to Indochina at this juncture while the conversations were in progress between our two Governments would create a very delicate situation and in my opinion could not but seriously and adversely affect these conversations. I told the Foreign Minister that the arrival of additional Japanese forces in Indochina at this time, in the light of recent activities of the Japanese authorities in Indochina to which I had already drawn his attention, such as threats to take over the telegraph, post, and customs, and the demands for additional air bases, would inevitably give rise to the most serious suspicions in regard to Japan’s aims in respect of French Indochina. The Minister replied that he was giving most careful study to my private and informal message on the subject and had already conferred with the Minister of War and hoped to be able to give me a reply in a few days. He added that he had also discussed with the War Minister the activities of the Japanese authorities in Indochina to which I had drawn his attention and had asked the Minister to take immediate steps to remedy the situation.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs then told me that since he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in the event that it was decided to send the official in question to Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the United States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would transmit his inquiry to my Government.
In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of expediting the progress of the conversations.