711.94/2624
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
When I called upon the Foreign Minister at his request this morning he first informed me that the text of the memorandum handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2 by the Secretary of State had been received and was being carefully studied. In reply to the Minister’s question whether I could make any comments on the memorandum I said that until I had had an opportunity to study the full text, the Embassy having received a resume only, I would prefer to make no observations.
Admiral Toyoda then told me that he was informed of my private meeting with the Prime Minister on September 6 and was aware that I had communicated to President Roosevelt through the Secretary of State, as a “personal and private message”, the substance of Prince [Page 664] Konoye’s statements to me at that meeting. The Foreign Minister said he wanted me clearly to understand that he harbored no objection to my contact with Prince Konoye; rather he was desirous that by such meetings between the Prime Minister and myself a helpful exchange of views might be effected. Admiral Toyoda stated that the private records of the Prime Minister with regard to the September 6 meeting revealed that, although Prince Konoye had “in principle” accepted the four points which the Secretary of State had continuously stressed, the Prime Minister had indicated that some adjustment would be required in the matter of applying the four points to actual conditions. However, a statement that the Prime Minister “fully subscribed” to the four points was contained in the memorandum given to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2. Admiral Nomura had therefore, in view of this disparity in the records, been instructed to inform the Secretary of State that the phrase “in principle” should replace the words “fully subscribed” in attributing to the Prime Minister the statement, which had been made privately.
The Foreign Minister declared that the statements made to me by the Prime Minister on September 6 were of a purely private and informal nature and were intended merely to acquaint me with the personal views of an individual who held an important position in the moulding of the decisions and policies of the Government of Japan. The thought of authorizing me to communicate the substance of his observations as a personal message to the President had only occurred to Prince Konoye during the course of our meeting. Accordingly there had been no expectation, said Admiral Toyoda, that there would be incorporated into a public document, which had to be circulated among various Japanese Government officials who had no knowledge of my meeting with Prince Konoye, any statement made to me by the Prime Minister under these circumstances. Thus, since an attribution of views to the Prime Minister had appeared in an official document of the United States Government, it had been deemed necessary, in view of the absence of previous comparison between the Foreign Minister and myself of notes relating to what might have been stated by Prince Konoye at the time of his meeting with me on September 6, to clarify the Japanese record of the Prime Minister’s statement. (There is no doubt whatsoever that the observations of the Prime Minister, which were made in Japanese and translated by Dooman to me, were correctly and accurately set forth in my telegram No. 1413, September 6, 10 p.m.,28 reporting my meeting with Prince Konoye. The Prime Minister doubtless is referring to his remark made subsequently that “he is convinced that divergences of view can be satisfactorily met” and [Page 665] that he “realizes that certain points may require elucidation and precision”.)
Admiral Toyoda stated at this point that he hoped to be able to comment following the completion of his examination of the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2, and in the meantime he felt that it would be helpful if discussion of items arising from what he termed “technical procedure” could be avoided. He had in mind such differences of understanding as that relating to Prince Konoye’s statement of September 6, and to certain material delivered to the Department by the Japanese Ambassador which either had no official standing or was incomplete as in the case of the Ambassador’s draft statement of September 4. Admiral Toyoda believed that any efforts to clear up details of this character arising out of questions of technical procedure would only tend to complicate the discussions, but once some real progress had been made he would be prepared to take up such questions. The Foreign Minister said that in so far as the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 was concerned, he would like to make one brief comment, namely, that it was his impression that the Government of the United States wished the Japanese Government to revert at once and unqualifiedly to the status quo which prevailed four years ago. Since that time Japan had been involved in warfare on a large-scale demanding hardships and sacrifices of the people of Japan who had been led to support such trials as a patriotic duty. The Japanese Government was willing and prepared to return to the situation prevailing four years ago but it was essential that the Government of the United States should understand that to undo virtually at a moment’s notice the work of the past four years is an undertaking of tremendous scope and one entailing basic adjustments.
Admiral Toyoda then inquired whether unofficially and privately I felt able to offer an opinion on the position of the United States Government as outlined in the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2. In reply I told him that it was the desire of the United States Government to establish conditions in the Far East on a sure and enduring foundation and that no lasting arrangements could be made except on such a basis. I told him that my personal reaction to the Secretary’s memorandum of October 2 was that the American Government was endeavoring to assure itself that Japan would genuinely and fully observe those principles without which no sure basis for a lasting peace in the Pacific area could be achieved.