711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, called on me this afternoon, at his request, and asked if I had read the full text of the Department’s memorandum of October 2 which he had lent us for perusal. I replied in the affirmative. Mr. Terasaki then asked if I would tell him in an entirely personal way and off the record my impressions of the memorandum. I said that I thought the memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance and that it indicated a clear desire on the part of our Government to make progress in the conversations.
Mr. Terasaki then asked what particular points impressed me in connection with the desires of the United States for action by Japan in order to reach a mutual agreement. I replied that without having the actual document before me I could not undertake to cover all the points presented, but that personally and off the record I might say that three of the points which had particularly caught my eye were (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) application to the entire area of the Pacific of certain of the Japanese assurances which appeared to be limited to the southwestern Pacific and (3) the special privileges claimed by Japan as a result of her geographical propinquity to China. In connection with the third point mentioned above I took the occasion to say that many prominent Japanese were comparing our Monroe Doctrine and our relationship to the countries of Latin America with Japan’s position in the Far East and her relationship with the neighboring countries, and I wished to say that in my opinion there was no more comparison between these two situations than between black and white. Mr. Terasaki said that he was obliged to disagree with me and we did not pursue that subject.
Mr. Terasaki then pointed out that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina must necessarily take time as it could not physically be done all at once and he wanted to know my opinion as to whether our Government intended to insist on the actual departure of all Japanese troops from China and Indochina before the proposed meeting of the President and the Prime Minister could be held and in this connection he asked my interpretation of the Department’s phrase “manifest intention”. I replied that I was not in a position to interpret the phrase under reference except to say that in my personal opinion the Department desired concrete evidence that these troops would be withdrawn. In the conversations it had developed that it was the desire of the Japanese Government to leave troops for a stated period in North China, Mongolia and possibly other [Page 667] areas and I pointed out to Mr. Terasaki the unfortunate experiences which we had met in times past through the failure of various Japanese Governments to carry out assurances given us in apparent good faith. It therefore seemed to me obvious and reasonable that my Government should seek concrete evidence of the Japanese Government’s “manifest intention”, and this would be my personal, off the record interpretation of the phrase.
I then pointed out to Mr. Terasaki that I had no authority from my Government to interpret the memorandum of October 2 and as I had said to the Foreign Minister in a previous conversation, in connection with his suggestion that the conversations be transferred from Washington to Tokyo, it was Mr. Hull’s wish, in view of the active interest of the President in these conversations, that they continue to be held in Washington although parallel conversations might be held concurrently in Tokyo. Mr. Terasaki at first seemed a little surprised by this statement but I reiterated that I had already clearly conveyed this fact to Admiral Toyoda. I therefore suggested that if the Japanese Government was still uncertain of the meaning of any statements contained in the memorandum of October 2 it might be well for Admiral Nomura to seek an interview with Mr. Hull and to put these questions to him.
In the course of the conversation reference was made by Mr. Terasaki to our Government’s suggestion that the Japanese Government might helpfully consider the advantage of making a public declaration with regard to its expressed intention to withdraw its troops from China and Indochina so that it was evident that this point had been clearly understood but this particular point was not pursued in our conversation.
At the end of our talk it was once more made clear both by Mr. Terasaki and myself that our conversation had been entirely personal and off the record.