711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)
I called this morning on Mr. Terasaki at his request.
Mr. Terasaki said that he was very anxious to obtain “off the record” my impressions of the memorandum handed by the Secretary of State to Admiral Nomura on October 2. I said that the Ambassador told me that Mr. Terasaki had already called on the Ambassador and had received the latter’s private and informal observations on the memorandum, and that I did not see that I was in a [Page 668] position to add anything. Mr. Terasaki then briefly summarized his conversation of last night with the Ambassador, laying special emphasis on the Ambassador’s observations that, in our view, the memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance. He went on to say that he was especially interested in that portion of the memorandum which makes mention of the need for Japan’s manifesting evidence of intention to withdraw its forces from Indochina and China. He pointed out that the paragraph under reference might be open to the interpretation that the American Government expected that Japan should withdraw its forces from the areas mentioned before the proposed meeting of the heads of Government could be held. After remarking that possibly the passage which he had in mind was open to such interpretation, I said that there was obviously another one. The Japanese military forces in Indochina were acting as though they were in permanent occupation of French Indochina and had converted that area into a Japanese colony. It stood to reason that the American Government would hesitate to make the slightest move toward agreeing to the opening of formal negotiations so long as the actions of the Japanese forces in Indochina constitute a complete negation of the spirit and letter of the undertakings which the Japanese Government expresses willingness to assume.
Mr. Terasaki said that he was not aware of the situation in French Indochina to which I referred. I told him that it was extremely important that he should bring himself completely up to date on recent developments, and I suggested that he confer with the Director of the South Seas Bureau. I referred to the actions of the Japanese military forces, such as the arrests of French and Chinese nationals, seizure of private property, seizure of air fields and military barracks, threats to seize the Customs, etc. I expressed the belief that he would agree, in view of the extremely difficult position created in Indochina by the Japanese forces, that there was sound reason for assuming that the American Government would not want to have the conversations progress at this time.
In reply to Mr. Terasaki’s question whether the Japanese formula with regard to the application of the principle of equality of treatment in the southwestern Pacific constituted a serious obstacle, I said that it was my opinion, based on what he had said to me on various occasions, that the Japanese formula under reference was not designed to be taken as an expression of intention on the part of the Japanese Government to confine the application of the principle of equality of opportunity to the southwestern Pacific—that it was intended as an affirmation of a positive intention with regard to an area in part of which the Japanese Government now exercise de facto control, namely, French Indochina, but that it was not intended by [Page 669] implication to exclude the application of the principle from other areas under which the Japanese exercised control. Mr. Terasaki said that that was precisely the case, and that it was evident that the intentions of the Japanese Government had not been clearly expressed. He thought also that the Japanese explanation with regard to equality of opportunity in China, particularly the reference to conditions created by geographical propinquity, were open to implications the giving of which the Japanese Government had especially desired to avoid.
Mr. Terasaki reverted to the reference in the October 2 memorandum to the question of withdrawal of troops from China. He said that it was impossible for Japan to manifest evidence, by withdrawing its troops from China, of intention to effect such withdrawal, until agreement had been reached between Japan and China. How then was it possible for Japan to meet this requirement of the American Government? I said that I could not pretend to interpret the passage under reference, but there could be several ways in which the Japanese Government could demonstrate the sincerity of its desire to evacuate China. It might be possible, for example, to provide a time schedule of withdrawal of troops; or, again, the Japanese Government might indicate willingness to consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese Government, possibly with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a satisfactory substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China for the specific purpose of maintaining law and order.
Mr. Terasaki was summoned at this point by the Foreign Minister, and in bringing our conversation to an end he expressed his appreciation for my courtesy in calling on him this morning and giving him the benefit of my views.